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RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
DURING
THE LAST HALF CENTURY



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BY

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It is with some hesitation that I gave my consent to the publication of these lectures. It is extremely difficult to handle such a vast subject in so short a space, and consequently some of the questions did not receive the attention they deserve. However, the other courses, given at the Institute of Politics, will help considerably to elucidate various doubtful problems.

I take this opportunity to express my feelings of deep gratitude to President H. A. Garfield and the Institute of Politics for their great kindness and hospitality.

S. A. K.

August 25, 1921.

Williamstown, Massachusetts.

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CHAPTER I.

FRANCE.

I.

I BEGAN the preparation of my lectures for the Institute of Politics with some apprehension. In the first place I felt that we were too far from the most valuable sources of information, namely the European archives of the foreign offices, especially the Russian Foreign Office, that still contain untold historical treasures.

Another difficulty that confronted me is the fact that the events of the last half-century are too recent, and it is very difficult to remain absolutely impartial. Yet the contemporary has one great asset, his personal observations, and these are particularly valuable in portraying personal characteristics.

Russia's rôle during these last decades has been very important. Little can be understood of the modern tangle of European affairs if one does not know or consider Russia's foreign relations.

In analyzing the latter one must keep in mind not only the social forces that move nations to certain ends

and achieve national aims, but also the rôle played by the various personalities, the statesmen at the helm of their countries. It is possible that a time will come when democracies and public opinion will direct foreign affairs, as they govern and influence other domains of public life, but with this great modern problem I will deal separately later on. At present one must acknowledge that very much still depends on personalities; on the character, the ideals and very often even on the moods and proclivities of foreign secretaries, heads of states or ambassadors.

In Russia and eastern Europe this was very much the case up to the time of the armistice of 1918, and we cannot yet be sure that this state of affairs has vanished forever. Take as an example the rôle which the Russian Tsars played in shaping the fate of their country! How much Russia's foreign policy depended on the likes and dislikes of her Emperors! We might instance the strong feelings of dislike of Alexander III towards Republican France, Bismarck's arrogance or the tactlessness of Alexander of Bulgaria; the stubborn lack of understanding of Japan by Nicholas II, his alarming weakness when dealing with the Kaiser, which led first to the Björkö Treaty in direct contradiction to the French Alliance and later to the Great War; or again his treacherous demeanor toward the Duma, when he left his ministers to disentangle the snarled thread of his policy, without his moral support. The same indictment must be brought against the ministers of foreign affairs. In a large measure Russia's fate depended on their personalities. Take for example Prince Lobanoff and Count Muraviev with

their limited intellects and their crass ignorance in some matters (especially the Far East); or Count Lamsdorff, the typical bureaucrat, with a splendid French style and no knowledge of Russia; the honest but weak-minded Iswolsky, who suffered much from constant intrigue and was no match for foreign diplomats; and finally the erratic and capricious Sazonoff, acting often as a spoiled child, with no great intellect, but with clear nationalistic purposes, a seeming liberal among reactionaries only because he was so very honest and simple.

I do not want to convey the impression that these men were not fitted for their office merely because they were the devoted servants of dying autocracy. We know quite well that the Parliamentary régime *ipso facto* does not necessarily improve matters and that the western countries cannot always boast of having intellects of the highest order directing their foreign affairs. My purpose is simply to point out how much Russia's fate did depend on the men in power from the Tsars downward.

In analyzing the history of the foreign relations of Russia I met with another difficulty well known to all students of history, from what date to start the narrative. The history of a nation being a continuous evolutionary process, all periods are equally important and it is hard to make up one's mind to begin with certain events. Moreover, the history of Russia in the nineteenth century does not have clearly defined periods, dividing the epochs of her social and political development.

After some hesitation, I chose for a starting point

the events of the Berlin Congress of 1878, because of their disastrous influence on the subsequent foreign relations of Russia. She entered the following period deeply disappointed and hurt by the treatment accorded her at the Berlin Congress. After having achieved great military victories, notwithstanding the evident shortcomings of her army organization, after having lost many thousands of lives of her citizens in order to liberate her Slav brothers in the Balkans from the bloody rule of the unspeakable Turk, after having herself lived through a period of national uplift, when the Slavophile movement had set so many Russian hearts aglow for the Slav cause, she was now forcibly thwarted in her national aims, most of her ideals were shattered and she was thoroughly disillusioned at home and abroad. Europe did her utmost to muzzle the Russian bear, and foremost among its enemies stood, not vanquished Turkey, but glorious and self-reliant England, led by Beaconsfield, the great comedian. No wonder Russia came out of the Berlin Congress discouraged and dissatisfied, cherishing ill feelings toward the other great powers, England in particular.

It seemed to many Russians at the time that their country had absolutely failed in her entire foreign policy. And this feeling of disappointment was coupled with the realization that Russia's own house was badly out of order. All through the '70's social dissatisfaction was constantly gaining in strength, the government unfortunately not knowing how to meet it otherwise than by coercion and repression. The climax came with the assassination of the Tsar in 1881.

His son and successor, Alexander III, for these obvi-

ous reasons preferred for Russia a position of isolation, cleverly called by a Russian historian the "cold storage theory." After the emancipation of her serfs Russia had tried an expansive and ambitious foreign policy, fostering the Pan-Slav movement, interfering in western affairs, spreading her influence into central Asia, and so forth, and had conspicuously failed. Now, it was thought, Russian autocracy ought to concentrate all its attention on internal affairs, dealing exclusively with the social discontent and leaving Europe to its own fate.

Yet the plan of Alexander III to keep Russia entirely out of European affairs could never have been carried through systematically; Russia could not extricate herself, however much she tried. There were too many European interests at stake, and further, the Balkan trouble was not settled, but on the contrary, the Berlin decisions were bound to call forth new complications; we know only too well that the Balkans remained the storm center of Europe till 1914. Further, Russia could not withdraw her claims concerning the Straits of the Bosphorus. Finally, even if Russia could have succeeded in cutting off her interests westward, the other countries had no intention of leaving her unmolested. There was first the restless Bismarck, his watchful eye constantly on his eastern neighbor; then came France seeking Russia's friendship and willing to pay millions to secure it; and lastly there was the steadily increasing enmity of England, suspicious of Russia's activities in central Asia. All this tended to thwart Alexander's plans for keeping out of trouble.

II.

The relations of Russia towards France during the first years of Alexander's reign were cool, though not inimical. Alexander III did not like the French Republic, he did not approve of her republican institutions, he hated her growing radicalism and socialistic influences, and considered republicanism the chief source of her political weakness and instability. The character of the French people was not to his taste. The past history of France's relations towards Russia also was not conducive to great friendship; for many years France had been opposing Russia in various ways. She was Russia's enemy in the Crimean War, she openly supported the Polish aspirations for independence, she was not on Russia's side at Berlin in 1878, and finally there existed certain political reasons for dissatisfaction, for Alexander looked askance at the French revolutionary sympathies abroad and at the growth of her socialism at home.

Thus the first years of this reign were a period of aloofness between the two countries and of ill-disguised suspicions on the part of the Tsar. And in that atmosphere of suspicions and personal dislikes, the least incident was bound to be magnified into enormous proportions. For instance, the rather insignificant fact of the recall of the French ambassador, General Appert, from St. Petersburg for purely personal reasons, seemed to Alexander an insult. He liked Appert, who was a military man of very conservative views, whose wife was of Danish extraction and intimate with

the Empress, herself from Denmark. The Tsar became so infuriated at this action on the part of France that he recalled his own ambassador, Mohrenheim, from Paris and informed the French that he did not want any ambassador from them at all. The diplomatic representation of both countries remained for a long time in the hands of secondary *chargés d'affaires*, and very naturally Germany used this incident to further her own purposes. Bismarck saw with joy how these two countries were drifting apart, thus greatly diminishing the chances of any French aggressiveness against Germany.

The ill feeling of Alexander III was increased at this time by two other events: first, by the publishing in France of the law which exiled the Royal princes and pretenders, Alexander considering it an unwarranted blow to his beloved monarchical principles; second, by the cases of the two prominent Russian revolutionaries, Hartmann and Kropotkine. They were both implicated in plots to assassinate his father, Alexander II, and had fled to France, where they found refuge, the French government not being willing to extradite them to Russia notwithstanding the insistence of the Russian authorities. Kropotkine was first convicted of murder by the French courts, but later pardoned by the French, and this act aroused the Tsar's ire. Alexander took it as a personal offense against himself and his rule.

This tension, however, was unexpectedly relieved, notwithstanding Alexander's strong predilections, which were so characteristic of the man. The great and noteworthy change, dating from about the year

1887, was born exclusively of the aggressiveness and clumsiness of the German policy. Bismarck seemingly misreckoned and counted too much on Alexander's reactionary tendencies. Only the many and consecutive mistakes of Berlin can explain the drastic change of Russia's policies.

It came about through the rapprochement of Germany and Austria, which alarmed Alexander extremely and caused him to make concessions to France. The latter country, contrary to the policy of Germany, was now making every effort to enlist the friendship of Russia, and took the initiative in making advances. First came the reëstablishment of ambassadorial relations; Mohrenheim was permitted to return to Paris, and France on her part sent Laboulaye, a remarkably gifted man, to St. Petersburg. Then came a Bulgarian incident. A Bulgarian deputation was travelling in Europe, enlisting the sympathies of the various governments with the cause of Prince Alexander; they were cordially received in London, but when they came to Paris, they found to their amazement a very cold reception, due exclusively to the desire of the French to please the Tsar, who disliked the Battenberg prince; this incident can rightly be looked at as one of the very first landmarks in the path of the Franco-Russian friendship.

At a later date Flourens, who was at the time foreign minister, asserted that the idea of a Russo-French alliance first originated with him. We overlook his mistake. When Laboulaye was sent to Russia there was no idea in France of any possible alliance with Russia; all the French government could hope for

was to reëstablish friendly relations. It was very gradually, after his arrival in St. Petersburg, that Laboulaye became convinced of the opportunity of much closer relations with Russia, and only later did he conceive the possibility of some sort of agreement as a common defence against Germany. This was due in great measure to Bismarck's erroneous tactics when he hoped to force the hand of the stubborn Tsar, and yet further to the great wisdom and diplomacy of the French ambassador, who in a short space of time succeeded in endearing himself to the Russian people and winning the unquestionable sympathies of the Emperor.

By that time the French ministry had changed and the portfolio of foreign affairs was in the hands of the able Freycinet, who saw at once the great advantages and new vistas opened to France by her far-sighted ambassador. Moreover, President Carnot had succeeded Grèvy, and being convinced of the advantages of an understanding with Russia, energetically seconded the prime minister, Ribot, to bring it about. Thus we have a number of French statesmen who were literally grasping the opportunity of approaching Russia and making her a friend and an ally. There must have been very serious reasons indeed for Alexander to thus change his policy. As we have seen, his personal predilections had previously drawn him in an exactly opposite direction; he was strongly inclined towards a friendship with monarchical Germany and personally disliked the French people and their political institutions.

The main cause for this change was the increasing

arrogance of the German chancellor, whose conduct antagonized the Tsar. Then too, Alexander gradually became convinced that the internal troubles of his own country were not as dangerous as they had at first seemed, after the assassination of his father. The police measures of his government succeeded in driving the leaders of the revolutionary movement to cover, and outwardly quiet seemed to dominate. This created very serious troubles later on, during the reign of his son, but Alexander had not the slightest realization of it. Finally, much of the success of the French policy must be attributed to the great skill and tact of Laboulaye. He worked at it so carefully, paved his way so cautiously, and approached the Russian government so gradually that Alexander might have been easily fooled, and not have noticed during the first months that any change was really coming. Certainly neither his ministers nor the general public realized such a change.

Least of all did Alexander expect to alter his personal relations with the old Kaiser; he openly admired Wilhelm I and loved him as a grandfather, resenting the brusque way Bismarck was treating his master. Perhaps this was also a remote cause of the Tsar's dislike of the chancellor.

There happened in 1887 a very unfortunate personal incident. The Tsar was returning home in the autumn of that year, via Berlin, from a holiday trip to Denmark, and had a stormy interview with the German chancellor, during which he violently accused Bismarck of interfering with Russian affairs by supporting Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, and also of having

written a disagreeable letter to the English government with which at the time Russia's relations were strained. This letter proved later a forgery, though its author was never known. The whole incident made a bad and lasting impression on Alexander, whose angry feelings towards Bismarck continued unabated to the end of the Tsar's life.

In 1888 came the death of the old Kaiser, and after Frederick's reign of three months young Wilhelm II ascended the German throne. At the beginning of this reign there was seemingly much sympathy between Wilhelm and Alexander. Wilhelm tried to be very respectful and subservient, which pleased Alexander immensely. Possibly the feelings Alexander had towards Bismarck counted much in the latter's dismissal. Alexander's opinion of the autocratic chancellor probably helped to convince Wilhelm that he ought to rule without such a "nurse" behind his back. I rather think that this fact does not receive sufficient attention from the historians of the epoch, especially from those who deal with Bismarck's resignation.

To sum up the policies of these years—1886-1890—we can say that Germany constantly irritated Russia—a policy most detrimental, chiefly to Germany herself—by the personal methods of Bismarck which antagonized the Tsar, and by her growing friendship with Austria. The aims of that friendship were never well disguised and it was known at St. Petersburg that they were directed primarily against Russia. Germany was relying too much on her former friendship with Russia and the family relations of the two courts. France, on the other hand, led by clever men, especially

Laboulaye, carefully paved her way to the building up of an understanding with Russia, clearing away all former causes of friction. Meanwhile Russia's own policy, planned by Alexander, was to remain absolutely neutral between France and Germany and to try to withdraw as much as possible into a position of isolation, which the Tsar deemed was the best guarantee of peace for Russia.

III.

Thus a sort of equilibrium was achieved in the mutual relations of these great powers, Russia holding the balance between Germany and France. In 1918 the German government published some Belgian documents, which they had taken from Brussels during their occupation of Belgium (*Schwertfeger* vol. V). These documents contain the reports to Brussels of different Belgian diplomatic agents. They unanimously state that they knew that Russia during this period was standing for permanent peace and directed all her endeavors towards establishing peaceful relations between France and Germany, notwithstanding the pressure brought upon her by France.¹

This was, however, not at all what France wanted. She had set her mind on getting Russia on her side. The next obstacle that she had to put aside was the influence of the reactionary surroundings of the Tsar. Among these there was great discontent, not only

¹ *Schwertfeger*, *Zur Europäischen Politik*, 1885-1914, Berlin, 1918. *Hansen*, *Ambassade à Paris du Baron de Mohrenheim*, Paris, 1907. *Cyon*, *Histoire de l'Entente franco-russe*, Paris, 1895. *de Freycinet*, *Souvenirs*, vol. 1-2, Paris, 1913.

with French republicanism in general, but with the French policy towards the Russian revolutionaries in particular. The police of the Tsar succeeded in combing out the revolutionary movement from Russia, but it became all the stronger abroad for that very reason; many of the young Russian revolutionaries found a haven in Paris, where their circles and meeting-places were well known to the Russian gendarmes. The reactionaries in Russia constantly urged the government to take drastic steps and make representations to France concerning these revolutionaries, and looked askance at the French for their seeming lack of desire to support such foolish pretensions. And very naturally this was bound to impede the progress of the movement towards a closer alliance.

Knowing this the French government opened in 1890 one of the darkest pages of the history of this alliance by starting persecutions against the Russian revolutionaries. The first one to take active measures against these Russians was Constans, then minister of the interior. This proved to be a terrible mistake, and remained to the very end the inner cause of weakness of the Russo-French alliance, for it could not be supported by the majority of educated and enlightened Russians as long as it had such foul political motives. They could not sincerely trust a republican France upholding an autocratic régime, which they were so devotedly fighting. Many of the misfortunes of Russia during the Great War must be ascribed to this potent cause of decay, that was eating away the very core of the alliance. It was certainly a heavy price France paid for Russia's official friendship, not realizing evi-

dently how much it estranged the bulk of the Russian educated people.

The Tsar and his government, on the contrary, were filled with satisfaction and gratitude for such friendly help on the part of the French. A short while after the police persecutions against the Russians had started in Paris and elsewhere, there began the secret transactions between the two governments to reach a definite agreement.

Just at that time there took place an incident which broke the ice. At the instigation of the Kaiser, his mother, the widow of Friedrich, went incognito to Paris. It is supposed by some that Wilhelm really hoped for some unfriendly demonstration against the poor woman. This would have given him his chance at France. The French government, however, took all necessary measures to prevent any demonstration. A possible crisis was thus avoided, but it was the first practical test of the new policy of friendship with Russia. Would the latter country side with France in a case of distinct German aggression? The French did not hesitate to apply the test, and quickly found that Alexander was willing to back them up; his sense of justice was deeply hurt by such methods of the Kaiser and he showed sympathy with France, which was enough to warn Germany.

Thus the former equilibrium had disappeared and Russia began to incline to one side.

Events developed rapidly after that. First came the mission of General Boisdeffre to Russia, where he was allowed by Alexander to attend the manœuvres of the Russian army near St. Petersburg in the pres-

ence of German officers only, to the dismay of the latter. During his visit to Russia Boisdeffre had long talks with General Obroutcheff, Chief of Staff, concerning the equipment of the Russian army. A short time previously the Russian army had adopted the French Lebel rifle and Boisdeffre was anxious to know if it had proved satisfactory. The order was placed with the French in 1889 at the time of a visit of the Grand Duke Vladimir to Paris, where he used to enjoy himself at the theatres and musicales. This was one of the most subtle means the French used to give Russia "friendly" assistance.

Then, on July 25, 1891, came the visit of the French fleet under the command of Admiral Gervais to Kronstadt. The reception accorded the French was quite exceptional, due to the special effort of the Russian government. The Russian reactionaries beheld to their horror the Tsar standing at attention and saluting while the revolutionary Marseillaise was being played by French and Russian military bands. This action of the Tsar was afterwards cited by some as an exceptional token of friendship, and by others as a terrible mistake; how could an autocratic Tsar salute a revolutionary hymn, asked the latter?

In August, 1891, during the talks between Generals Boisdeffre and Obroutcheff, the question of a possible military convention between the two countries came up. The first text of an agreement, dated August 22, 1891, was rather "platonic." However, this was really the beginning of an alliance.

Next came the visit in the autumn of 1891 of the Russian foreign minister, de Giers, to Paris, when

he discussed the same matters, but on a broader plane, with Ribot the prime minister and Freycinet the French foreign secretary. Finally in December, 1891, there took place formal transactions at St. Petersburg between the French ambassador, Count Montebello, General Boisdeffre, Colonel Moulin, on the one side, and the foreign minister, de Giers, the minister of war, General Vannowsky, the chief of staff, General Obroutcheff, on the other.

On June 6, 1892, came the visit of the Grand Duke Constantine to the French President Carnot. He was magnificently received. A second text of an agreement is dated August 30, 1892, but the Panama scandal deferred the transactions. (This agreement was the final text of the military convention, since published by the Bolsheviki, Paris, 1919.)

In October, 1893, a Russian squadron commanded by Admiral Avellan paid a return visit to France at Toulon, and was received most cordially by the French government. A great effort was made to please the Russians. Finally, on June 10, 1895, Ribot formally announced the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance.

IV.

Parallel to her political transactions, France endeavored to strengthen Russia's bond of friendship by other, more subtle means, namely, by loans for her industrial development. One must remember in this respect that beginning with the '80's there was

started in Russia a great industrial expansion, two consecutive Russian finance ministers, Vishnegradsky and Witte, trying by all sorts of means to foster and further the industrial development of their country, and one must say that notwithstanding the fact that much of it was artificial, unnatural and of hot-house growth, they still succeeded in achieving very remarkable results. In two decades (the '80's and '90's) Russia in that respect was unrecognizable; towards the year 1900 she possessed a well-developed industrial movement.

But such development demands capital, and Russia had none of her own to spare. France and Belgium, on the other hand, had abundance of surplus money, the savings of their thrifty populations, ready to invest in any enterprise that would pay them a fair percentage. The statesmen on both sides, realizing these conditions, set to work to make the supply and the demand meet to their mutual satisfaction. Their motives, however, were very different; the Russians wanted the capital for their young and promising industries and were quite ready to pay a handsome percentage; the French and Belgian people simply looked for a secure investment, whereas the French government, assuring the people of such a security by government guarantees, sought political advantages by establishing financial bonds tying Russia down to an alliance with France.

Germany was not willing to participate in Russian loans; all her money in those days was being invested in her new colonial enterprises.

The French money on the contrary came to Russia

in great quantities; enormous Russian loans were floated on the French money market, constantly increasing in size. In 1890 three loans were concluded, in 1891 two; later other loans succeeded these; 1893, '94, '96, 1901 and 1904 saw others, and finally in 1906 the largest and politically the most important, which Witte calls the loan "which saved Russia," or, we may add, the Russian autocracy. Then government loans were succeeded by municipal, provincial (the Finland loans), metallurgic, mining, manufacturing, transportation loans of various character and qualifications, amounting to the enormous sum of 12 billions, or nearly one quarter of all the investments abroad of the French nation.¹

In the early history of the financial policy of France there took place an incident, little known abroad, but very characteristic. It was during the negotiations of the first loan of 1891; the banking house of Rothschilds in Paris suddenly interrupted the transactions and declined to proceed with them, giving as a pretext the Jewish persecutions which were then going on in Russia. As a matter of fact there was more back of this stand by the bank. These transactions coincided with the friction that ensued between Paris and Berlin on account of several incidents. France then inquired if Russia would uphold her in her policy against Germany. Russia answered that she would certainly come to the aid of France if Germany attacked her, but not otherwise. This qualification alarmed the French government, who forced the Rothschilds to withdraw from the transactions in order to put pressure upon

¹ See *A. Tardieu, France and the Alliances*, N. Y., 1908.

Russia. The details of that story are still unknown, and perhaps there is some exaggeration in it, but the spirit of it is undoubtedly true. Such was Russia's position during those years; she would not back any aggression on either side, and still endeavored to hold the balance as even as possible. France, on her side, was working for much more and against the will of the Russian people, the Russian government, and especially the Tsar, she forced the alliance upon Russia, and willingly employed financial means to exert such pressure.

The real test of the Franco-Russian alliance came during the Japanese war. One cannot doubt the motives of France in any way; she was honestly trying to help Russia in her difficult situation, the more so because Germany was endeavoring to establish friendly relations and assist the Russian government, too, as best she could. There exist many proofs of French sincerity; her help to Rojdestvensky's fleet at Madagascar and at other ports and her continued financial support are but a few of the many instances that might be cited.

There was one thing wrong, however, in the Franco-Russian alliance, and the events of the Japanese war ought to have been a warning to France: first, the Russian army was in no way as strong as the outside world thought; the organization was poor, the command was deficient, the system of supplies was not working well, and what was more the army had not the whole-hearted backing of the nation; second, the internal policy of Russia was absolutely unsatisfactory, for it was undermining her strength and

creating social discontent, which had already burst forth in a revolutionary movement in 1905. Seething with dissatisfaction and revolution, Russia could not give France the support she expected from her. There came a moment when France ought to have realized this, namely, in the spring of 1906 when Witte was conducting the transactions concerning the loan "which saved Russia," but that really only helped to defer the revolution for another ten years. The factors for this last huge loan from France were as follows: For the loan were the already firmly established alliance and the strategic plan of the two countries, bound to each other, France depending absolutely on the military assistance of Russia; the mercantile hopes for profits on the part of French investors, who were expecting big percentages on their investments, the French government constantly arousing their hopes by all sorts of artificial means and promises; and some elements of the ruling classes on both sides, hoping to find support from such a policy of backing Russia and her autocratic government, though one cannot say that it was the whole of these classes, as there were among them farsighted persons who realized the precariousness of the political condition in Russia.

Witte's parleys concerning this loan were started with the Rouvier government, but the following winter it fell, and was succeeded by the Sarrien government, which concluded the negotiations, Poincaré having unfortunately the finance portfolio,—thus carrying the heaviest responsibility for the loan,—while Clemenceau had the portfolio of the interior, which enabled him to control the police and deal with

the question of Russian revolutionaries. These were the forces that Witte, the Russian government, the French capitalists and some French statesmen were relying on to carry the loan.

Against the loan was a formidable array on both sides. First, political morals or ethics. I realize that there are many people who deny that ethics play any rôle in politics, but I consider this very wrong, and the present case is the best possible example and proof of the enormous influence that the moral point of view can have on political matters. The American-Chinese relations, especially concerning the Boxer indemnity, the open door policy, and the Shantung protests afford other examples. Second, Russian liberal public opinion, which was unanimously opposed to the loan, considered that France at least ought to have confronted the Russian government with the request for constitutional guarantees. It was a brilliant opportunity for France to stand for constitutionalism and thus strengthen the Russian liberal movement. This would have been a tremendous advantage for the young Duma in her political struggle. Most energetic action was taken at that time by the leading Russian political party, the Constitutional Democrats or Cadets, as they are usually called. They even went so far as to send a deputation to Paris in order to convince the French of the necessity, if not of refusing the loan, at least of attaching definite political and liberal conditions to it. Some of the Cadets were so strongly of this opinion that they considered the loan to be a real crime against Russia. (Subsequent events proved, alas, that they were not far from right.) The

Russian government, on the contrary, naturally considered these men traitors, not daring, however, to court-martial and punish them, knowing well that public opinion all over Russia was backing them strongly. It is a great pity that the French government refused to recognize them and consider their point of view. Much of the history of Russia and even of Europe would have been different had they been recognized by France. Third, whereas the men in power in France at that time never realized this chance, there were many statesmen, especially among her radicals and socialists, who saw clearly enough the frightful dangers for France in backing a tottering autocracy. To the lasting shame of the French government of that year and of Witte, the loan was concluded, and the Tsar and his government were saved from certain defeat at the hands of the liberals. The first negotiations were conducted by Witte and the French banker, Neutzlin; to the latter credit must be given, for at the beginning he was strongly opposed to concluding a loan without the knowledge and the sanction of the Duma. Witte, however, succeeded in persuading him to push through the loan. The Russian government made the immoral threat to France of starting a flirtation with Germany in case the French refused the loan. It was at the time of the Algeiras conference, and the Russian government intimated that it would not back France, but would help Germany to protract the negotiations, which Germany had already done very effectively. It was practically impossible for Russia to make good the threat, but it brought France to the point of agreeing to float

the loan. That threat was made by Witte. The Russian liberals requested at least one condition—that the Duma should be given the opportunity to sanction the loan, which would have given it the chance to criticize the Russian government and lay bare some of its shortcomings and mistakes. But the French government firmly refused.

It is interesting to note that England took the position of counselling moderation to France, and was not averse to backing the Russian liberals in their demand to allow the Duma to sanction the loan and criticize the government. English influence in Paris during these days was not sufficiently strong, however. A few English bankers with Lord Revelstoke did take part in the loan, notwithstanding the fact that the English government was opposed to it; the Rothschilds declined to take a hand in it.

In only one particular was Witte right in insisting on the absolute necessity of that loan. Russia was in dire need of money and could obtain it only in France. There were many payments due in 1906 from previous loans; there were the tremendous expenses of the Japanese war to be paid; there existed a dangerous tendency for Russian gold to go abroad, thus lessening the bullion reserve, which was threatening the newly established gold standard of the Russian currency. But contrary to Witte's opinion it must be said that when the loan was concluded its conditions were ruinous to the Russian treasury, and its political meaning as mentioned above quite disastrous. The amount of the loan was first fixed at 2,750,000,000 francs, but later reduced to 2,250,000,000 francs, bearing 6 per

cent interest, and floated in April, 1906. Germany absolutely refused to participate in this loan, though at the start her bankers did take part in the negotiations, possibly in order to simply keep in touch with what was going on. As the transactions reached the decisive point they withdrew, alleging the prohibition of their government to take part in the actual floating of the loan. The American firm of J. P. Morgan was also invited to participate, but withdrew early, though no political reasons came to the surface at the time.

V.

The history of the French loan of 1906 was the last warning to France. After that date the two governments, Russia and France, became closely bound and had to stand by each other, *per fas et nefas*.

The aggressiveness of Germany either against France or Russia called absolutely for the assistance of the other ally, and no one was better aware of this than the government of Berlin. And vice versa, if France or Russia began an offensive policy against any other nation, the other ally was forced to back such action, no matter what its own opinion in the matter might be. This was the case, for instance, in the Morocco crisis, when Russia stood by France, though she herself had no interests at stake in northern Africa. But the time of greatest trial came when in the summer of 1914 the conflagration started in the Balkans. Berlin knew from the very beginning that France would have to back the Russian stand on the Slav

question. London and most of the other capitals knew it as well.

The only possible break might have been the Björkö treaty, a very cleverly laid intrigue of the Kaiser. For many reasons it was bound however to fail, thus leaving the Franco-Russian alliance intact.

The great historical meaning of this alliance is not in doubt at the present day. The victory of the Allies was the necessary outcome of that strong friendship, built up between France and Russia. The victory of the Marne and the resistance on the western front were due in no mean part to Russia's rôle in the east, though at the present time this fact is not always remembered.

The impartial historian, however, is in duty bound to mention the drawbacks of that alliance and the fatal mistakes of some of its originators and constructors. Russia's mistake was of a general political nature, of not heeding the signs of the time; her reactionary government did not want to make the necessary liberal concessions up to the moment when it was too late; the concessions it did make were always insincere and insufficient.

France's miscalculation was double. First, the French statesmen helped much too willingly the Russian reactionaries in their persecutions of their political opponents; the exile and imprisonment of Russian revolutionaries always will remain a dark page in French constitutional history. Second, when there came a moment of grave warning, at the time of the first Russian revolutionary attempt, after the Japanese war in 1905-1906, France did not heed this warning, notwithstanding the fact that Russia's

best liberals were telling her the undisguised truth. Many eminent Frenchmen understood the situation very clearly and supported the Russian liberals. England, too, gave her warning to France, but all in vain. The money she loaned Russia only helped to support a decaying and degenerate autocratic government, which was fated to fall sooner or later. A constitutional Russia would have been a much stronger and surer friend and ally to France. Russia could not prove the strong ally, sincere as she was in her friendship, and was bound to go to pieces, economically, politically and socially.

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CHAPTER II.

ENGLAND.

I.

CONTRARY to the history of Franco-Russian relations, which constantly grew closer and friendlier, our story concerning Anglo-Russian relations starts with avowed enmity and keeps this character for a long series of years. For several decades not only did there not exist any amicable relations between Russia and England, but on the contrary, it was mostly open hostility and mutual dislike and suspicion.

The main bone of contention was Turkey, but as time went on new questions arose, creating further complications for the statesmen of St. Petersburg and London. First came the central Asia trouble; later the Far Eastern quarrel with Japan, in which England played no small part, and only toward the end of the first decade of the twentieth century under pressure of quite extraordinary circumstances did those feelings of mutual enmity gradually abate, being replaced by an entente, which grew into an alliance when the German danger began to loom above the horizon.

When there is so much inflammable material amassed by long years of mutual suspicions and accusations, new quarrels are bound to increase in number and intensity, and there always exists great danger of

a sudden explosion and consequent warfare. Several times during this period were Russia and England on the very brink of war, saved from it more by good luck than by good statesmanship.

Our narrative begins with the open enmity that existed between Russia and England in the '70's of the last century on account of Turkey and the Balkans. Each time the Tsar Alexander II tried to put pressure on the Sultan in order to force him to alter his atrocious methods of governing the Balkan peoples, England, in the person of Beaconsfield, heartily supported by Queen Victoria, backed the Porte and helped her to evade the Russian demands, thus gradually bringing about the armed conflict of 1877-1878. All Europe was clamoring for an end of the Turkish atrocities, the English liberals, headed by the great Gladstone, not least among those who insisted on such reforms. At the cost of enormous sacrifices, both in lives and money, Russia achieved brilliant military success and liberated the Balkan Slavs. She stood victorious at the walls of Constantinople; the Turks had capitulated, having signed the armistice of San Stefano; some of the Russian guard regiments had already received the order to march into the Turkish capital, as a crowning act of this war, when the English veto put a sudden end to the plan. The Berlin Congress that followed ruined nearly all of Russia's achievements. Fortunately, one thing remained, namely the freedom of the Slavs; but even this was not without its troubles; the path of liberty, which the Slavs now began to tread, proved to be a very thorny one.

One must say, however, to the honor of the British people, that the defenders of Turkey were in the minority; the masses were all anti-Turkish; this was strikingly proved by the election of 1880, which annihilated Disraeli, his policy and ideals, and brought to the government the liberal leader, Gladstone, a violent opponent of the Sultan's rule.¹

The chief argument of the English conservatives against Russia and her claims in the Balkans, was that Constantinople really was the gateway into Asia, the necessary bulwark of the Suez Canal, protecting the routes entering Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Egypt and, further back, the Indian Empire. This idea dates far back into the time of Napoleon I, when he had his strife with the Tsar Alexander I, that ended in such a brilliant victory for the latter.

From the very first these fears of the British imperialists were much exaggerated and unduly magnified. Russia could not, even if she wished, achieve such aggression into the heart of Asia; she was much too weak internally; then too, one can now prove historically, that responsible Russian statesmen never seriously considered such plans. They themselves would have been frightened had they been obliged to carry them out. The '70's were a period of great internal troubles and social discontent in Russia. The only possible excuse for the British conservatives of Disraeli's camp, who trembled for their Asiatic possessions, was their absolute lack of knowledge about Russia and the Russians; they knew no more about

¹Compare *Viscount Bryce*, *Modern Democracies*, New York, 1921, Vol. II, p. 378.

them than the ancient history of the Aztecs or Peruvians; the Russian nation remained a constant riddle to them, unsolved up to the end of the century.

No wonder that in 1879, after the end of the Berlin Congress, Beaconsfield was boasting of a great diplomatic victory, and Gor'tchakof, on the contrary, thought that this was one of the darkest pages of Russian history. These times are long since passed, but what we have to keep in mind is the fact that it was this feeling of mutual distrust alone that can explain the events of the following decade. The intense enmity that developed in the '80's between Russia and England culminated in '85 in the central Asiatic crisis, notwithstanding the fact that at England's helm stood for a long time a liberal government, headed by Gladstone himself.

We must not minimize the moderating influences of Gladstone; he at least was never an enemy of Russia and did his very best to avoid an open conflict. There were two reasons for this policy of Gladstone: first, he hated Turkey and appreciated the rôle Russia played in liberating the Balkan Slavs, and second, he was never convinced of the existence of the "Russian danger" in Asia. On the contrary, in this latter respect he was even not averse to coöperating at times with Russia. This was shown, for example, by his assent to a conference with Russia concerning Greece (1880).

During the '80's Anglo-Russian relations passed through a double crisis. On the one hand we have the Bulgarian trouble, and on the other the far more serious events in this respect in central Asia, south of the Caucasus.

After the Berlin Congress, England did not want to see the resurrection of a strong Turkey. England could not very well stand for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as she herself had occupied Egypt and meant to retain it. The Porte had to be held down, but never with the help of Russia. Austria seemed a more willing and easy ally for such a task. In other words, England wanted to weaken Turkey, but without any increase of the influence of Russia. As the latter country seemed to have established a firm control over Bulgaria, it was there that England planned to challenge her influence, with the willing assistance of Austria.

Bulgaria at that time had her own troubles. Her people were striving for more liberty and final emancipation, while the Russian control took the form of a military and despotic rule of a few uncultivated generals. Her prince, Alexander of Battenberg, unhesitatingly took the side of the people, and with the help and advice of England stood for a constitutional government, which only exasperated the Russians, especially the stubborn and limited Tsar Alexander III. Things went so far that Russia withdrew from Bulgaria her representatives and military instructors, threatened to sever her relations entirely, and showed in many other ways her open hostility to the Bulgarian people. The latter succeeded in holding their own only on account of the united support they received from Austria and England.¹ But, naturally this could not

¹It was also due to English help that Bulgaria could retain the province of Eastern Rumelia, which she annexed, contrary to the insistence of Russia.

create any feelings of friendship between Russia and England.

Germany viewed these intimate relations of England and Austria with pleasure, as a counterpart to Russian strength. In fact Bismarck even miscalculated in this respect in urging Austria on too much against Russia, thus spoiling his own relations with the latter country. As we have seen in respect to France, this German policy helped very much to bring about the friendship of Russia with France, frustrating the former monarchical alliance of the three eastern Emperors.

The second crisis of the period mentioned above concerned central Asia. Russia was slowly but very steadily moving into central Asia, like a powerful avalanche, conquering and annexing new territories and gradually approaching the Indian frontiers. This last fact was the bugbear of England. The British government was extremely alarmed by this Russian expansion, and tried by all sorts of means to put a stop to it. One of the means they chose was to establish their own influence over Afghanistan and create out of the latter a buffer-state between Russia and India. Russia, on her side, was attempting to spread her influence all around Afghanistan, in Persia, in Turkestan, etc. Thus, naturally, a clash of interests became more or less inevitable. First arose mutual suspicions, then came accusations of intrigues, finally, unmitigated enmity.

Great Britain was not very fortunate in her central Asiatic policy either. It was Beaconsfield who originated the idea of making Afghanistan a buffer

against Russian aggression ; but the Afghans, a wild and restless people, in no way wanted to lose their independence. They fiercely resisted the British intrusion, murdered some of the English representatives and officers and declined to have any diplomatic relations with England. The Afghan war ensued, and General Roberts vanquished them, firmly establishing the English rule over Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the Russian caravans and merchants were coming into central Asia, bringing with them not only Russian goods, but also Russian influences and policies. Russia consecutively occupied Tashkent, Samarkand, Krasnovodsk, Khiva, Bokhara, Kokand, the beautiful oasis of Merv and Murgab and other minor places. The years 1885-86 were especially anxious times. Tension between Russia and England became very great, and at moments it seemed that the friendly ties would break and war would start. Public opinion and the press, particularly the conservative papers, on both sides were full of excitement and hatred to their opponents, and as usual in such cases, all sorts of stories and lies were circulated, poisoning the atmosphere and making the work of the governments still more difficult. Reading, in the present day, the memoirs or papers of those days, one sometimes wonders how peace could have been maintained under such circumstances.

The storm finally blew over, but it left behind it a very unpleasant, not to say dangerous, aftermath. At the least provocation from either side, this enmity flared up again. The feeling of mutual distrust and hostility developed strong roots, which spread deep

into the psychology of these two nations; it took a very long while and quite unusual circumstances to eradicate the enmity between the Russians and the English. During many succeeding conflicts and diplomatic entanglements do we often find traces of this national hostility. Germany, with her mechanical conception of international relations, was strongly counting on this enmity, when she was diligently preparing for the World War. She was hoping that the hostility between England and Russia would help her to detach Russia from the Entente and bring her over on to the side of the Teutonic powers. One might judge how strong these feelings of mutual dislike were at this epoch by the recently published new memoirs of Prince Kropotkine, the famous revolutionary. No one would accuse him of being either prejudiced in any way, or narrow-minded in general. He was then living in exile in England, but kept up a lively correspondence with some of his friends, in Russia. In one of his letters he tells us that up to the very end of the century there was spread among Russians in England a rather doubtful legend, about the English policies of the '80's. It was said that since 1885 England was working for a coalition against Russia, with the object of securing Poland and the Ukraine for Austria, Bessarabia for Rumania plus a part of the Kherson province including Odessa; Germany was to receive the Baltic provinces, Sweden was to get Finland, and England herself the Transcaspiian provinces and a protectorate over the Caucasus. The gossip went, that it was the French ambassador in St. Petersburg who told Alexander III about this plan and that that was

the real cause that forced the Tsar to conclude an alliance with France. *Si non e vero, e ben trovato*; we might add, the story is not a true one, but the spirit of it strikes at the very heart of the relations between Russia and England, of those days. It explains at least one phase of the gradual inclination of Russia toward France.

Most interesting, however, is the fact that just those ideas concerning the partition of Russia did actuate repeatedly both England and Germany, and the influence of some of them is being felt even at the present day. Speaking once to Kropotkine, Joseph Cowen asked him: "Will you divide Russia, when you get a constitution?" "No," said Kropotkine, "we will have a federation, excepting Poland." "You could see his disappointment," adds Kropotkine in his letter. This attitude even of enlightened Englishmen is extremely characteristic.

The Anglo-Russian hostility of the '80's had only one unexpected good consequence, namely the strengthening of the bonds between Russia and France. The latter country also had several reasons to dislike the policy of Great Britain. France and England were by no means friendly, and it was only natural that the Tsar Alexander III, in order to support his own anti-English policy and oppose Bismarck's aggression, turned finally to France, though personally he did not like the French people and their political institutions. In other words, English hostility unexpectedly was helping the establishment of the Franco-Russian rapprochement, which later developed into an alliance.

II.

In the following decade of the '90's there arose new and unexpected difficulties, this time on account of the Armenian massacres (Sassoon, Bitlis, Mush). European public opinion was very much aroused by these horrors perpetrated at the instigation of the Sultan; especially in England people were clamoring for pressure to be put on Turkey to make her cease these persecutions. Unfortunately, the initiative of the British cabinet met with stern opposition in St. Petersburg, and I am sorry to say much of this action of Russia seems to have been based upon criminally personal motives of Prince Lobanoff, the Russian foreign minister. Without the coöperation of Russia, England certainly could not succeed in forcing the Porte to make amends and stop the Armenian terror. It is possibly the best example of the pernicious consequences created in the East by the mutual distrust and quarrels of the European Powers.

In that same period of the '90's, however, England did succeed in reaching a measure of understanding with Russia concerning central Asia. Thus an agreement was signed in 1893, recognizing the British influence in Afghanistan, and another one delineating the spheres of interest in Tibet. For a time it seemed as though the two powers would be able henceforward to coöperate, at least in those regions. Consequent events proved, however, the futility of such hopes. Very soon the former hostility once more predominated.

At that moment we find the personality of Witte looming up suddenly and standing far above the other

Russian statesmen, on account of his extraordinary intellect and wonderful energy.

He started, for instance, in Persia an experiment which he developed later on a much larger scale in China; he founded a Russian bank, controlled, financed and directed by the Russian government. The idea of the establishment of this Russo-Persian bank was to spread through its means Russian influence into Persia, the Persian market, the railroads, etc., a regular plan of "peaceful penetration," that would carry Russia through Persia, right to the coast of the Persian Gulf. Englishmen very naturally became much alarmed. The bank was also a powerful channel of influence upon the Persian government, where personal persuasion was duly coupled with financial assistance. We must note in this respect that the policy of Witte, coincides with a similar policy of Germany, trying to get a railroad outlet to Koweit, on the Persian Gulf and link it later with the Bagdad Railroad. There is all reason to believe that Witte acted with the understanding and consent of Berlin; he was constantly in close touch with the Germans.

The Boer war could not help to improve the relations between Russia and England. On the contrary, it was another outburst of the old enmity; no doubt Germany was much to blame for this. The Kaiser and his ministers tried their very best to arouse an anti-British feeling among the Russians. Russia *twice* asked the French government to intervene and offer mediation, but in both cases behind the back of the Russian government we easily discern Berlin; the Kaiser repeatedly urged the Tsar to take active steps

in this direction; the incident with the Kruger telegram is too well known to need description in this place. France on her side referred Russia to Germany, declining to interfere on their account.

Finally, the last and probably the most dangerous break between Russia and England came at the time of the Japanese war. From the very beginning of the hostilities, the sympathies of the English were with the Japanese. England was viewing with great distrust and anxiety the Russian expansion into Manchuria. This was one of the main motives that forced upon her the Japanese Alliance.

As Kropotkine tells us in his correspondence, English public opinion was whole-heartedly on the side of Japan and foretold from the first the Russian defeat, applauding every Russian reverse, as it occurred.

The Dogger Bank incident was the climax of this hostility;¹ We certainly were on the very verge of war. The inexcusable action of the Russian admiral called forth such a storm of indignation in England that many contemporaries were quite convinced that a declaration of war would follow within a few days.²

¹ The Dogger Bank dispute was settled by a declaration dated November 25, 1904.

² Though no excuse exists for Rojdestvensky's action, there is an explanation for his foolishness. During the war there existed an active Japanese propaganda among the Russian revolutionaries, directed toward the disruption of the Russian Empire; the Japanese paid Russian revolutionaries, Finns, and others, substantial sums in order to weaken Russia by their revolutionary activities, a method very successfully used by the Germans ten years later. The Japanese also had numerous agents in Scandinavia, who sent out alarming messages to the Russian fleet proceeding to the Far East, in order to scare the commander and give the impression that Japan had torpedo-boats in the North Sea, awaiting the passage of the Russian squadron; it was these messages that fooled the overstrained admiral and made him fire at defenseless English fishermen.

We can easily recognize in this case the resurrection of the old hostility between the two people, which had back of it so many years of mutual suspicions and distrust.

Two factors, however, saved the situation at the eleventh hour; the Anglo-French entente, which was then just crystallizing, and the fear on the part of England and France of a Russo-German alliance; the latter was very strongly urged upon Russia by the Kaiser, whose feelings at the time were highly anti-British; he did his best to convince the Tsar that England was their common enemy and that the only salvation would be a strong Russo-German agreement.¹ France was terribly afraid of this, rightly considering that it was a menace to her and to the Franco-Russian alliance, which might easily fall to pieces. Wilhelm, on the other hand, was surely considering such an eventuality! This actuated the French government, just then so ably counselled by their foreign minister Delcassé, to make every possible effort and exert strong pressure upon England in order to avoid an open break between that country and Russia. Arbitration in such a case was the only possible means, and as is well known, France was entirely successful. As soon as England consented to arbitrate the Dogger Bank case, the danger was over and the future Entente thus was made possible.

The storm had blown over and for a long while enmity between Russia and England had disappeared.

¹This feeling of a common danger from Great Britain had its repercussion in the Björkö agreement, having personally influenced the Tsar when he gave his consent and signature.

III.

This great diplomatic and peaceful success achieved, France set herself to slowly building up the long desired entente between the three countries and against Germany. It was at that time that the French found a staunch friend in unexpected quarters. We mean the personality of King Edward VII.¹ Very shrewd, subtle in his ways, agreeable and polite in his manners, Edward proved to be a great factor in European diplomacy of those years. He was constantly travelling about, seeing the crowned heads of states, interviewing the prime ministers and himself steadily moving in one direction, having in view one object, the curtailment of German aggression and creation of such conditions as would thwart the ambitions of his nephew, the Kaiser. Whatever one might think of Edward personally, no one can deny his great diplomatic skill, as well as his foresight. He evidently realized from the very first the dangers that were concealed in the imperialistic plans of Berlin, and he subtly set himself to destroy them at their very source and inception. This is the policy that the Germans have called the "Encirclement of Germany"² and that was a menace, not to the German nation, but exclusively to the Kaiser's plans for imperialistic expansion.

King Edward and his government could well consider at that time that the Russian danger or imperial-

¹ Queen Victoria died in January, 1901.

² King Edward VII's authorship of the encirclement theory, is questionable, but he took a very active part in carrying it through. See Sidney Lee, Article on King Edward in the Dictionary of Nat'l Biography.

ism was dead or at least fatally crippled, and thus for England there could only accrue advantage from a rapprochement with Russia, as against Germany.

Indeed, in the Far East the danger of Russian aggression had vanished with the victory of Japan, apparently for ever. Japan herself was quite willing to follow England's lead without any protest. In Central Asia things had turned all Britain's way: the expedition of Colonel Younghusband assured English influences in Tibet (Treaty of 1906); Afghanistan was previously secured; in Persia Lord Curzon thwarted successfully the Persian Gulf plans of Russia. Finally in the Balkan question, Russia's weakness also diminished her influence and helped to pacify English fears. Thus England began to feel her way very cautiously towards establishing better relations with Russia. She had to be very careful, however, considering the past hostility.

The first step in this direction was the letter of Lord Lansdowne to Sir Charles Hardinge, ambassador at St. Petersburg (September, 1905), explaining the Anglo-Japanese alliance as being in no way directed against Russia; the alliance was meant to be a purely pacific instrument. The next step was a certain pressure put on Japan during the Portsmouth peace transactions counselling moderation and letting Russia know about this.

Further, in Algeiras both countries supported France and also coöperated in Constantinople. In other words, England tried everywhere to show that she was ready to support the Russian policies.

Later, in the summer of 1907, a Russian squadron

visited England and was very cordially received. The same year a convention was signed August 31, 1907, concerning Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. According to this agreement, Persia was divided into three zones of influence, Afghanistan was recognized as being exclusively under English influence, and Tibet was made semi-independent, the powers promising not to send to Lhasa any diplomatic representatives and acknowledging the agreement concluded by Colonel Younghusband. Annexed to this convention was a letter of Sir Edward Grey to Sir Arthur Nicholson, ambassador at St. Petersburg, explaining the situation in the Persian Gulf.

Finally, in 1908, Edward VII went personally to see the Tsar. On June 10 they met at Reval, both being accompanied by representatives of their governments, the Tsar by Iswolsky, the King by Sir Charles Hardinge.

This seemed a dangerous setback to Germany, not only to the Kaiser and his government, who were very much alarmed, but to many German publicists too. Maximilian Harden, for instance, wrote fiery articles in his paper, the *Zukunft*, about the imminent danger that was threatening Germany. The Germans realized for the first time that they were being encircled. The most important immediate consequence of Edward's visit to Reval was the Turkish revolution, which in a way was prompted by it and which upset at once the whole equilibrium of the Balkans.

In other words, gradually and slowly the conviction was beginning to grow among more far-seeing Englishmen that it was Germany and not Russia who was

the real enemy of Great Britain. The policy of Edward VII helped to spread these ideas. The German nation was growing in strength and numbers very fast; in a short period it increased from 40 to 55 millions; the German government began to have imperialistic designs in Africa, whereas before Germany seemed very little interested in colonies and colonial policies, Bismarck even priding himself on not having any colonial policy; now she started to make her influence felt both in southwest and southeast Africa. Then came the Morocco incident. China too was experiencing German interference. Germany was very successful in acquiring Kiao-chow and partaking in the Russian aggression in the Far East, urging on the Tsar in his shortsighted policy. German trade in China was also prospering and beginning to compete successfully with the English. Finally in the Balkans, especially in Turkey, the German hand was now felt very much and German influences weighed very heavily; there too, German goods began rapidly to replace English goods. The trade mark "made in Germany" was everywhere in evidence, and with it spread the German political influence at a tremendous rate. The Bagdad Railroad scheme, the influence of Germany on the Young Turks, who were educated in German political and military ideas, the Turkish army reorganized, armed and instructed by Germans—all proved the increasing German influence and the remarkable growth of German authority.

On the other hand it was quite evident to Englishmen that Russia was no possible competitor. Politically she was very weak after the Japanese war, eco-

nomically she was concentrating all her attention on her industrial development. She gave way entirely in central Asia, the Far East was out of the question, and there remained only the Balkans and Constantinople, where England knew she could reach some workable understanding with the Russian government.

All this helped to establish the Triple Entente. Its real start was the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 concerning central Asia; its practical test came later, during the Balkan troubles that developed after the Turkish revolution of 1908, and particularly at the time of the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913.

The Turkish revolution forcibly opened the eyes of Englishmen as to the extent of the German influence in Constantinople. England, therefore, willingly co-operated with Russia in the Turkish question, assisting Russia in her endeavors to force reforms on the Young Turks. Of even greater importance was the Anglo-Russian coöperation during the Balkan wars, when this feud was being liquidated in London. Sir Edward Grey helped immensely in trying to settle the trouble and worked hand-in-hand with the Russian government.

The appointment of Delcassé, the creator of the Anglo-French Entente, as ambassador to St. Petersburg (February, 1913), where he was soon to be joined by General Joffre, the future commander-in-chief of the French armies, was also meant to strengthen the Anglo-Russian unity.

France was now sure of her position. Her ambition was realized; she had a military convention with Russia assuring the coöperation of these two countries in

times of war. But Russia was still very weak at sea; her fleet was much weaker than the German fleet, and the Baltic in consequence seemed at the mercy of Germany, who could attack Russia at any moment from Danzig or from Kiel. In order to strengthen Russia in this respect France was working steadily for an Anglo-Russian naval accord that would protect the Russian interests in the Baltic; English friendship meant English naval assistance to Russia. These transactions culminated in the signing, just before the war broke out, of a naval agreement between Russia and England, thus crowning the French efforts.

The war necessarily consolidated the Anglo-Russian friendship; though of such recent date, it seemed, at that time at least, that this friendship superseded the former enmity.

After the beginning of the war, Russia pressed upon England the necessity of coming to a final understanding concerning Russia's claims in Constantinople and the Straits. With some hesitation, England finally agreed to sign a secret agreement March 4, 1915, simultaneously with the Treaty concerning Italy, the Dalmatian coast and Fiume. According to this agreement the Ottoman and Austrian empires were to be divided as spoils of war, Russia receiving Constantinople and the Straits. This promise, however, was never kept. The first thing the Allies did, when they saw that Russia was going to pieces, was to repudiate this part of the understanding of 1915. Already in the spring of 1917, when M. Albert Thomas, the French socialist minister, visited St. Petersburg, he told the Russian provisional government that the Allies repu-

diated the imperialistic aims of war, but applying it exclusively to Russia. The treaty with Italy remained in force, and so did, for a time at least, the agreement signed by the Allies in February, 1917, concerning the right bank of the Rhine. The Russian provisional government, however, to the very last moment of its existence did not consider these actions as binding upon Russia. The question of Constantinople and the Straits was settled by the Turkish peace treaty without the participation of Russia.

IV.

We must mention in conclusion a certain phase of the Anglo-Russian relations that had special importance, namely the Persian question. It has from our point of view a double significance, first, because it illustrates how diplomacy worked during the autocratic régime of Russia and second, on account of its contemporary consequences. Much of what was happening in Persia during the years 1906-1912 has had a decided influence on present day events in central Asia.

As we have mentioned, the Anglo-Russian agreement was finally reached, after long delays, in August, 1907. For a short time it seemed that Russia and England had at last found a solution of the Persian question. It also promised mutual help and assistance in all central Asian matters. Persia was divided into three zones; the south was to be under English, the north under Russian influence, and a central strip of

land was to remain neutral, where neither of the two countries could interfere. It meant that Persia from then on would be the buffer between Asiatic Russia and British India. This rôle had previously been assigned to Afghanistan, and Persia's position now was a similar one. Afghanistan had not proved to be a good buffer; it was no real protection to the English against the dreaded Russian aggression, but it did help to bring disorder into Afghanistan and make it a playground of intrigues, Russian as well as English. It was a great temptation to the Afghan rulers and their supporters to make use of European interference for their own purposes. The necessary consequences were internal disorders, misrule and governmental chaos. Exactly the same thing was now bound to happen in Persia; the buffer was simply moved a trifle northwards; that was really all the difference; the line of contact between the Russian and English spheres was drawn right across poor Persia. Thus all the evils of the competition between England and Russia now fell upon Persia. No wonder that a few liberal statesmen and scientists, who were personally interested in the fate of Persia, were heartbroken and violently attacked the policies of Great Britain and Russia; Professor E. G. Browne was most prominent among those who attacked Sir Edward Grey.

The Russian autocratic government did not possess the necessary inward cohesion and could not very well control the eastern policies of its bureaucratic representatives. Take for example Witte's policy in Persia, when he established there the Persian Loan Bank in order to exploit the Persian market and later to get

an outlet to the Persian Gulf. It was a policy of intrusion, of sending first agents and then small military forces which interfered with the local administration and tried to influence the local government. When the western powers protested, St. Petersburg promised to withdraw, sometimes actually ordered the withdrawal, but the Russian agents did not obey and the whole thing continued, gradually increasing in strength, until a break somewhere would release the political pressure.

Just such a rôle was played in 1908 by a Cossack Colonel, Liakhof, who commanded a detachment of Cossacks at the Persian capital, Teheran. The English did not like his presence so near the Persian Court and repeatedly asked Russia for his recall; St. Petersburg promised the recall, but really did nothing.

Then came the personal clash between the diplomatic representatives at Teheran. Both countries had strong men there, unwilling to yield to their adversaries. The Russian minister was Hartwig, the man who played such an important rôle later on in Serbia. The Englishman was Sir George Barclay, no less energetic and enterprising. At certain periods, during his absence, Marling, no less strong, was replacing him. Both were advised by Major C. B. Stokes, the strongest enemy of Russia among them all. Finally in 1911 there appeared on the scene the American Treasurer-General Morgan Shuster, who by his impatience and unwillingness to compromise soon brought the crisis to a head. It was distracted Persia who had to foot the bill and pay for this diplomatic game.

The trouble became acute in Persia in 1911 mainly

for two reasons, first, due to the Mejlis or Persian Parliament and second, because of the financial catastrophe which was threatening the Persian treasury.

Morgan Shuster had a splendid chance of playing Bismarck's rôle of "an honest broker" between the two contending sides, the Russian and English, if only he could have handled the situation cautiously and tactfully. He started, however, just the other way, by violently antagonising the Russians. Far be it from me to defend the Russian standpoint, but I think one can maintain that there might have been a much more peaceful solution of the Anglo-Russian tension, than the one brought about by Mr. Shuster in 1911. One must say, however, that he was not an official representative of the United States; on the contrary, and this was perhaps unfortunate, he managed the question singlehanded. The moderating influence from Washington was absent.

Mr. Shuster started by advising the appointment of Major Stokes as Chief of the Persian gendarmes, who were expected to keep order all through the country, but especially at the capital. This act at once aroused the anger of the Russian representatives. Then followed several incidents of personal friction, so that when the Swedish Colonel Hjalmarsen was finally appointed to command the gendarmes, it was too late; the personal relations were hopelessly spoiled.

During the summer of 1911 a civil war broke out in Persia, one Persian party backing the Mejlis, the other standing for unmitigated autocracy and the restoration of all the powers of the Shah. Mr. Shuster and the English sided with the former, the Russians up-

holding the latter. The new Russian Minister, Poklevsky-Kozell, presented an ultimatum and finally Persia had to yield, to the great displeasure of England. Late in 1911 Colonel Liakhof attacked and took Teheran with his Cossack brigade. The Mejlis was dismissed, the Shah was returned to power and Mr. Shuster was forced to leave the country. Russia thus seemed to have triumphed, but not for long.

It was this situation in 1912, when Russia acquired a free hand in Persia, that called forth a storm of indignation among the English liberals, who violently attacked Sir Edward Grey for his seeming connivance at Russian successes. This case is often cited as one of the most glaring examples of the dangers of secret diplomacy.

The English liberals argued as follows: Had Sir Edward Grey kept his Persian policy less secret, English public opinion would have backed him and never allowed the Tsar's government to restore Persian autocracy. This also would have prevented the massacres of 1912, the dissolution of the Mejlis, the victory of Liakhof and the dismissal of Mr. Shuster. Further, the events of 1911 and 1912 were deemed to be the direct cause of the Russian advance in 1913 into the "neutral zone," of the gradual spread of Russian influence all over Persia, and finally of the steady preparation on the part of Russia for the conquest of the whole of Asia.

Most of these accusations can be dismissed as great exaggerations, but one must admit some truth in the statement. It was on account of the secret diplomatic methods that the English nation could not understand

the real meaning of the Persian policy; Englishmen were slow to realize the reason for Great Britain's sudden change of front. From a life-long enemy of Russia, she was now turning to be a devoted friend of Russia and upholding a very obnoxious policy of the Tsar's government; Englishmen could not understand this new element of humoring the Russian government in central Asia and elsewhere, which was really intended to consolidate the western Entente.

The very same arguments apply to Russia, with this difference that they are in that case a hundredfold stronger. If there had been less secrecy about the Russian foreign policy in the Persian question, for example, many evil consequences would have been easily avoided. Unfortunately secret diplomacy was always one of the most dangerous but very much used weapons of autocracy. It is certain that liberal public opinion in Russia would have censured the Persian policy of the Tsar's government even much more severely than did English public opinion. Russian liberals were much more strongly opposed to it than their British colleagues.

It seems very unfair to accuse Sir Edward Grey, as the British liberals did, of having supported the Russian autocratic claims and methods of action in Persia. No man on earth can better stand above such personal suspicions than Lord Grey; he will remain in history as one of the greatest idealists of our days. The fault lay with the unfortunate methods of all European foreign offices, which worked and planned their policy constantly in absolute secrecy, never taking the nations into their confidence.

But there was more to it; the secretive methods of Downing Street hid away from the British people the real motives of that new and strange alliance of liberal England with reactionary Russia. The English nation did not understand the full meaning of this rapprochement, nor did it realize at large the growing German danger and that an understanding with Russia had become so imperative; the alliance with Russia from the point of view of an uninformed liberal was preposterous; as Professor Browne exclaimed, "It was a monstrous conception of a peaceful Russia and a beligerent Germany!" To him, as to so many Englishmen, Russia was still the old enemy and constant aggressor. They simply did not know the inner conditions of Russia, her helplessness and revolutionary discontent, considering the Kaiser a peacemaker and Germany too, much abused.

These feelings could have been changed, and, I contend, they ought to have been changed by one possible means, by public discussion of the foreign policy. It would have helped Russia immensely in forcing upon her government constitutional reforms, so very much needed at that moment. Neither the British nor the French governments realized sufficiently that they were backing autocracy and not the Russian nation. On the part of France there might possibly be found some psychological excuse for such a policy, explained by her great anxiety created by the very real German danger, though even then, personally I have my doubts. In the case of England no possible excuse exists for this fatal mistake; it seems so much more strange, because at the head of the British Empire

there stood a liberal government of avowed humane and democratic principles and ideals.

In the second decade of the twentieth century, the Russian nation had forgotten the former enmity against England. When the war began in the summer of 1914, the enthusiasm of the Russians was tremendous, when they heard that England would participate. They felt a peculiar assurance that for that reason alone the war would be won.

CHAPTER III.

CHINA.

I.

RUSSIA'S intercourse with China dates from the early part of the eighteenth century, and these trade relations have always been most amicable. We know of the Russian religious missions, of the appointment of consuls and agents, and also of the Russian-Chinese tea trade. Russia's relations with China might well be divided into two periods: the first ending about the middle of the nineteenth century, ever peaceful, with Russia alone in the north to deal with China; the second one, extending from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day, during which other powers appeared, and great competition began.

China's troubles started in the year 1895 with the conclusion of the unfortunate war with Japan, which left the young Empire of the Rising Sun the victor. China was forced to pay a heavy indemnity, with no money to meet the demand. Her trusted counselor, Sir Robert Hart, was called in to inform her if there was any possibility of England coming to her aid by granting a loan for the payment of the indemnity. Rumors of this request got noised abroad and the other European powers, afraid that such a loan would give Great Britain too much influence, at once interfered. Russia,

backed by France, also proposed giving a loan to China.

After some hesitation China accepted the Russian offer and on June 24, 1895, the agreement was signed between the Russian ministry of finance, six French and four Russian banks and the Chinese plenipotentiaries, granting a loan of 400,000,000 francs to the Chinese government for thirty-six years, carrying 4 per cent interest.

In order to compete with this arrangement, Germany and England also agreed to grant two loans of £16,000,000 each, one for thirty-six years at 5 per cent, the other for forty-five years at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, both guaranteed by their respective governments, Germany and England. All these loans were to be paid from customs incomes, the tax on salt and the likin.

Thus started the nervous competition between the great powers, trying to outdo one another in the exploitation of poor China. Then came the question of railroad construction. The western powers were also very eager to build many new railroads to facilitate their trade and the exploitation of the Chinese market.

At that time the man who had most influence in China was Li-Hung-Chang, a careful and farsighted statesman, who realized the predicament of his country, so helpless before the onslaught of European greediness. During his whole life he preferred Russia to the other countries and always considered Russian support as the most profitable for China. This policy called down upon him, from the other powers many accusations of crimes and immorality, none of which were ever proved.

The turning point in China's relations to Russia came in 1896, when Li was sent by his government as ambassador extraordinary to attend the coronation of the Tsar. He later planned a return trip across Europe and the United States.

Shortly before Li-Hung-Chang left Peking important diplomatic conversations took place between his government and the Russian minister, Count Cassini, when the whole matter of the Russian relations, railroad construction included, was discussed in full detail. A Shanghai newspaper got hold of the rumor and published an account of a supposed agreement. It subsequently became known as the Cassini convention, and is often quoted as such by historians and politicians.¹ As a matter of fact there was no such convention, nor did Cassini sign any agreement at the time. There took place only preliminary discussions, the conventions being signed later in Europe. The contents of the article of the Shanghai newspaper, the *China Daily News* of March 27, 1896, however, corresponds somewhat vaguely with what had been going on in Peking.

The Peking conversations concerned mainly the following points. S. J. Witte, who was then at the head of the Russian finance ministry, had proposed to lease a strip of land across Manchuria in order to construct the Siberian railroad in a straight line to Vladivostok, instead of building it in the round-about way along the Amur River. From the middle of northern

¹ *Cordier, H.*, *Histoire des relations de la Chine, etc.*, Paris, 1901-02, rightly points out that the Shanghai text was vague and inexact.

Manchuria there was to be built a line south to Port Arthur, with a branch from Mukden to Shanghaikwan; this latter branch to be built by the Chinese, but with the financial support of Russia. In his Memoirs, published in 1921, Witte tells the whole story of these transactions in full detail. His plans were far-reaching and really meant the peaceful penetration of Russia right into the heart of China. He considered China a natural market for Russia and intended to exclude from it all other competitors. Russia sent a squadron to Port Arthur, with the consent and support of France and Germany, to make a demonstration against Japan and force her to curtail some of her demands on China. It was Witte who originated the pernicious idea of taking Port Arthur away from Japan, along with the Liao-tung peninsula, both of which Japan had acquired by the Shimonoseki treaty of 1895.¹ Witte wanted to prevent the further penetration of the Japanese into Manchuria and thus eliminate their competition. He misreckoned, however, in his calculations, because Russia herself proved much too weak, economically and politically, to carry on the exploitation of the Far Eastern market. It led only to countless complications, for Russia had overreached

¹ *Cordier*, loc. cit., seems to think that the initiative was taken by France, which had addressed a special note to Russia, concerning Manchuria, a week before the Shimonoseki treaty was signed by Li Hung Chang, and that Germany at once expressed her consent. Personally I think Witte is right. These transactions took place during the whole time of the Shimonoseki treaty negotiations at his instigation, while Russia was backing Li Hung Chang. It was the Russian support that gave Li the courage to withstand the Japanese demands. Russia for example helped to diminish the amount of the indemnity China was made to pay.

herself and had thereby created a dangerous enemy for herself in the nation of Japan, which sooner or later was bound to take vengeance. Again, in Russia proper, the Far Eastern plans of Witte created a most unwholesome imperialistic development, fostering greed among all sorts of promoters and adventurers. In his Memoirs Witte tries to throw the blame of the Russo-Japanese war on the Russian Court and in particular on General Kuropatkin and minister von Plehve. Without exculpating them in the least, we must say, however, that it was much more Witte's own fault, because his "peaceful penetration" was in no way less dangerous and also unavoidably led to a conflict with Japan, which was bound to disclose Russia's weakness.

Witte, no doubt, was a very clever statesman and laid his plans very carefully. He realized that the first attempts of Russia to help China financially with the backing of French capitalists were insufficient and in a way incoherent. There was, as we have pointed out, a great rush at the time for financial assistance to China. Every power wanted to take part in it. Besides the government loans, there were many private enterprises ready to start work in China, as for example the company of which ex-senator W. D. Washburn was the active head and which failed only because the State Department declined to back it.

Witte knew of all this and proceeded to work out a more successful plan. Again with French help he founded a semi-private, semi-official bank, called the Russo-Chinese bank, with a capital of 11,250,000 rubles and 5,000,000 taels. The president was to be a Chinese figurehead and the active managers, Russians, work-

ing under the supervision and direction of Witte's finance department. It was this bank that was to build the railroad, exploit the Manchurian market and carry out Witte's policy of the peaceful penetration of China. These carefully laid plans of Witte were worked out in full detail when Li-Hung-Chang reached Russia in the spring of 1896. Russia had the support of France and Germany. France looked for a profitable investment for some of her capital (this was the period of intensive French financial help to Russia). The French were profiting handsomely from their Russian investments and many of their capitalists were eager to assist Witte in his policy. Cordier thinks that the starting of the Russo-Chinese bank was only a natural consequence of the participation in the loan of French capitalists. He does not mention, however, that on the Russian side the bank was a mere tool in the hands of Witte and that most of the managers and directors were officials of the finance department and Witte's subordinates.

Germany on her side had other reasons for taking part in these transactions; her motives were almost exclusively political. She was not averse to seeing Russia become involved in the Far East question; it was a sure game for Germany, heads she won and tails Russia lost. The more Russia became involved in the question of China, the less able would she be to take a hand in the West and support France in her anti-German policy. Thus Germany looked with a complacent eye on Russia's new start in the Far East, well realizing the troubles that were bound to come to her. Most of the transactions between Witte and Li-Hung-Chang were known to Berlin.

While Li was on his way to Russia, some men of the Tsar's Court, notably the Buriat doctor, Badmaieff, an irresponsible adventurer, who nevertheless had some influence with Nicholas, came forward with a project for building a railroad not across Manchuria, but down to China across Mongolia (from Kiachta to Peking). Witte had great difficulties in convincing his government of the advantages of the Manchurian line and the lack of trade through Mongolia. Witte further states that on account of the foreign minister's absolute lack of knowledge of the Far East question—Prince Loban-off was in fact an ignorant man—the Tsar entrusted him with the whole matter.

Thus it was that Li-Hung-Chang, after his arrival in Russia had to deal almost exclusively with Witte, and as a consequence these two men were the ones who worked out the agreements concerning Manchuria, the railroad lease (December 16, 1896) and the Russo-China Bank.

The details of these conventions are well known. (See *W. W. Willoughby*, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 1920.) They created a very complex international status especially along the railroad line, where the Russians, though preserving and acknowledging Chinese suzerainty of the leased territory, yet acquired full rights of government, establishing their own system of administration, their own courts of law—mixed tribunals for mixed cases—kept their own police and a special military guard, with the intention of developing the last named into a regular army unit.

The visit of Li-Hung-Chang to Russia and all these

amicable transactions greatly increased the influence of Russia in China. Shortly thereafter many of the Englishmen working for the Chinese government (in the customs service, for example) began to be replaced by Russians. There appeared new Russian consuls and vice-consuls, etc. But this was mostly felt in the dangerous corner of Korea, where Japan had concentrated most of her interests. The Korean army was instructed by Russian officers, and the Korean arsenal was placed under Russian supervision. Li-Hung-Chang evidently thought that it was profitable for China to increase Russian influence in Korea in order to oust the Japanese. However, this line of action proved a great mistake, for it worked just the other way and finally lost Korea to China entirely. For a long time Korea was the storm center in the Far East, just as in 1894 Korea was the real cause of the Chino-Japanese war, so was it the cause of the Russo-Japanese war a decade later. Li-Hung-Chang did not know Russia as well as he did Japan and was much more afraid of the latter than he was of Russia's influence. The Russians seemed to him more genial, more friendly, than the cold and calculating Japanese, who were for such a long time China's bitter enemies. This easily explains why he preferred to depend on Russian help.

II.

During all these years when the European Powers were trying to outdo one another in getting hold of the Chinese market and of so much of the Chinese terri-

tory, the government of the United States alone stood for the integrity of China. America realized that she could not keep aloof and remain disinterested in what was going on in the Far East. China was in dire need of a strong hand to protect her from the invading foreigners. The assistance of the United States was consequently more than welcome. It was absolutely necessary to save China from the encroachments of the European Powers. The Department of State, ably led at that time by John Hay, knew quite well that the only way to save China was by the policy of the so-called "open door," which alone could restrict European monopolies, by prohibiting secret agreements forced upon China in order to get from her certain individual privileges.

The knowledge of what was going on in China was first brought home to the Americans by Lord Charles Beresford, who lectured in the United States on his way home to England, telling them the shocking stories of the exploitation of China.¹ How much official knowledge there was in London of Beresford's speeches is not well known, but we may suppose that there was some at least, for when Secretary Hay issued his famous note, asking the Powers to recognize and adopt the policy of the open door for China, England alone responded. All the other nations contented themselves with evasive answers, not meaning to stop their aggressiveness. The Russian answer among others was possibly one of the most unsatisfactory.

This can be easily explained now that we know the

¹See *Prof. Latane's* article in the May number of the *World's Work*, 1921.

history of Russia's plans concerning China in general and Manchuria in particular. But behind the back of Russia there loomed the sinister figure of the Kaiser, urging her on to her foolish effort, for Germany had nothing to lose.

The fatal years of 1897-1899 saw a further disastrous step taken by the powers to transform their purely commercial aggression into military action and occupation of parts of Chinese territory. Germany was the first to start the policy, when she suddenly landed a force, [late in 1897] on the Kwantung peninsula, without any intention of leaving it there, but simply for the purpose of egging Russia on. Germany later assured the powers and China that her force was merely a surveying party.

Count Muraviev, Russia's very superficial and ignorant foreign minister, caught at the bait and proposed to the Tsar to secure a naval base for the Russian fleet, making use of the ports taken away from Japan in 1895, Port Arthur and Talienwan. In spite of Witte's protests and the warning of other Russian statesmen, Muraviev and the Court circles pressed the Tsar to adopt this project and carry it through to the great satisfaction of Berlin.

In December 1897 a Russian squadron, commanded by Admiral Dubassoff, occupied Port Arthur. The Russian chargé d'affaires in Peking informed the Chinese government that Russia had no intention of infringing upon Chinese suzerainty, but was there merely to protect China from the aggression of other powers (sic!) and that she would willingly withdraw when the danger was past.

Germany had thus scored a brilliant victory. The policy of territorial aggression was well started, but the initiative and moral responsibility fell entirely upon Russia. This action was bound to weaken Russia immensely, detract her attention from western Europe and sooner or later bring her into conflict with Japan. Germany also exchanged Kwantung for the much more advantageous position in Kiaochow, which she proceeded to occupy. This might be looked upon as one of the greatest successes of German diplomacy, though achieved in such a tricky way. Witte alone among Russians realized how dangerous this step was and how it involved Russia in unnecessary conflicts, but even he did not see the whole purport of it. He was against this policy of the Russian government mainly because it spoiled his own plans of peaceful penetration. It altered for instance the whole character of the Manchurian railroad, which he was constructing; it necessarily changed the demeanor of the Russian officials in China and finally it was bound to arouse the suspicions of the other great powers. The Eastern-Chinese railroad was planned by Witte to be an exclusively peaceful channel of advance, meant for commerce and culture, without any element of political aggression. The same could be said about the Russo-Chinese bank. Now they became the means of supplying military equipment, of transporting troops, and of financing military enterprises. Even the active direction of the Russian policy in the Far East soon slipped from the hands of Witte into those of military leaders like General Kuropatkin.

The act, leasing Port Arthur and Talienwan, in fact

the leasing of the whole Liaotung peninsula was signed and delivered on March 27, 1898, by Li-Hung-Chang and Chang-Ing-Huan to the Russian chargé d'affaires. The territorial agreement was signed on May 7. Russia paid a handsome sum to Li-Hung-Chang and Chang-Ing-Huan for their signatures, and this fact will always remain a most immoral blot on the reputations of these famous Chinese statesmen. In consequence the French occupied Kuangchowwan, May 27, and the English—Wei-Ha-Wei, July 1.

This Russian agreement with China made use of the same juristic ideas which were laid as a foundation for the Chinese-Eastern railroad line; the territory leased from China retained nominally the Chinese suzerainty, the Chinese living on that territory remained Chinese subjects, with allegiance to the government of China and under its laws and courts. Whereas the Russians were subject to their own laws and authorities, had their own officials and courts and were practically the masters of those territories. For a long time international lawyers did not know how to construe this new set of facts nor how to fit it into the general system of international law. The German jurists with the same problem before them in Kiao-chow, where similar legal forms were used, created a special idea of their own, the "public law lease", to which they really applied the system of the civil law lease in use in most countries of the civilized world. This same theory was made use of by the Russian jurists.

Russia, however much as she protested to the contrary, was firmly established in these Chinese territories

and had no idea of withdrawing. It was then that the comedy was started by promises of withdrawal, which were not meant to be kept and which deceived no one, but which proved a powerful argument in the hands of Russia's enemies. In America especially they created a very bad impression. It coincided with Hay's pronouncement of the open door policy, which the American people with their usual idealism took very much to heart; and there was Russia, openly professing to believe in that principle and promising to follow it by withdrawing her troops and releasing the occupied territories, but as a matter of fact doing the exact opposite and establishing her rule more and more firmly. No wonder Americans were indignant. This explains the fact that the years, 1898-1905, were the only time in history that America and Russia were not friends and Russians were decidedly unpopular in the United States. This enmity disappeared only after the Russian defeat by Japan, when Americans realized that this Far Eastern policy was not the doing of the Russian nation, but of a very unpopular government, which lacked the backing of the people.

The shortsighted policy of Russia in the Far East had another fatal consequence, which still has some effect even in our days. It was due to Russian aggression that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded in 1902.

In 1900 came the frightful Boxer uprising, one of the most foolish acts of the Chinese Empress-Regent, which brought upon her and her Empire many dire complications.

When the uprising was quelled, after much fighting

and loss of life, the events which followed seemed for a moment to justify the Russian policy. China was being torn to pieces by the European powers and the Russian government was arguing that this was sufficient reason for their own aggression: first, to take part in the distribution of the spoils and second, to protect Russian interests along the extensive frontier, where both countries met. Russia wanted at all costs to get a free hand in Manchuria and guarantee at the same time freedom of action in Peking to her friend and supporter Li-Hung-Chang. The other powers naturally resented this and would not agree. Then began the game of "grab". Russia succeeded in getting a concession in Tientsin, occupied Newchwang and Anshanshan and almost entirely absorbed Manchuria.

Under the pressure of the protests of the powers, Russia finally concluded a new agreement with China (the convention of April 8, 1902), by which Chinese authority was reestablished in Manchuria and Russia promised once more to withdraw her troops within six months and to restore the Chinese Eastern railroad to China, the latter making the necessary reimbursements. But again none of these promises were fulfilled.

Meanwhile rumors began to spread that Russia was negotiating new agreements with China, consolidating her possessions in Manchuria. All through 1903 these rumors persisted, notwithstanding the energetic protests of the Russian government. We know now that the latter was not sincere, and though she did not sign any specific convention (as the rumors had it), she certainly did conduct negotiations at Peking with the view of consolidating her Manchurian acquisitions.

At that time, however, new developments took place. The Russian aggression began to spread from Manchuria into Korea and this called forth the Japanese opposition. At first Japan seemed to ignore the spread of Russian influence in Manchuria, but when Russia began to infringe upon Korea, the Japanese lost patience and started to prepare for a fight.

There was a period in 1902-1903, when Russia had full control over Manchuria; her eastern railroads were just finished and began to show their influence on the local commerce; Siberia was rejuvenated; the Far Eastern provinces and the Russian Pacific coast were rapidly developing their trade and so forth. All these activities were ably supported by the Russo-Chinese bank, started by Witte. It was probably the most potent agent in the spread of Russian influence among the Chinese. It gave them easy and profitable loans, spread Russian paper currency, which was most popular among the Chinese, for it not only replaced their bulky silver money, coins and taels, but also called for greater confidence and protection from a seemingly very powerful neighbor.

The author had just at that time a chance to witness personally the effect that the spread of Russian currency had in Manchuria. It was a deliberate policy of Witte and was meant to offset somewhat the military measures of the Russian government.

Prior to 1903 there is no doubt that at least some Chinese officials favored the Russian aggression as an offset to Japan and England and considered the spread of Russian influence in Manchuria as an advantage to

China. Only in 1903 did even they realize that this policy was creating too much opposition and envy among the other powers and especially on the part of Japan. It was only then that Peking became really alarmed and began to foresee the coming complications.

It was too late, however. The Russian policy was on an inclined plane and was bound to run to the bottom. Japan lost patience and declared war, which brought upon Russia numerous humiliating defeats, deserved by her government but disastrous to her people.

After the war the exclusive Russian influence in China naturally vanished. In her relations with China, Russia now acted in coöperation with Japan. Only for a moment did independent Russian action flare up again in 1912 in the Mongolian question; it died down finally during the Great War.

Thus in agreement with Japan, Russia consented to joint action in Manchuria, July 30, 1907. On July 4, 1910 Russia signed a convention with Japan concerning the improvement of railroad lines and their traffic, and also the construction of a direct railroad from Siberia to Peking. Then came the secret agreements of 1910 and 1912. The same spirit of coöperation between Russia and Japan is made still more clear in the agreement between the two Imperial governments of July 3, 1916. This agreement does not restrict the understanding solely to Manchuria, but covers on the contrary the whole of China. This understanding effectively barred American commerce from Manchuria, ending the open door policy.

III.

In recent years the relations between Russia and China were once more disturbed.

The trouble came through the desire of the Mongol ruling princes to emancipate themselves from the Chinese government. Russia at once seized the opportunity to establish her hegemony over Mongolia. On the whole the Mongolian market does not amount to much, but there exist very important trade routes which connect Siberia with inner China. By this route for example the best tea is imported into Russia from the Yang-Tse valley.

Mongolia is very sparsely populated, most of its territory is desert land and only in a few places can one find inhabited centers. Mongolia is divided into two uneven parts, the larger one, called Outer Mongolia and the smaller southern one, adjoining China, called Inner Mongolia. The plan of the Russian government was to establish its influence over Outer Mongolia and leave Inner Mongolia to the Chinese. In order to consolidate the Russian influence over this chosen morsel the government of St. Petersburg was backing the Mongolian princes and promising them full independence, meaning certainly the separation from China. These princes, about one hundred and sixty in all, especially the chief Khutuktu of Urga, were quite willing to accept Russian dictation, extend their power and increase their wealth, whereas Peking was insisting that for centuries Mongolia had been a province of the Chinese empire, controlled and governed by the Chinese.

In 1881 Russia had signed a very advantageous treaty with China, securing many privileges along the Mongolian frontier.¹ This treaty was concluded for ten years and was renewed in 1891 and in 1901 and was due to be renewed in 1911. Early in 1910 Russia began to remind China of this treaty and of the necessity to renew it, but the Peking government did not show great enthusiasm about the matter, nor were any steps taken in this direction. This annoyed the Russians and as the time for renewal approached they became more insistent while the Chinese seemed to become more obdurate. In 1911 the Chinese officials began to levy customs duties in direct opposition to the provisions of the treaty, which thus seemed to have lapsed. Then there began riots and disorders among the Mongolians and the Chinese naturally accused the Russians of instigating them.

China, however, by this time had her own troubles. In the province of Szechuen a revolution broke out in September and in December the Mongolian princes making the best of this opportunity, at a meeting at Urga chose the local Khutuktu as the Mongolian Emperor, declaring their independence from China. The Russian officials were certainly in close touch with this movement.

In 1912 the revolutionary movement became widespread in China and very soon succeeded in overturning the Imperial government. The Emperor abdicated

¹The treaty of 1881 provided, first, that Russia had the right to have consuls in Mongolia and Turkestan; second, that Russian merchants were permitted to purchase real-estate, houses, warehouses and shops, etc., and third, that a zone should be established along the Russo-Chinese frontier within which all imports and exports were free of duty.

and a Republic was proclaimed. This was very opportune for Russia's designs in Mongolia, but even then the Chinese did not want to give in. The new Chinese republican government refused to recognize Mongolian independence and sanction Russian infringements upon the sovereignty of China. Russia then decided to use force.

On September 17 the Russian government declared that they considered the treaty of 1881 still in force and would act in the future as if the treaty in fact existed. There cannot be any justification for such highhanded proceedings. The Russians coolly explained that now that Manchuria was forever cut off from Siberia by Japan, nothing remained for Russia but to expand into Mongolia. This also needs no explanation. There never existed any serious Russian interests in that field; at the best Mongolia was very poor. The policy was undiluted imperialism, taking advantage of China's impotence.

At the same time Russia declared that the neutral zone of 1881 was abolished; this also lacked both legal and moral justification.

On November 3, 1912, Russia signed a special agreement with "independent Mongolia" pledging Russian aid for the maintenance of this independence and for the exclusion of Chinese colonists and troops which might be sent out by the Peking government. In return the Mongolians promised all sorts of privileges to the Russians (freedom of travel and navigation, freedom of commerce, extra-territoriality of Russian subjects, consular service, freedom from customs duties,

and the right to buy and own real estate, along with many other privileges).

Having reached this agreement with Mongolia, Russia proceeded to force it upon Japan.

All this took some time, however. A year later, on November 5, 1913, the necessary exchange of notes took place between Peking and St. Petersburg, recognizing and sanctioning this state of things, certainly not to the glory of Russia. Yuan Shi-Kai, the strong man of China, did his best to make the Khutuktu acknowledge the sovereignty of China, but could not succeed because of the support Russia gave Mongolia.¹ China was thus forced finally to recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.

On September 30, 1914, Russia signed a special agreement with Mongolia which gave Russia the right to "advise Mongolia" concerning the building of railroads. As a matter of fact there were no railroads to speak of in Mongolia.

Finally on June 7, 1915, a tripartite agreement was signed between Russia, China and Mongolia, providing a definite legal form for the following conventional agreements: ²

1. Outer Mongolia, though remaining autonomous, recognized the Chinese suzerainty over her.
2. The treaty making power remained in China's hands, although commercial treaties might be negotiated directly by Mongolian authorities.

¹ China retained her jurisdiction exclusively over the Chinese residents in Mongolia.

² For details see, the *American Journal of International Law*, 1916, vol. X, *E. T. Williams*.

3. Russia and China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, promising to abstain from all interference with the internal administration of the Mongols.

4. No customs duties exist either on Chinese or Russian imports into Mongolia.

5. Chinese residents are under Chinese jurisdiction, Russians under Russian jurisdiction, while special mixed courts are established for mixed cases, on the model of the former Russian-Chinese mixed courts of the Russian-Chinese railroad.

6. China promised to consult Russia on all political questions concerning Outer Mongolia.

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CHAPTER IV.

JAPAN.

I.

WHEREAS Russia's relations with China date back far into the centuries and were mostly of a very peaceful character, her relations with Japan are quite recent, dating back but a few decades and from the very beginning they were exceedingly militant.

The first real contact took place at the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and at once hostility was apparent. Russia was backing Li-Hung-Chang at Shimonoseki, where the Chino-Japanese peace negotiations were transacted. It was due to Russia's initiative that the two European powers, France and Germany, joined with her in partially depriving Japan of the fruits of her victory, by forcing her to return to China the Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur, a splendid strategic harbor.

In order to understand Russia's action one must remember that just at that time she was intent on penetrating into northern China in order to take firm hold on the Manchurian market. Her Pacific Coast plans were not yet so clear. Japan flushed by her easy victory over China had also an eye to northern China with Korea as her immediate objective. If Russia had been more careful and considerate of her new neighbor, she

could easily have reached at that time at least, a peaceful understanding concerning "spheres of influence" at China's expense. Russia's overbearing attitude towards Japan in treating the latter as a negligible quantity only served to exasperate her and led the Japanese to increase their claims. The unavoidable result of this policy was the final clash of arms.

Worst of all for Japan were the events which followed the loss of Port Arthur, which alone was an insult to her pride. Not many months passed before those very European powers who claimed to stand for the protection of China began themselves to grab her territory. And just this same peninsula of Liaotung and the harbor of Port Arthur were shamelessly annexed (or "leased" as the official documents called it) by Russia. What could Japan think of European diplomatic methods after that? And this was the start of her intimate dealings with Russia, the beginning of a new period and of new relations. No wonder that these relations from the beginning took the shape of mutual distrust and dislike. The Japanese are often accused, especially by Americans, of underhand dealings and diplomatic duplicity but it must be acknowledged that they took their lesson from the European powers. From the very beginning of her relations with Europe, Japan found nothing but double play and trickery and when later during the suppression of the Boxer uprising she witnessed the looting and robbing of Chinese homes by Europeans, she must necessarily have felt grave doubts about the lofty ideals of European civilization. The Chinese riots on the Russian frontier gave Japan another example of the real atti-

tude of Europe; when the riots occurred along the Amur River the Russian generals there behaved most cruelly, for not only did they shoot promiscuously all Chinese in sight, but ordered some of them to be placed on barges in the river and the barges sunk. A further example might be given. Russia first crossed with Japan concerning Korea in 1895-1896. On February 10, 1896 Russia even sent marines to Chemulpo and Seoul; after taking hold of some government offices, the Russians established themselves in the Korean capital and obtained a strong influence over the Korean government. This lasted till the summer of 1896 when the Lobanoff-Yamagata Protocol was signed (June 16) defining their mutual interests. Later on this was confirmed by a similar agreement, signed at Tokyo by Nishi and Rosen (1898). Both agreements practically recognized the independence of Korea.

Thus from the very beginning the relations of Russia and Japan were marked by a distinct lack of trust and sincerity. The Japanese knew how to bide their time and hide their feelings. During those years, Japan was not yet strong enough to protest vigorously and unwillingly had to submit.

Then came the Boxer riots, the stupid enterprise of the Chinese Dowager Empress and the gradual increase of European infringements upon China, her territories and her markets. Russia especially was very eager, under the leadership of the clever statesman, Witte, to establish a firm hold upon Manchuria. The Russo-Chinese bank, the Chinese Eastern railroad and the Siberian expansion all pointed, with un-

varying clearness, but one way. Japan was bound to realize that sooner or later Russia would in the Pacific menace her fondest plans.

With two problems facing her, namely, the seeming strength, haughtiness, and duplicity of the European governments on the one hand, and on the other, her own weakness, which handicapped her in her dealings even with China, Japan set out to find a friend and an ally.

Very carefully did she begin to study the complex situation in Europe, testing the relative strength of the powers, learning their history, studying their mutual relations and trying to find out future possibilities. One must acknowledge the great success with which the task was accomplished. Japan really sized up the situation extremely well, due to the subtle methods of investigation she used and to the statesmanlike gifts of her diplomatic representatives. Baron Hayashi in this respect ranks foremost among them all, while Marquis Ito was a close second. There existed not nearly as much absence of teamwork between these two men, as *Mr. Pooley's* Memoirs of Hayashi would have us believe. It was camouflage to a great extent on their part that made it seem that they were working on different policies.

Very soon it became evident that Japan's choice would be England or Russia. France did not count much in Far-Eastern affairs and Germany did not at first seem to attract the sympathies of Japan; much more likely however Germany was herself not sufficiently interested in the affairs of the Far East. In this latter respect we might surmise that Berlin purposely

tried to confirm this impression of the Japanese; at that time it was Germany's established policy to push Russia into the breach and to act exclusively behind Russia's back.

In 1900 Japan carefully felt her way. In 1901 she began negotiations with England and Russia simultaneously; Hayashi had talks with Lansdowne and Ito came to St. Petersburg to consult with Witte and Lamsdorff. Both these Japanese diplomats reported in detail to Tokyo and the Japanese government thus had a full picture of all the possibilities and contingencies. Germany was very careful in the rôle she had chosen; between England and Russia she was the *tertius gaudens*. The Secret Memoirs of Baron Hayashi describe very well how Germany tried to keep in touch with what was going on in London and at St. Petersburg; how her representatives called at proper times on the Japanese diplomats and the local ministers and how they simulated indignation at being "left out" of the agreements; how Lansdowne and Lamsdorff tried to keep the negotiations secret and how the news constantly leaked out. Germany, we think, did not want to take part in these agreements and much preferred to have her hands free. The Kaiser was at that time much too anti-English to enter into an agreement with Great Britain, and as to Russia, he liked better that the latter country should pull the chestnuts out of the fire for him. We can also suppose that the Japanese soon realized this, but did not care about it one way or the other. Such lack of desire on Germany's part to become involved in the agreement became quite evident later on; in February 1902 Komura, then minister of

foreign affairs, had a talk with the German ambassador at Tokyo, and asked him if Germany would like to join, but the latter refused.

On the other hand, Marquis Ito found the attitude of the St. Petersburg government much too haughty, unattractive and overbearing. The Russian ministers tried to deal with him as they had dealt with the Chinese; they treated the Japanese representatives as inferiors and constantly put forward impossible claims. In no matter did they want to meet the Japanese halfway, either in Manchuria, which they seemed to consider their private property, or concerning Korea, where they wished to have a predominant influence. There is no doubt that at the beginning Tokyo would have preferred an agreement with Russia. Two factors worked strongly in that direction; first the idea that Russia was very powerful, and second, the conviction that Japan had more in common with Russia than with England, due to the neighborly situation in the Far East. An understanding with Russia would have been so much more natural, even if it had no moral background of sincerity. Tokyo had learned not to rely too much on morals when dealing with Europe. However the Russians spoiled this chance and the scales began to lean towards England.

Meanwhile Baron Hayashi was cleverly conducting his negotiations with the British government all through the summer of 1901. His endeavors were centered on the question of Korea, which Japan wanted to secure for herself entirely; she finally succeeded in doing so.

The treaty of alliance between Japan and England

was signed in London, January 30, 1902, by Lansdowne and Hayashi; it was to be of ten years' duration.

Hayashi rightly points out the risks of conducting such double negotiations. It would have been very embarrassing, for him especially, if Ito had succeeded simultaneously at St. Petersburg. Personally we think that Japan would then have dropped the negotiations with England. Later, however, things changed materially and Japan was exceedingly happy to have England as an ally instead of Russia. From this point of view the overbearing policy of Witte and Lamsdorff was certainly a very grave and unpardonable mistake; it was however unfortunately in harmony with the general policy of the Russian government and brought forth its worst results two years later.

II.

Having secured an ally in Europe, Japan naturally felt steadier on her feet and began to assert her claims concerning China and the Far East with much greater firmness. On her side, Russia showed signs of greater aggressiveness and less understanding of the Japanese point of view.

The Russian government refused to take into consideration, even in the slightest degree, the Japanese interests. She was thus proceeding headlong into a disastrous conflict. The author can speak from personal experience, for he spent the winter of 1902-1903 in Manchuria, Port Arthur, Shanghai and Peking, and saw the slow but steady growth of Japanese prepara-

tions for an armed conflict. The strength of the Japanese was increasing daily and parallel to this was augmenting the lack of understanding on the part of Russian bureaucrats. It was really tragic to return to St. Petersburg in the spring of 1903 and realize how little attention was paid there to the Japanese claims and how little people understood the strength of Japan and the danger of a conflict with her. In Russia, and this applies to the government as well as to public opinion in general, there was nothing but derision towards the Japanese. No one wanted to take them seriously, hardly any one ever gave a thought to Far Eastern events. Russians gave the government a free hand in these affairs and we know now what a criminal use was made of this opportunity.

It was during the author's stay at Port Arthur, that he and his colleagues first heard of the new enterprise of the Russian government in Korea, the most foolish and criminal one ever undertaken there.

A few unscrupulous adventurers, a former officer of the guards, Besobrasoff, an admiral, Abaza, and a few less known men had succeeded in persuading the Tsar of the wonderful possibilities of exploiting the natural resources of Korea. These resources, no doubt, were of a remarkable financial potentiality, and Japan well realizing this wished to acquire them herself, and was in no way inclined to allow Russia or anyone else to interfere in Korea. This latter fact was clearly evident in the Far East, whereas in St. Petersburg not a single person, except perhaps Witte, paid the slightest attention to it. The Tsar and several members of his family invested their personal capital in the Besobrasoff con-

cession on the Yalu River and made the whole enterprise a personal affair. This at once became a tempting bait for unscrupulous bureaucrats and officials, who thought that they could further their own career by helping with the concession. An especially ugly rôle was played by the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeiev, who was sufficiently clever to realize the dangers that this enterprise implied; living himself in Port Arthur, he could not but know the complications that were bound to arise and the protests that were certain to come from the Japanese. Yet he never thought of protesting vigorously, or of tendering his resignation, though the acts of Besobrasoff on the Yalu were even challenging his vice-regal prestige. He was the official link between the Russians and Japanese and was obliged to tell the Japanese all sorts of stories about the Korean plans of Russia, which he knew were not true and which he knew that the Japanese did not believe.

Much heavier blame however falls upon some of the Tsar's ministers, as well as on himself. Besobrasoff, Abaza and their men were simply promoters and adventurers and could do their mischief only because they had such a strong backing in the Russian government circles, whereas the ministers had no such excuse.

The psychology of the Tsar in this case is explained by his absolute contempt of Japan, on the one hand, perhaps even with a tinge of vengeance at the back of it, for he was wounded in the head by a Japanese at the time of his visit to the Far East, and on the other hand, by his conceit and conviction that he, the Lord's anointed, could do no wrong (especially in dealing with inferiors). It was also one of the most pernicious influ-

ences of the Kaiser that told in this case very strongly. Wilhelm was consciously and cleverly urging the Tsar on to such a conflict, upholding his conviction of superiority over the Japanese and flattering him into complacency. His game was a sure one too; Germany could only win, Russia could only lose. However, this was but a weak excuse for Nicholas; he might have known better and there are indications that he was not so averse to war as he wanted people to believe. He was so sure of himself and of the strength of his army that he firmly believed in a brilliant and easy victory over the despised Japanese.

Among the ministers, the chief culprits (because their policy was nothing short of a national crime) were General Kuropatkin, the minister of war, and von Plehve, the minister of the interior. They were actuated however by different motives. Witte's share of the blame was less serious. Though he started the fateful policy of peaceful penetration of Manchuria and Russian expansion in the Far East, he never, even for a moment, contemplated any military action, never planned to spread Russian influence farther than Manchuria proper and finally realizing very early in the game to what dangerous consequences the Russian policy in the Far East was leading, he warned the other ministers and tried to put on the brakes, but unfortunately it was too late. Kuropatkin was a typical aggressive general, convinced of the strength of his army and of the sanctity of the autocratic régime of his government. Witte, for example, writes in his Memoirs of how Kuropatkin hailed Russian aggression in Manchuria, his plan being "to seize that province

and turn it into a second Bokhara." He played no mean rôle either in the repressive policy against the Boxers, supporting with joy the "punitive expedition" that looted China and the Chinese. In the West Kuropatkin was not less aggressive; it was due to him that the idea started of exerting pressure upon Sweden by fortifying Finland and making it one with Russia. It was due to Kuropatkin's counsel that Russia did not withdraw her troops from Manchuria and repeatedly broke faith with the other powers, thus effectively undermining her prestige abroad. In November 1902 Kuropatkin was sent by the Tsar to Japan and the Far East. Here he became convinced of the strength of Japan and of the dangers coupled with the Beso-brasoff expedition and warned the Tsar. It was too late, however, for these policies were well started and the Tsar was too firmly convinced of Japan's inferiority. This warning of Kuropatkin does not lessen his culpability.

The other culprit, Plehve, played his part also by urging drastic measures against Japan but for different reasons. As minister of the interior he had to deal with the Russian revolutionaries and the constantly growing social discontent. At that time Russia was seething with revolution and Plehve conceived the awful idea of recurring to the Machiavellian principle: "when troubles threaten at home, start a foreign war." He told the other ministers that he did not mind the complications with Japan, that as a matter of fact he was glad of it: "A little war will help us very much." The war, however, proved to be neither "little," nor a "help" to these men.

It is interesting to note the fate of these three men, implicated in the Japanese embroglio. Witte was destined to settle the trouble and sign the peace for a defeated nation, gaining all that it was possible to gain under the circumstances, but losing his own standing and popularity among his people and with his government. General Kuropatkin was appointed after some hesitation, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies against Japan, had to lead the bad generals of his own appointment and creation ¹ and sustained defeat after defeat, till he was finally demoted. Plehve was assassinated by revolutionaries, whom he never succeeded in curbing though he did succeed in demoralizing the system of his autocratic government.

In the summer of 1903 Japan made the last effort to settle the trouble amicably by renewing negotiations with St. Petersburg, but met with the same reluctance on the part of Russia to give any decisive answer. Russia's replies were as evasive and unsatisfactory as they had previously been. Witte describes this in a striking sentence, "We were headed straight for war and at the same time we did nothing to prepare ourselves for the eventuality. We acted as if we were certain that the Japanese would endure everything without daring to attack us." This was absolutely true, Russia directly provoked the war by her foolish policy while not really lifting a finger to prepare for it.

On January 16, 1904, Japan finally lost patience and

¹Though most of the very poor generals sent out to command the Russian troops in Manchuria were chosen either by the Tsar or by influences at Court, their promotions depended exclusively on Kuropatkin, who as minister of war, selected them chiefly for the pull they had at Court.

presented an ultimatum. She was ready to recognize Russian interests in Manchuria, provided Russia would recognize her interests, especially in Korea. The answer was again very unsatisfactory. The Tsar, it was said, did not want war, the people did not want it and they did not expect it. In consequence it was a genuine surprise to the Russian government, when on the night of February 8, the Japanese destroyers entered Port Arthur and fired torpedoes at Russian battleships, unprepared and unprotected. On the following day war was declared.

The war was never popular with the Russian nation. From the very beginning Russia was against it, not even understanding why she was fighting Japan. Under such conditions defeat was unavoidable. The people did not back the government in any way and instead of bringing with it popular enthusiasm that would have diminished social discontent and weakened the revolutionary movement, as Plehve expected, the war called forth the exactly opposite results—the gradual spread of dissatisfaction among the people, which rose to a climax in the summer of 1905, when the conditions in the army were at their worst.

The situation became so threatening that in July the Tsar had finally to give in. He sought peace abroad and made constitutional concessions at home, all under the direct pressure of fear. The initiative of the peace negotiations came, as is well known, from President Roosevelt. After some hesitation the Tsar appointed Witte as the chief representative of Russia, probably her cleverest man, but unfortunately lacking in firm moral principles.

Witte gives a vivid account, in his *Memoirs* (Chap. V) of the Portsmouth Peace Conference and of how he won a brilliant diplomatic victory, nearly succeeding in annihilating the Japanese military achievements. At the same time he also succeeded in another, no less important task of swinging American public opinion from open hostility to hearty sympathy. This part of his story concerning his dealings with the American press and his personal endeavors in the United States is most instructive and clearly shows the force of public opinion in our days. Contrast only his seeming open-mindedness and civility to the pressmen with the cold aloofness of the Japanese, enshrined in their dignity, secluded and secretive, and you will easily understand the results and consequences! In the space of a few weeks, American public opinion was entirely on the side of Russia and against Japan, whereas during the war and previous to it, while Russia was dickering in Manchuria, the trend of American feelings was just the opposite—wholeheartedly back of Japan.

There is no doubt whatever that this change, achieved among Americans affected the peace negotiations and helped Witte to gain the upper hand.

Not doubting Roosevelt's sincerity, we can at present question his wisdom in forcing this peace upon Russia. Not that we could have expected a victory or even military achievements for Russia, but Japan might have learned a lesson which would have changed much of the succeeding events throughout the world. As a matter of fact Russia's condition and the state of her army could not have become much worse if the war had dragged on a few months longer. The Russian

army would never have been able to show much energy, but her internal troubles would have increased and forced the government to grant more reforms, establishing in a firmer way the principles of constitutional government, for which she was quite ready, but which neither the Tsar nor the ruling class were yet ready to grant. What they did grant they tried to take back as soon as the social discontent quieted down. Again, the continuation of the war would have brought important changes in Japan. Japan at that moment was at the end of her tether. Roosevelt, in other words, saved Japan from an economic collapse that might have called for constitutional reforms in Japan also, and only the latter could be a reliable guarantee against the development of imperialism in the Pacific.

III.

The Portsmouth Peace Treaty, September 5, 1905, returned to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur and Talienwan or Dalny, which she had lost after the peace of Shimonoseki, owing to the "friendly advice" of Russia, Germany and France. But it gave Japan much more than that. The Russians had built up and developed Port Arthur and Dalny; Port Arthur became a first class fortress and was a splendidly equipped harbor for the Japanese navy, while Dalny became a very convenient port for commercial shipping. Further, Japan received the South Manchurian railroad and could thus spread her influence unhampered all over Manchuria, practically controlling that market

as she saw fit. From that moment on Japan began to look upon Manchuria as she formerly looked upon Korea, as a sphere for her exclusive influence, where no other power should interfere. To Russia all this meant pure loss, to the rest of the world it was simply a change in tenants. Russian domination was now replaced by Japanese domination, but the door to Manchuria, the "open door" was tighter closed than ever. In addition Russia ceded the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, with its natural resources of no mean value. On the other hand Witte succeeded in thwarting the Japanese desire for an indemnity; they asked for six hundred million dollars, but had to withdraw the claim before the treaty was signed.

The peace treaty was naturally only the first step in the adjustment of the Russo-Japanese relations after the war. China too had to be considered, in some way at least. There had to follow, consequently, an agreement between Japan and China, which was signed in December 1905, sanctioning the transfer of territory as arranged by the Russo-Japanese treaty. The legal forms of these transfers were similar to the preceding arrangements with the other powers, viz., the sovereignty of China was recognized, but the government and administration were to be entrusted to Japan on the model of the civil law lease.

Later followed new agreements between Russia and Japan, signed during the summer of 1907. One convention (signed June 13) concerned the detailed railroad arrangements, junctions, etc., between the Eastern Siberian railroad and the Southern Japanese section. Two other conventions were signed July 28; one

concerned commerce and navigation and the other the fisheries on the Pacific coast, especially in the Behring and Okhotsk seas. Finally on July 30 Iswolsky, minister of foreign affairs, and Motono, Japanese ambassador in St. Petersburg, signed a general agreement defining their respective interests in the Far East.

Still later, on the same principle of amicable coöperation between these former enemies and now close friends, two new conventions were signed July 4, 1910 and July 8, 1912. These conventions concerned the joint action of Japan and Russia in Manchuria and were meant to reaffirm the policy of exclusion of the other countries. The first confirmed the *status quo ante* of reciprocity between Russia and Japan, while the other related to the railroad lines in Manchuria, their improvement and expansion. The understanding of 1910 was, as a matter of fact, an answer to the American and other inquiries, relating to the open door policy. The Western powers were asking whether Japan and Russia were prepared to accept this principle and give other nations a chance to trade in the North-China market. The answer was a decisive refusal, for neither Russia nor Japan was willing to admit foreign participation in their Manchurian commerce. They eagerly combined to shut out any possible competition.

Finally, in still clearer terms these same principles of coöperation, of mutual help and of recognition were stated in the last agreement signed by Russia and Japan, in the treaty of July 3, 1916. This agreement also mentioned mutual military assistance in the war against Germany then going on. The worst

of it in this last case was that it was not restricted, as the previous arrangements had been, to North-China and Manchuria only, but on the contrary, covered the entire field of the Far East.

Thus ended the short feud between Russia and Japan, passing away as suddenly as it came. If we now look back at the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1901-1905 we can easily see its characteristic artificiality. It was so unnatural and unnecessary and could have been so easily avoided if each side had been willing to concede a little to its opponent. Especially does this fault lie with Russia. Her policy towards Japan was the height of foolishness and political shortsightedness; it will always remain a terrible indictment against the Tsar Nicholas and his immediate counselors, and it will ever be a striking example of the dangers of secret diplomacy. Had there been more light thrown on the mutual relations of those two countries, as they were developing during these fateful years, the danger might have been avoided or at least lessened.

After the war and the peace treaty of Portsmouth had become history, Russia soon seemed to forget her ill-feeling towards Japan and in later years there did not exist any desire for vengeance, or enmity towards the Japanese. This fact is best witnessed by the ease with which the mutual agreements that followed the Portsmouth peace were reached and approved by the two nations.

CHAPTER V.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

I.

WE now approach one of the most entangled problems of the European situation, the relations of Russia towards Austria-Hungary. It is very difficult for anybody studying the complex policies in the Near East, with their parallel alliances, criss-cross intrigues and mutual distrust of the great powers, to get a straight and coherent story out of them. Much has been written about these problems, and yet so very little is known concerning their historic meaning. Most of the literature is either prejudiced or insincere.

The relations of Russia with the Hapsburg monarchy fall into three periods: first, from 1878 to 1897 there existed a decided tension between the two empires, brought about by the Russian success in the armistice of San Stefano and the Russian relations with the Balkan Slavs; second, from 1897 to 1907 this tension gradually disappears and there ensues a period of relative friendship, not always sincere, but at least outwardly peaceful; third, beginning with 1908 and up to the Great War of 1914, the relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary steadily grow worse, until a final break became inevitable.

The fate of Austria-Hungary after her defeat of

1867 depended entirely on her relations with Germany and for a long time it was Bismarck who really inspired the main principles of her policy; with few exceptions, the directives constantly came from Berlin.

After the Berlin Congress of 1878, Bismarck expected from Austria effective help in case of any new military conflict, and used the weight of her influence in his political and diplomatic game in opposing the growth of the Slav influences. In the last mentioned case he found a willing friend in the Hungarian nation, because it was most afraid of a Slav expansion. The Hungarians are very much like the Prussians, nationalistic and chauvinistic, having ruled the Slav population of the Dual Monarchy most ruthlessly.

Bismarck started by backing Austria whole-heartedly at the Berlin Congress, meeting all her demands and finally giving her the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As *Temperley* says in his "History of Serbia," "where Russia had spent thousands of lives and millions of pounds, Austria spent only ink and paper" and still she got the greatest advantages out of the Berlin Congress.

At that time the Austro-Hungarian Empire was governed by a Hungarian, Count Andrassy, Sr., who eagerly met Bismarck more than half way. In August 1879 Bismarck arranged for an interview with Andrassy at Gastein in order to discuss the mutual policies. From the very start he proposed an alliance between the two empires of a most "general" character, covering the west as well as the east. Andrassy demurred, realizing the dangers that were created in the west by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and the undying, though

for the moment hidden ill feeling of France. He proposed instead an agreement that would be directed against the east exclusively (against Russia). Bismarck did not quite like it, as he knew that the German Emperor would be very unwilling to antagonize Russia and the Russian Tsar, with whom he was bound by personal friendship and family ties. The Chancellor overcame, however, these objections, as he so often did during his lifelong service, and agreed to the conclusion of the alliance with Austria, which was signed October 10, 1879 and ratified October 15, 1879. The fate of the Austrian empire became henceforth absolutely dependent on the policies of the Berlin government; the two monarchies were bound to stand and fall together.

In dealing with Austria Bismarck had only military advantages in view, considering the possibility of a future war on either side of the German empire, west or east. He did not care for taking part in the Balkan trouble and left it entirely to Austria; Germany had still much room for her national expansion and Bismarck persistently declined to start any colonial or Near East policy; Austria might deal with Russia or the Balkan Slavs as best she could.

The treaty of 1879 was kept secret but its contents soon were known to the world and aroused, especially in Russia, a very natural feeling of anxiety. The objects of this dual alliance were, first, the defence of the *status quo* created by the Berlin Congress, secondly, a mutual insurance against Russia. The first article of the treaty promised reciprocal aid in case of an attack by Russia; if another power attacked, Aus-

tria-Hungary was to remain neutral, but if Russia joined the attacking power, article I. was to be in force; finally Austria was to warn Tsar Alexander that if he attacked one of the allies, the other one would be compelled to join the power attacked. The treaty was concluded for five years, but was constantly renewed. The full text of this agreement is published by *Pribram and Coolidge*, "Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary," 1920. Thus there was formed a strong nucleus in east Europe.

Having achieved this great consolidation, Bismarck cleverly proceeded to pacify Russia; he could not afford to have Russia as an enemy-neighbor. He was actuated, however, in the case of Russia not only by military considerations; there existed strong political reasons for a Russo-German understanding: first, the personal friendship that existed between the two emperors, and second, the need of upholding the monarchical principle, on which both empires were built. In consequence, he tried to find means of approaching Russia and allaying her fears.

The situation in Austria-Hungary was much more difficult. Her alliance with Germany was bound to increase her quarrels with the Balkan Slavs, her own numerous Slav population included; many of them were dreaming of entire independence; the Pan-Slav ideal too, which Austria and especially Hungary hated and feared so much, seemed to increase steadily in strength. One must keep in mind in this respect a most characteristic trait of the Russian Pan-Slav movement; it was prompted much more by hatred of Germans than by love of Slavs; Vienna paid too little at-

tention to this factor. It soon proved to be the main source of trouble between Austria and Russia; for a very long time it disturbed the peace of Europe and unfortunately the question is still with us: Is it solved?

Bismarck, meanwhile, spent his time and efforts in endeavoring to build up an understanding with Russia. He made use in this respect of the former alliance, the so-called "Entente of the Three Emperors," existing since 1872; he wanted it resurrected in spite of his new alliance with Austria and finally persuaded the two other governments to renew it; it was signed in Berlin June 18, 1881 by himself and the two ambassadors, Sabourof for Russia and Szecheny for Austria-Hungary. According to that understanding, if one of the three countries should be at war, the other two were to remain benevolently neutral; if war broke out with Turkey, the three powers had to reach a special agreement concerning the outcome of such a war. This understanding was concluded for three years, and the first difficulty arose in 1883, when the renewal of 1884 was discussed by the allies. Russia wanted to be free towards Turkey, but this attitude alarmed and displeased Austria and friction seemed imminent.

Bismarck then once more displayed his great diplomatic skill. Harping on the monarchical ideal he convinced the three emperors of the necessity of a personal meeting in order to further strengthen their autocracies. He succeeded in bringing them together in Skiernevice in 1884, where they met accompanied by their ministers.

One can easily judge of the complicated situation and the involved game Bismarck was playing by the

fact that simultaneously he succeeded in greatly strengthening the Dual Alliance by the accession of Italy, which was to act, at the same time, as a counter weight to Austria. Italy agreed to join chiefly for two reasons, because of her isolated position in Europe and on account of some anti-French feelings that existed among certain Italian parties; France had hampered the Italian policy in Tunis. Germany on her side promised Italy commercial advantages for the reconstruction of her shattered finances. Austria expected that Italy's accession would minimize the dangers of her *Irridenta* on the Italian frontier.

Thus we can see how these diplomatic entanglements crossed and neutralized one another, increasing the difficulties of the Eastern Empires and creating mutual distrust and dissatisfaction.

The Balkan trouble, just then developing between Bulgaria and Russia, only helped to add fuel; Austria was glad of making use of it and looked on with pleasure at the Serbian war with Bulgaria that broke out in 1885.

Russia, on the other hand, showed more distinctly her dislike of Austria, and when in 1886 the time came for another renewal of her treaty with Austria and Germany, she naturally hesitated and wavered in her policy. The treaty was finally renewed on June 18, 1887, but without the participation of Austria, to the latter country's great alarm.

We cannot wonder at that. Austria was very much afraid of her Slav subjects and of the growing Pan Slav movement. The only solution for her would have been to frankly admit the federal principle; but just this

Parallel to these difficulties came the transactions concerning the renewal of the Teutonic alliance. Bismarck rightly pointed out that since the accession of Italy and the many changes in eastern Europe the premises of the original agreement required thorough revision. This was achieved during the years 1886-1887 and the new text of the Triple alliance signed in 1887 was somewhat different from that of 1879.¹ Thus, for instance, we find three new words inserted, "without direct provocation," referring to the possible attack on one of the allies, which were absent in the text of 1879; the latter was much simpler, whereas the text of 1887 became very ambiguous; this can be easily explained by the increased complexity of the political situation in Eastern Europe. A little later arose a very interesting, but troublesome question, as to the continuation of the treaty of 1879; some statesmen and jurists argued that the two treaties of 1879 and 1887 were two different instruments and the one of 1887 could not be looked at as the mere renewal of the previous alliance of 1879, and as there was no mention made about the abrogation of the treaty of 1879, it

¹ *Pribram, A. F.*, *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*.

still was in force, parallel to the agreement of 1887. This point of view is defended, for example, by Friedjung.¹ This made the involved situation still more complicated, but unfortunately there is much justification of the cited opinion, especially as the alliance of 1879 was now made public in Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest; the treaty of 1887 remained secret up to the time of the Teutonic defeat. Thus the web of diplomatic intrigue was unabatingly woven by the eastern autocracies, which were fated finally to perish themselves, strangled in the vicious meshes of their own fabrication.

II.

In the '90's the relations between Russia and Austria began gradually to improve. There were two important causes for this: on the one hand, the Pan-Slav movement lost its former impetus and there appeared many points of disagreement among the Slavs of different countries; on the other, Russia, their elder sister, suddenly changed her policy, henceforth ignoring the Balkans and directing all her efforts toward an unexpected expansion in the Far East; this latter development was bound to tell on Russia's relations to her southwestern neighbors.

Vienna was not slow in noticing it; in 1896 Francis Joseph paid a visit to St. Petersburg where he was cordially received, and proposed a new understanding between the two countries. As a matter of fact an agreement was signed in 1897 to the disadvantage of

¹ Comp. his book *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*.

poor Serbia, which was left by Russia to the mercy of Austria. The objects of this understanding were: first, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia, where bandits were openly pillaging; and second, the delineation of spheres of influence; to Russia were apportioned Bulgaria, Turkey, and Montenegro, while Austria got as her sphere of influence Serbia, Macedonia, Saloniki, and Albania.

Simultaneously, we can witness the appearance in both countries of new political groups, working for mutual friendship, austrophiles in Russia and russo-philosophes in Austria.

But even during this period of better understanding, the horizon was never entirely without clouds. The storm center lay in Macedonia. Serbia and Bulgaria continuously clashed there; each one wanted its own schools, its own influence, its own advantages. From the south there came also Greek interference. Turkish maladministration and occasional massacres only added fuel.

During this whole period, 1896-1907, the efforts of the great powers were much too timid and insincere to be able to achieve any drastic change or improvement. In 1902 the Russian foreign minister, Lamsdorff, undertook a special trip to Vienna, Sophia, and Nish in order to reach some mutual understanding, but failed; even the small nations seemed to want to keep away from Russia. Lamsdorff succeeded, however, in convincing Vienna of the necessity of discussing amicably the Balkan situation and of deciding on some sort of mutual policy.

In consequence, a Russian-Austrian memorandum

of reforms was drawn up on February 17, 1903 and sent to the Sultan, who accepted it without protest, but also without paying much attention to it. Later in the year a meeting of the two emperors, Nicholas and Francis Joseph, took place at Mürzsteg (September 1903) and a new program of common action was worked out and accepted. According to the provisions of this new understanding, a special Inspector-General, commanding the gendarmes in Macedonia was to be appointed by the Porte, with two assistants, one of whom was to be a Russian, the other an Austrian. Further, there were to be mixed courts for political crimes and the christians were to receive a special indemnity.

This plan also failed to impress the Sultan, who calmly continued in his old policies. Moreover, though all other powers sanctioned these reforms, Germany demurred, in the hope of secretly sustaining the Turks; the latter gladly took this chance and felt themselves supported in their opposition to Russia. The reform plans naturally were bound to fail.

Then came the unfortunate Japanese war, taking up all Russia's time and strength and preventing any possibility on her part to interfere any more in the policies of the Balkans.

During the war Lamsdorff, the Russian foreign minister, signed an agreement with the Austrian ambassador, d'Aehrenthal, by which Austria promised to remain neutral and keep up a joint policy with Russia in the Balkans; at that time Austria did not take any advantage of Russia's weakness.

The last act of this friendly period was Iswolsky's

visit to d'Aehrenthal and the Austro-Russian note of October 1, 1907, concerning the Macedonian reforms and the Müritzsteg program, which seemed to affect Turkey so little. This common action was weaker than ever and showed already the increasing insincerity in the relations of Austria and Russia. The storm was not long in coming.

III.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the personal enterprise of the energetic count d'Aehrenthal, who had no scruples, especially when Russia and Russian interests were concerned.

Before he became minister of foreign affairs for Austria he had a long record of diplomatic service in Russia and knew well the Russian Court and the bureaucratic surroundings of the Tsar. Likewise was he acquainted with all the details of the situation of the Russian government at that time; after he left St. Petersburg there were many friendly informants, who kept him in touch with what was going on there. He had for example a great friend in the person of one of the ministers, Mr. Schwanebach, of German descent, who was always willing to send him any information, even to the extent of being paid for it. D'Aehrenthal succeeded the old count Golouchovsky in October 1906 and from the start had two political objects for future policy: the establishment of Austrian supremacy in Serbia and ousting the Russian influence, having especially in view the Russian minister at Belgrade, Hartwig, who was looked upon in Vienna as the source of all evils, and second, the reforms concerning Turkey,

in particular her administration in Macedonia and her finances. D'Aehrenthal was very clever and astute and had what not many Austrian statesmen had possessed before him—firmness of character and clear vision of what was going on in the other capitals of Europe, especially in Russia. One must say that old Austria, as the Russian jurist Baron B. Nolde once wrote, had educated a wonderful school of diplomats and clever bureaucrats, who administered that chequered empire as well as it was possible. This is perhaps the only merit of this defunct monarchy, which was really an abstraction, not a nation. There was even no national culture to back the government.

D'Aehrenthal was well aware of Russia's internal troubles and of her great weakness, which undermined her forces after the Japanese war. The reactionary policy of the Russian government further helped to increase her internal trouble and weakness. On the other hand Turkey was also much too weak after her revolution and seemed powerless to protest against whatever Vienna undertook to do in the Balkan peninsula. The moment must have seemed a very propitious one for him.

Further, after the Turkish revolution there might have come up at the instigation of the nationalistic young Turks the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina's representation in the Turkish Parliament. Turkey might have claimed that after all these provinces belonged to her, according to the treaty of Berlin, their population was composed of Turkish subjects and it would have seemed only fair to give them a chance to participate in the newly established system of represen-

tation. The powers would then have been unable to protest because such a measure would have been undertaken in the name of constitutional principles and civic freedom. This would have meant, necessarily, the end of Austria's "administration" of these provinces, which d'Aehrenthal had no intention of losing. Turkish chauvinism alarmed him very much.

There were still further reasons for anxiety. The Teuton powers had just learned the details of King Edward's visit to the Tsar, which took place at Reval, where the plan of an understanding between Russia and England was seriously discussed. Austria could not afford to have Germany threatened.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina came not quite as a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. D'Aehrenthal had prepared his way very carefully; several measures taken by him had cleared the way for this last act. His first step was taken in January 1908; on the 27th he proposed in a speech before the parliamentary delegation of Austria-Hungary the building of the Mitrovitza railroad. This proposition was not merely a technical plan of railroad construction, but a detailed program of economic exploitation of the whole Balkan peninsula; it was a plan destined to alarm all the powers, but especially Russia. Turkey became evidently anxious too for she protested to Vienna; Russia then made public her own similar plan for another railroad going east-west to the Adriatic.

From the very beginning of his administration of foreign affairs, d'Aehrenthal was ably assisted by the Austrian Heir Apparent the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The latter stood, as is well known, for the so-

called "Trialism," viz., the addition on equal terms to the Austro-Hungarian union of a third part, composed of the Slav elements of the empire, Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bohemia and all others.¹ This combination had great advantages to speak for it. It might have solved the problem of Austria's future, since it certainly would have eliminated the greatest danger—the Slav resistance. It would have satisfied them and guaranteed them full national equality. Yet, it had many staunch enemies; against it was the whole Magyar nation, which did not want to give up its privileges of exploitation of those parts of the empire, which were predominantly Slav. Against it also were the Austrian bureaucratic interests and the Austrian government ideology. The Vienna officials were too much bound by their old methods of administration. Finally there existed the real danger for Austria in the growing Slav hope for a "Greater Serbia," which would have been given an impetus by the system of Trialism.

The German influence at Vienna was also against the plan. Berlin could not look with indifference upon the growth of the Slav element in Austria-Hungary; we know that the Kaiser repeatedly tried to persuade Francis Ferdinand to give up the plan. The Austrian Heir-Apparent, however, was insistently pressing it on d'Aehrenthal. The latter's attitude towards the plan is not quite clear but sufficient evidence exists to show that he did not altogether sympathize with it; he was temporizing when he was dealing with Francis

¹ Some east-European statesmen were even dreaming of a great trialistic empire, with Constantinople as its capital!

Ferdinand, whereas the latter was always sincere in his attitude towards the minister.

The second step of d'Aehrenthal was consequently taken in the same direction of spreading the administrative system of Austria over the Balkans. In July 1908 he came forth with the plan of annexing the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar; it entailed a program more vast than the railroad plan of the preceding winter. It had more strategic advantages for Austria-Hungary and its economic advantages were no less. But for those reasons it called forth much more energetic protests from the other powers, some of which like Russia were really quite indignant about it. D'Aehrenthal realized that the moment for action had not quite come and withdrew his plan; it had important consequences, nevertheless. First of all because he succeeded in securing simultaneously the friendship of Bulgaria, promising her support in case she would like to proclaim her full independence from Turkey; second, it bared the weakness of Constantinople and the Turks; third, it was a start for the idea of federation of the Balkan peoples, under the hegemony of Austria, which greatly increased the prestige of the latter country. Finally it helped the negotiations between Austria on the one hand and Rumania and Greece on the other.

In order to meet the fears of Russia d'Aehrenthal played a rather contemptible trick on Iswolsky, then Russian foreign minister. He invited Iswolsky in September 1908 to count Berchtold's country place at Buchlau and had long talks with him of a most intimate character, succeeding thus in allaying all his fears and promising him not to act independently. Iswolsky was

quite satisfied and content with the Buchlau meeting and was certain that he had the friendship and confidence of his unscrupulous opponent.

Then came the sudden coup. On October 5, 1908 d'Aehrenthal unexpectedly announced that Austria-Hungary was annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was a deliberate infringement of the provisions of the Berlin treaty of 1878 and likewise a breach of faith with Russia, and personally with Iswolsky. Those events in October 1908 created a sensation all over Europe and were a terrible blow to the Slavs. Only among some Slavs of the Austrian empire did the act of annexation meet with sympathetic favor, for special reasons. The Bohemians, especially Kramarz, were not averse to the annexation, because they argued, it strongly increased the Slav element of Austria. This element was bound to triumph some day. It was not, however, what d'Aehrenthal wanted. The Serbians were very much alarmed and considered d'Aehrenthal's policy a direct threat to their kingdom.

The Turks were anxious, also, and declared a boycott on Austrian goods in the Levant, which proved very successful and materially hurt Austrian products. Finally, Italy looked askance on the increase of Austria's strength and was in no way ready to support the latter's claim. We see here probably the first fissure in the triple alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy; Italy was unwilling to follow the leadership of the other two. There is little wonder that contemporaries at that time considered the equilibrium in the Balkans seriously, if not permanently, shaken.

Russia at once took steps to counteract Austria's policy. Iswolsky sent out a note and then went personally to see Sir Edward Grey in order to protest and to propose a European conference instead, which would settle the whole Balkan matter. He worked out a detailed program concerning all the disputed questions, but his labor was in vain.

The idea of a European conference was untenable both to Vienna and to Berlin and for a simple reason. In both those capitals the statesmen realized very well that their claims and policies had not the least chance of being accepted by the other powers. They were far too selfish and aggressive. Austria especially preferred direct dealings with Russia, hoping to bluff her, which would never have been allowed by the other powers. Perhaps it was a mistake on Iswolsky's part to have included in his program the question of Constantinople and the Straits. This inclusion might have frightened England and not have secured for Russia her whole-hearted support.

Germany on her side was strongly opposed to any conference and her action proved decisive for Russia. The displeasure of Berlin came forth first in a speech of the Chancellor, delivered October 7, 1908, in the Reichstag, in which von Bulow unrestrictedly accepted Austria's act of annexation. Vienna was simultaneously notified by the German ambassador of the whole-hearted support of Berlin.

Later came a token of personal friendship in the form of a trip of the Kaiser to Vienna (April 1909), meant to accentuate the mutual understanding, and a blunt notification of St. Petersburg, that Germany

will "stand in shining armor" by the side of her ally, which was practically an ultimatum to Russia, and was thus understood by her government and her people, by the press and public opinion. All were terribly indignant, but none could help, for Russia was much too weak after her war with Japan and unsuccessful attempt at revolution. Russia could not resist the German threat. The insult, however, was never forgotten.

In only one way did Russia score a success. She helped to estrange Italy from Austria. In December, 1908, Iswolsky spoke in the Duma and Tittoni spoke in the Italian parliament about the Italo-Russian friendship, both hinting that all was not quite right with Austria. Then came the visit of the Tsar to Racconigi, where he met the King of Italy. It is interesting to note in this respect that the Tsar's trip, undertaken from Odessa, was routed in a wide circle in order to avoid any Austrian territory; this was an intentional demonstration against Vienna.

But if Russia was not ready for a conflict, neither was Germany. So, after brandishing the sword and appearing in "shining armor" Wilhelm sheathed his sword and put away his armor, attempting again to make friends with Russia as best he could. The following summer he took a cruise in the Baltic, coming to see the Tsar (June 17, 1909) at Björkö. This visit does not speak well for the sincerity of the Kaiser, nor for the cleverness of the Tsar. Seemingly each tried to fool the other, but it is a splendid example of the great dangers to a nation of such autocratic rule, where a monarch by his personal acts can endanger the peace

of the world and the happiness of his own people. The two emperors patched up their differences a year later, when in November, 1910, the Tsar paid a return visit to the Kaiser at Potsdam.

Finally we must note the important rôle the Austrian press played in the hands of d'Aehrenthal. He knew how to manage it wonderfully well and manipulated it without any scruples; he realized the influence of the press on public opinion in modern times. All through this crisis of 1908-1909, d'Aehrenthal constantly held a firm grip over the Vienna papers, filling their columns almost daily with his propaganda and coloring all the news that came through them to the Austrian people. His assistants were men of no mean ability; we need mention but one, the famous historian Friedjung. It was not the first time this man had worked for the Ballplatz government. Later on Berchtold followed the example of his predecessor in handling effectively the Austrian press.

IV.

The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 once more changed the whole aspect of the Near East policies of the Russian government and her relations with Austria.

The first war and especially the alliance of the Balkan people greatly alarmed Vienna for they were exactly contrary to her interests. However, she, as well as Germany, soon saw that the alliance would not last and that Russia had not the influence in it that they had at first imagined. The quarrels between the Balkan allies, which soon followed, filled Vienna with

joy. As a noted French writer said: the hatred of the Balkan peoples helped "Austria to definitely break up the Balkan block."

This meant the estrangement of Russia from Bulgaria and her growing feeling of friendship for Serbia; the farther Russia got away from Bulgaria, the easier did it become for Vienna and Berlin to spread their own propaganda among the Bulgarian people. The consequences of this began to tell at once after the Great War broke out and led to Bulgaria taking sides with the Teuton powers.

The liquidation of the wars of 1912-1913 was assisted by the united action of Russia and Austria; this gave the latter an important trump and helped to strengthen her influence in the Balkans.

Russia could not afford the victory of the latter and yet Germany's "Drang nach Osten" seemed at times impossible to stop. It was unfolding so rapidly and so cleverly, receiving from Berlin such a tremendous impetus.

Great Britain was also alarmed, and so much so, that she forgot her century old feud with Russia concerning Constantinople and was willing to back Russia's claims even to the extent of establishing an entente with Russia.

Italy gained from these conflicts and simultaneously weakened her ties with the Teutonic powers.

Russia was hailing with joy the alliance of the Balkan people, but her wavering and inconsequential policy could not make use of events and was never really successful. Austria was against such an alliance unless it was put under her full control and hegemony,

which the Slavs neither liked nor wanted. These two powers were constantly at odds in the Balkans and Germany made use of this for her own purposes in order to strengthen her eastward rush.

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CHAPTER VI.

THE BALKANS.

I.

We may approach the Bulgarian problem from two angles. In the first place Bulgaria was looked upon by the world as a child of Russia, though their relations had in them the tinge of those of a foster child. There was much sentimentalism in the idea of Pan-Slavism: the religious element of St. Sophia was often a factor subsequent to the conquest of 1453. It failed because the Slavs did not want to be liberated by the autocracy of Tsardom.

The Black Sea and the Straits, which Bismarck so well named "the keys to Russia's back door," we will examine as the second part of the question. Russia often changed her policy, sometimes for and sometimes against the Turkish possession of the Straits, but her purpose was ever constant and clear—to acquire herself the control over the Straits. As early as September, 1877, Nelidoff, future ambassador to Turkey, stated the two purposes of this policy: free communication for Russia with the Mediterranean Sea, and closing access to enemy ships to enter the Black Sea to attack the southern Russian coast. Never for a moment did Russia lose sight of this, even at the time

of her worst reverses; one can find it in the reigns of Catherine II, Alexander I, and Nicholas I, during the Crimean War, or the Turkish War; Beaconsfield preferred to help the Turks rather than assist Russia, effectively thwarting the Russian claims and policy, but Russia doggedly held on to her diplomatic game.

It was a great national aim, coupled with sentimental mysticism and religious superstitions, but it was invariably handicapped by the very deficient political organization of Tsardom as well as by English jealousies and supported by misrepresentations of narrow-minded nationalists on both sides.

Pan-Slavism as a national movement is very little known abroad and one might add that not so long ago Russians themselves did not quite realize the purport of the movement.

Pan-Slavism can be studied under three different aspects. It has first a strong sentimental side to it. This, however, can easily be disposed of. In the past it was constantly much exaggerated and at times even distorted by nationalistic jingoism.

In the psychological element of Pan-Slavism an important rôle was played, for instance, by historic memories of Russian conquests, when prince Oleg nailed his shield on the gates of Byzantium, or the Russian armies stood victorious at the walls of Constantinople; further, the christian feelings were easily aroused by the Turkish Crescent dominating over the Holy Cross on St. Sophia, as an emblem of vanquished Christianity and a symbol of the victorious Ottoman. The religious element was prominent only at times and always for a short while, as, for example, in 1876-1877,

when a holy war was preached among Russians and Slavs, which resulted finally in the liberation of the Balkan peoples. Among the latter, the desire for protection against the Turks was naturally very strong and forced them to look to Russia for their salvation.

2. And yet we can see at present how much this feeling was exaggerated. The racial element among the Slavs, all belonging to the same historic group of people, played a much more important rôle. Leaving aside the doubtful question of the early origin of the Bulgars, we can definitely state that to all practical purposes they belonged to the Slav family for many centuries. And it is this racial element that creates the strong feelings of unity and of mutual bonds, that are bound to play a most important rôle in the near future. Here we find the really sound foundation for Pan-Slavism.

3. But in order to establish friendship and unity, alliance or federation, something more is necessary. And it was this third element or aspect of Pan-Slavism that constantly was either entirely lacking or badly warping the mutual relations of the Balkan States and Russia, namely, the confidence of the former in the policy and government of the latter.

There always existed a tremendous difference between Russia and the Balkan peoples in size and in potential social force; Russia was many times stronger and larger than all the other Slav nations. The small size of the latter made them naturally very cautious and suspicious, and historical developments prove sufficiently that such feelings were well grounded. The political system of the larger sister-state was quite unsatisfactory and could not arouse confidence

among the Balkan nations; they were afraid of Russia's hegemony. Their dearly won independence was constantly threatened by Russian autocracy, which viewed with an evil eye the constitutional developments in the Balkans, and consequently imperilled local autonomy and self-government. The history of the Russo-Bulgarian relations is the best possible illustration in this case, as the Tsar's government for many years impeded and thwarted all the liberal efforts of the Bulgarian people.

Under such circumstances there is small wonder that the main ideas of Pan-Slavism could not find any real response in the Balkans, and that the other Slav nations shunned the friendship of Russia. Russian friendship or assistance meant to them much more domination than federation.

Among the Balkan peoples the Bulgarians suffered most and longest from Turkish oppression, and stood closest to the Russians, territorially and spiritually; there existed a constant interdependence of culture between Bulgaria and Russia; this was very evident, for example, in the '70's.

There broke out at that time in the Balkans a succession of uprisings and Russia came to the rescue. The war of 1877-1878 was a war of liberation of the Slavs and an epoch when Pan-Slavism was at its best, being a sincere outburst of friendly feelings. Even at the present day this fact is not forgotten by the Balkan peoples, who are sincerely grateful to Russia for their freedom.

Unfortunately, these feelings of friendship never had free play; they constantly encountered political oppo-

sition within Russia and hostile influences without, from other nations, especially England. Thus, one of the main objects of the Berlin Congress of 1878 was to weaken Russia and frustrate her influence in the Balkans.

In Bulgaria use was made of the new prince, Alexander of Battenberg, a nephew of Tsar Alexander II, elected on April 29, 1879. It was the more easy because of the short-comings of the Russian government régime. Instead of an enlightened guidance, Russia sent to Bulgaria some of her most tactless generals, who soon succeeded in alienating most of the Bulgarian statesmen and politicians.

According to the Berlin arrangements, Turkey kept her suzerainty over Bulgaria, but the administration was in the hands of the Russian generals, first Dondoukoff, later Ehrnroot, Soboleff, and Kaulbars. The Bulgarian army had Russian officer-instructors.

Then came the awakening of the Bulgarian nation and a remarkable growth of their liberal aspirations, which displeased the reactionary Tsar. It soon became evident that the rule of the Russians not only was powerless to stop the movement, but on the contrary helped to spread dissatisfaction among the Bulgarian people, who were aspiring to full independence. They could not understand what purpose could exist for upholding any longer their Turkish oppressors. From a humanitarian point of view it was inexplicable. The worst fact to them was that Russia was now against them.

Prince Alexander unhesitatingly took the side of his people and thus aroused the ire of the Tsar, Alexander

III. Friction with Russia appeared very early; the first trouble came on account of the railroad construction plans; the Bulgarian ministry proposed a different project from the one worked out by Russians, but it connected the Bulgarian railroads with the Austrian net, whereas the Russians insisted on building a line much more expensive and connected with the Russian net. The Bulgarians were forced to agree. In 1883 the differences with Russia became very acute when prince Alexander appointed a liberal ministry, with Zankoff at its head. But the act of prince Alexander that aroused the Tsar's strongest anger was the restoration, in 1883, of the Bulgarian constitution, which had been in abeyance since 1881. That really maddened the Tsar, who also looked askance at the annexation of eastern Rumelia (October 21, 1885). Russia was not averse to the annexation, but it was her desire to do it herself instead of Bulgaria. On November 3, 1885, the Tsar struck the name of prince Alexander from the lists of the Russian army. This definite rupture between Bulgaria and Russia found favor both with England and Austria. Austria now set herself to the task of sowing seeds of discord among the Balkan peoples in order to weaken them for future exploitation.

Serbia then stepped into the breach. She was as the grain between millstones for Austria hemmed her in on the north, while Turkey and Greece were on the south. Her natural outlet was eastward and she was therefore strongly opposed to the strengthening of Bulgaria; thus the annexation of Rumelia could in no way lessen that opposition. Austria was assiduously

fomenting this discontent and made use of the Serbian King Milan, of the Obrenovich line, to further her purposes. He was a mere tool of Vienna and was easily persuaded to attack Bulgaria that he might thereby acquire more territory for Serbia; but superiority of numbers proved no help to him; he was badly defeated by the Bulgarians at Slivnitsa. Serbia was the more ready to engage with Bulgaria because she thought that the Bulgarian army had been demoralized by the withdrawal of the Russian instructors. Austria helped because of her treaty with Serbia, June 28, 1881; the treaty was renewed, February 9, 1889, and continued in force up to 1895.

Peace between Serbia and Bulgaria was concluded March 8, 1886. Bulgaria, though victorious, gained no advantages; the occupation of Pirot meant nothing for her, though it worried Serbia. It was on the threshold of Serbia. After that prince Alexander gradually began to lose his popularity. As the Tsar still continued to be opposed to his rule, Alexander could not hold out and Stambouloff had no great difficulty in deposing him on August 21, 1886. The prince attempted to come back to Sophia in September, but the Tsar would not allow it. The new régime lasted about a year—until the Sobranje succeeded in electing a new prince, July 7, 1887. He was Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, whom Russia did not want either.

The stubborn Alexander III did not change his relations with Bulgaria up to the last; he disliked the liberal tendencies of the Bulgarians and hated their constitution. Only after his death in 1894 did the relations of Russia and Bulgaria begin to improve.

Thus ended the first period of Russian-Bulgarian relations, 1878-1894, a time of constant strife and mutual discontent, after the brilliant but short period (1876-1878) of liberation and friendship. The history of those years shows already what a storm center the Balkans were for Europe, how complicated and unsatisfactory was the solution of the Berlin Congress of 1878 and how selfish were the great powers in fomenting and upholding this dissatisfaction.

This epoch left a disagreeable aftermath both for Russia and Bulgaria; true their mutual relations after 1894 kept rapidly improving up to the time of the conclusion of the Russo-Bulgarian convention of 1902, but under that outward friendship, under cover of handsome Pan-Slavic decorations, there constantly existed a vicious undercurrent of distrust, fed by the inconsistency of Russia's policy, undermining the Russian prestige.

In order to appreciate the great difficulties of the situation in the Balkans, one must never forget the constant interference of the other powers, of England especially, who endeavored to keep Russia out of Constantinople, and of Austria, who made great efforts to get control over the Balkan peoples. Only later did the third competitor, Germany, appear on the scenes. It was this coming forth of Germany that caused such a drastic change in the English policy, for it put her suddenly and unexpectedly on the side of Russia.

The years 1896-1910 were the happiest in the history of Russo-Bulgarian relations. This was also the period of redoubled activities of Bulgaria in Macedonia, which proved so very dangerous to her later on.

The seeming stability of the situation was, however, achieved at a high cost to Russia, namely, her understanding with Austria. The cost was high since their interests were so contradictory in the Balkans and Russia did not succeed in upholding her prestige.

This policy of balancing Russia against Austria was the favorite idea of prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria; he always insisted that Bulgaria must lean on both powers simultaneously, that just as soon as she gave preference to one of them she was lost. The idea is not without truth.

No. 1
In 1902 a Russo-Bulgarian convention was concluded against Rumania; its most important clause was a promise on the part of Russia to guarantee Bulgaria her territorial possessions. In 1910-1911 this convention was renewed. On March 8, 1905, came the treaty of commerce and navigation. Further, Russia promised Bulgaria in September, 1907, an outlet to the Aegean Sea. Prince Ferdinand visited St. Petersburg on February 23, 1910, and had a cordial reception; unfortunately even then we cannot find any definite policy on the part of Russia.

Beginning with the year 1911 there started a rapid decline of Russian influence in Bulgaria; especially did the wars of 1912 and 1913 prove how weak was Russia's hold on the Balkan peoples. At that time there was an understanding between Bulgaria and Austria. With the acquiescence of the latter, Bulgarian independence was proclaimed October 5, 1908. At the initiative of Iswolsky, the Turkish debt to Russia, existing from the war 1878, was transferred upon Bulgaria, on condition that the Bulgarians should re-

ceive the management of the Oriental railroad. Bulgaria was to pay Russia in long installments, having the privilege of exploiting this railroad. Turkey recognized Bulgarian independence April 20, 1909, and her example was soon followed by the other Powers.

The war of 1912, as is well known, was the outcome of the alliance of the three Balkan peoples: Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks. The treaty of alliance, 1912, had, added to it, special military conventions. It was planned and carried out without the participation of the great powers, and in most details, even without their knowledge. Russia was informed about the alliance by a special ambassador, Danef, in March, 1912, and in answer the St. Petersburg government hastened to express a wish for moderation on the Bulgarian side.

Russia was very much afraid of this armed conflict. Repeatedly did her minister of foreign affairs, Sazonoff, warn the Bulgarians to be cautious and avoid any aggression. It was not the first time that Russia counselled moderation and warned Bulgaria of evil consequences of aggression. Russia told the Sophia government, through Dr. Danef, that she would not brook the Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. Bulgaria's position was always embarrassing; she could not afford to discard Russian advice, but it was at the same time very hard for her not to protect her brothers and sons, the Bulgarians in Macedonia, suffering from Turkish cruelty and maladministration.

Sazonoff travelled to Paris and London to find some peaceful solution of this trouble. He had conceived a

little earlier a plan to marry one of the Tsar's daughters to the Bulgarian crown prince Boris, but under the conditions existing in 1912 this plan was bound to fail. It was, however, too late, mainly for psychological reasons. Russia's arguments were lost on the Bulgarian people because the latter refused longer to trust Russia's judgment, having set their hearts on finally getting rid of the Turkish oppressors. Russian sympathies were with the Balkan people from beginning to end; she helped them diplomatically, kept Rumania out of the war, supplied them with munitions of war. In doing so, her objects and possible advantages during the conflict of 1912 were: first, the consolidation of Balkan peoples; second, she was afraid that Turkey would defeat the Slavs; third, Russia hoped to maintain the *status quo* of Turkey and had herself designs on Constantinople; and finally, Russia was not prepared for a European conflict, which was evidently threatening.

Much more astonished and surprised by the Balkan alliance were Austria and Germany. Austria was naturally very much alarmed by the Balkan alliance and tried to help Turkey by sending her, through Rumania, heavy artillery for her fortresses. Still, outwardly Austria kept with Russia and even sent a joint note, October 8, 1912, warning the allies not to go to war. This was Sazonoff's last achievement before war broke out.¹ The results of the war of 1912

¹ See, *Hanotaux, G.*, *La guerre des Balkans et l'Europe, 1912-13*; also Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, *Report of the International Commission to inquire into the causes and conduct of the Balkan wars, 1914.*

were that the Turks were beaten to the surprise of all, but especially of Germany. Germany's whole plan seemed torn to pieces.

But unfortunately these very excellent achievements were soon thwarted by the fratricidal war that followed between the Balkan allies themselves in 1913. Russia again tried to mediate; this time quite unsuccessfully, as her policy after the victories of 1912 was opposed to Bulgaria's claims. Russia was at that time most unpopular in Bulgaria. In this atmosphere the proposition that Nicholas II should mediate was quite unacceptable. It was bound to fail. According to article 1 of the treaty of alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia, these governments promised to ask the Tsar to arbitrate in case of differences. On June 8, 1913, the Tsar telegraphed to both Bulgaria and Serbia, counselling them to avoid a quarrel; the telegram was couched in strict terms and contained a special warning to Bulgaria, mentioning the pending danger and the impossibility for Russia of helping her in case of disaster. It was, however, again too late. The feeling in Bulgaria was too strong against Russia and war broke out to the great joy of Germany and Austria and to the undoing of Bulgaria.

On June 16, Ferdinand gave his army orders to attack the Serbs even without the knowledge of his own government and on June 26 Bulgaria, defeated and humiliated, was forced to sign the disgraceful peace of Bucharest.

Russia, however, could not allow Bulgaria to be utterly crushed by Rumania; this would have meant

upsetting the whole balance of the Balkans; a too strong Rumania, with her Teuton leanings, seemed quite undesirable at St. Petersburg. So the Russian representatives had to keep a watchful eye on the transactions at Bucharest and put a damper on the designs of the victors.

In Bulgaria there was no feeling of gratitude towards Russia; on the contrary, I should say that the anti-Russian tendencies strongly dominated. Bulgaria felt deeply her humiliation, not realizing her own faults and the criminal activity of Ferdinand, who started the whole trouble.

It was with such feelings that Bulgaria met the news of the Great War. The Bulgarian government was strongly anti-Russian. At the same time there existed among the Bulgarians intense hatred of the Serbs and an unshakable belief in the strength of unconquerable Germany.

No wonder the Bulgarian statesmen of those days leaned towards Germany and not towards the Allies, though the majority of the Bulgarian people never evinced Teutonic sympathies. In addition one must say that the Entente seemed unable to elaborate any program, sufficiently alluring to the Bulgarians. Their proposals were neither coherent, nor consequential. Russia, knowing the strong anti-Russian tendencies in the government and among some political circles, was wary and over-cautious in her proposals at Sophia. After many waverings the Allies finally proposed to Bulgaria, May 16, 1915, the following program: first, a frontier line, Media-Enos; second, a Serbian Macedonia up to the line Egra-Palanka-Sopo-

Ochrida; third, the exchange of Ravala, which was to go to Bulgaria for new acquisitions for Greece in Asia Minor; further, the Bulgarians were promised allied support in case of transactions with Rumania, in order to give Bulgaria the Dobrudja, and financial help as well.

Unfortunately, all that was much too late. German offers proved more enticing, and what was more important, more certain. The die was cast. Bulgaria made her choice in favor of the Teuton Alliance.

In conclusion, I must mention that at the present day Russia in her plight gets much sincere help from the Bulgarian people; there is a numerous Russian colony in Bulgaria that receives a wonderful hospitality; many Russian professors lecture at the Sophia University, and there seem to grow up strong cultural ties.

II.

I have much less to say about Serbia, except that she too got her freedom at the hands of Russia, as a consequence of a war with Turkey (Treaty of Adrianople 1829). During the first decades after the Berlin Congress, 1878, there was not much in common between Russia and Serbia. It was Bulgaria, not Serbia, that drew most of Russia's attention; the latter was considered only when the main question of a general Pan-Slav movement, concerning all the Slav people, was raised. This was not often the case, because the Pan-Slav movement had after all no great hold on the Russian people; its fame was much exaggerated abroad; then too, that movement was made use of by

Russian reactionary influences, which estranged the liberal and educated men.

This gave Austria the chance to concentrate her attention on Serbia and for some years Russia seemed to consider Serbia the legitimate sphere of Austrian influence. For example, when a Russo-Austrian agreement was reached concerning the Balkans, Austria invariably was given control of Serbian interests. There existed many points of contact between Austria and Serbia, many economic interests, strategic matters, a long frontier, and last, but most important, the Slav element in the Austrian Empire, which was constantly affected by the proximity of Serbia. Many of the Austrian Slavs were eager to follow the example of Serbia and get their independence; they were fretting under the Austrian rule. The Serbians, on their part, were not averse to making use of this feeling of their Slav brothers, against the Austrians.

The Obrenovitch dynasty was absolutely under the control of Vienna, but after the abdication of Milan and the murder of Alexander and his wife Draga, with the new dynasty of the Karageorges, the influence of Russia began to be felt in opposition to Austria. The new king evinced no friendship or gratitude towards Vienna and felt free to act as was best for his people.

The change of dynasty, occurring in 1903, was mainly an outburst of ill-feeling of the people, due to the long misrule of the Obrenovitchi, though the bloody form it took was a great misfortune for Serbia's future. King Peter I was handicapped in his policy from the very beginning for just that reason. His relations to the great powers were necessarily not quite sincere,

due to the manner in which he had gained the throne. He made no effort at all to punish the assassins of Alexander and Draga.

Most of the diplomatic representatives were withdrawn from Belgrade (except those of Russia and Austria-Hungary) and allowed by their governments to return only in 1904. However, by very tactful proceedings king Peter and his government succeeded in reëstablishing the confidence of the powers, but with the difference, that he showed much more independence than the Obrenovitchi ever had. Serbia began to drift away from Austria and the latter's influence was gradually replaced by that of Russia. The internal conditions improved rapidly and this helped the hopes of the Serbian patriots for further achievements.

The test came at the time of count d'Aehrenthal's coup of 1908. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina very naturally affected the Serbians greatly. Serbia was much alarmed by the increase of Austria's strength and by the fate of the Slavs, living in the annexed territories. It was entirely against her interest and policy. We know that Russia also felt very badly about the annexation, which thwarted her Balkan plans. In consequence they became brothers-in-misfortune; Serbia was glad to find a sincere friend in Russia, ready to back her in her indignant protest to Austria. However, German interference forced Russia to withdraw her support.

As Russia herself was not ready for any quarrel and had not yet overcome the consequences of her Japanese defeat, she was even obliged to tell Serbia frankly, that she could not help her and counselled moderation.

Serbia naturally had to withdraw her protests and hide her indignation for a while. She sought the friendship and moral support of another member of the great Slav family, her small but brave neighbor, the principedom of Montenegro.

Soon, however, there came a new provocation from Austria. The Vienna government turned its attention to hunting down those Serbian patriots, who were helping the Slav movement among the Austrian subjects, trying to accuse Serbia of instigating a revolutionary spirit. Thus, several Serbs were arrested in Croatia and Bosnia and court-martialled in Zagreb. On October 5, 1909, thirty of them were sentenced to heavy punishment, notwithstanding the protests of many prominent men. It was then that Professor Masaryk, now President of Czechoslovakia, started a campaign to prove that these men were indicted on false documents, forged by some Austrian officials, a fact which was well known by the Vienna government. Two men played an important rôle in these forgeries; professor Friedjung, a talented historian, but an extreme nationalist, without any moral scruples whatever, and the Austrian minister in Serbia, count Forgatch. The disclosures of Masaryk saved the lives of the poor Serbs, accused by Austria, but certainly could not stop either the further persecutions of Vienna or the nationalistic propaganda of Belgrade. Too many hatreds were now loose and matters were bound to get worse.

In March, 1910, King Peter visited St. Petersburg, received a most cordial reception and established permanent friendly relations with the Russian government. Russia henceforth became the avowed protector

of Serbia. Tragic results ensued four years later, for Russia was now in honor bound to support Serbia in all circumstances.

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III.

The relations between Montenegro and Russia have never had a complicated historical development. From olden days they were based on very close friendship and intimate Court bonds. There was a time, for example, when Alexander III often used to say that prince Nicholas was his only true friend in the whole of Europe. At most of the international conferences, Montenegro was represented by Russians; thus the well known jurist, Th. Martens, used to have the Montenegrin vote at many an international meeting.

On January 1, 1910, Montenegro was proclaimed a kingdom and recognized as such by Russia and the other powers. It was not agreeable to Austria, but she could not help it. Russia on the contrary was very much pleased in getting one more element of support in the Balkans against Austria. Montenegro played an important rôle in two cases: in the Albanian question and during the first Balkan war of 1912. In both cases Russia had in this little kingdom a warm friend. Its strength was certainly small and negligible,

but its moral weight was not unimportant, and gave Russia a chance for interference in support of her own interests in the Balkans. Nicholas of Montenegro knew very well how to make use of this for his own purposes. Two of his daughters were married to two Russian Grand Dukes and at times exerted great influence at the Russian Court. The worst of this was, that one of them helped the so-called "occult" influences, Rasputin among others, to get hold of the Tsar and his wife.

IV.

With Rumania, on the contrary, Russia never had cordial relations. One reason was that subsequent to 1883 (October 30) Rumania had a treaty of alliance with Austria, renewed in 1892 (July 25), the purport of which was directed against Russia. In 1883 a treaty was concluded also with Germany and later in 1888 with Italy. On November 23, 1892, they were changed into one agreement, which was renewed in 1896, 1902, and in 1913. This was mostly the work of Bratianu; his argument was that Rumania had no choice. England and France were cool towards her, while Russia acted quite inimically when she annexed the Rumanian province of Bessarabia.

Great assistance was given at that time to Bratianu by the Rumanian king, Carol, himself a Hohenzollern and a profound admirer of Germany. The people were more or less indifferent, mostly due to their very rudimental social development. The alliance of Rumania with the Teuton powers was a direct menace to Russia

and helped immensely to strengthen Russian fears of the evil influences in the Balkans. A consequence was the conclusion of an alliance between Russia and Bulgaria, in 1902, directed against Rumania and promising Russian support to Bulgaria against Rumania. The latter was economically entirely dependent on Austria, which took all possible advantage from this situation.

Rumania never dared to show any signs of unfriendliness against Russia, but she always could try to attack Bulgaria, which had thus to seek the support of Russia. At times there was open enmity between these two countries, Bulgaria and Rumania. Rumania avenged herself in 1913, when she helped to defeat and humiliate Bulgaria; unfortunately it was the latter country's fault entirely.

V.

The quarrel between Russia and Turkey is a very old one. It dates back centuries, sometimes abating, sometimes wildly flaring up again. Many a war has Russia fought against Turkey and with few exceptions always getting the best of her, but never really succeeding in destroying her ancient enemy.

Russia's aim of conquest of Constantinople, dating back so many centuries, is too well known to need elucidation; it is an historic trend toward the open sea. With great difficulty did Russia reach the coast of the Black Sea at the end of the eighteenth century, and then only to find that her outlet was blocked by Turkey, strongly entrenched on the Bosphorus and

the Dardanelles. It was mostly due to England alone that Russia could never achieve this historic task of hers, to oust the "despicable Turk" from Europe. England was constantly opposed to Russia getting a foothold on the Straits, and thereby she saved Turkey time and again.

The last time this happened was in 1878 after Russia was at the doors of Constantinople and had already signed the victorious armistice of San Stefano. Due to Lord Beaconsfield's energy, the Berlin Congress undid all that Russia accomplished by her victorious armies and left Russia dissatisfied and discouraged.

The commercial importance of Constantinople is also too well known to call for any special mention; most of Russia's southern trade is bound to pass through the Bosphorus. Her wheat and hides, her coal and oil cannot reach the European markets any other way; her manganese and petroleum are inaccessible to other nations if they cannot find an outlet from the Caucasus by the Dardanelles. This was clearly demonstrated during the Turko-Italian war, when the Ottoman government suddenly closed the Straits and bottled up the Russian commerce. The Dardanelles were closed for only a few days to Russian sea trade and yet about one hundred and fifty steamers were held up and the loss to Russian business houses amounted to eight million francs. Communications were soon reëstablished, but it taught Russia a lesson, showing her once more how important a rôle the Bosphorus played in her commercial development.

Toward the end of the century, Germany began to interfere with the Levant commerce. The German im-

ports rose appreciably and began to replace the English and French goods; gradually even Russia began to feel the new competition and with it came political influences. Germany started to build up her friendship with the Turks with great care and perspicacity; she helped to reform the Turkish army, gave the Turks instructors, furnished artillery and ammunition and reorganized her system of defence. At the same time German influence began to be felt at the Porte, in the very heart of the Ottoman government. Turkey seemed to grow much stronger and consequently resented the Russian, English or French ways of interfering in Balkan matters and her own affairs, invariably finding support in German counsels. This naturally caused great anxiety among the statesmen of the European capitals and thwarted all their efforts to force Turkey to reform and accept their plans concerning Macedonia, Asia Minor or Armenia.

Then suddenly came the unexpected break. For some time between 1902 and 1904 the attentive observer could have noticed, that there was developing in Turkey a strong revolutionary discontent. About 1903 a small but very energetic party came to the front; they soon were known to the world as the Young Turks, standing for reform and constitution, but led by German influence. Most of them had German education or training, some were directly under German leadership. They formed the Committee of Union and Progress in 1904 and founded the powerful and influential paper, *The İkdam*. Most prominent among them were Taalat and Enver Bey, both strongly pro-German; their headquarters were among the officers

of the second and third army corps; their propaganda affected mostly Macedonia and Saloniki.

The years 1907-1908 were very anxious ones for the Sultan. He must have felt that his powers were being undermined. Finally the Ottoman government officials lost their heads entirely and were overthrown without much difficulty in July, 1908. This was a great triumph for Germany. She scored a political success of high significance and importance and at the same time disarmed the protests of the other powers, as the *coup* was made in the name of liberalism and freedom. Neither Russia nor England could very well protest against the deposition of the Red Sultan, whom they hated so much themselves. And everything was accomplished exclusively through German help and German inspiration.

The causes of the revolution of July, 1908, are rather complex. It was mostly the constant interference of the European powers in the Macedonian question that hurt the pride of the Turks. They attributed this to the undue weakness of the Sultan. The Young Turk propaganda pointed this out repeatedly, arousing the nationalistic feelings of the Mussulmen. Maybe we have in this respect a part explanation of the strong nationalistic feelings that characterized the Young Turks from the very beginning and proved so very harmful to them later on.

There was, however, an immediate cause, explaining why the revolution broke out just at that moment; I mean the German influence. Germany was much alarmed by the visit king Edward paid to the Tsar at Reval in June of that year; she consequently hastened

to establish her firm rule at Constantinople, as an outlet before it should be too late. For that purpose she deliberately let loose the Turkish revolutionary forces and carried out her eastern plans with great precision.

Germany's position was, however, a delicate one, on account of her relations to Austria, her weak sister. Vienna could not have been much pleased by the revolution, as she did not like to see Constantinople strengthened and Germany had to display great tact in order to lull the Austrian suspicions. The feeling of growing independence of the Young Turks could not be agreeable to Austria in any way; it was just at that time that d'Aehrenthal was carrying out his program of annexation of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a policy which was as much against Turkey, as it was against the Slavs, Serbia and Russia.

Without serious difficulty Berlin convinced both Vienna and Constantinople that moderation was the only possible and profitable policy; this seemed to satisfy both sides. Russia was entirely excluded for the moment by her difficulties with Austria, by the German support of the latter, and her own internal revolutionary troubles. Thus did Germany, by persistent effort, succeed in firmly establishing herself at the Porte.

Russia and England, now for the first time close allies in the Turkish question, recognized the new Ottoman government without hesitation. They were hoping that this new régime would finally bring to Turkey the long expected reforms. They were disillusioned.

sioned, however, by the characteristic traits of the Young Turks, which soon became evident. These Turks proved to be intensely chauvinistic, hating all foreigners, without ever trying to conceal their hatred. With alarm did those two powers witness the increasing strength and influence of Germany at Constantinople; it ruined their own policy and threatened their fondest hopes.

Then came the unexpected surprise with the first war in the Balkans; the sudden and overwhelming defeat of the Turks was a thunderbolt.

There is reason to believe that Germany was so thoroughly convinced of Turkey's strength under the military leadership of German instructors and generals, that she even viewed with pleasure the brewing storm in the Balkans and in no way impeded the alliance of the Balkan nations. Thus to Germany the Turkish defeat meant much more than to any other power; it really spelled the ruin of the whole of her Near East plans. It meant, first, the destruction of her own military prestige; everyone could easily see that it was the German military methods that were defeated by the Balkan allies; her military leadership was now questioned, her instructors seemed at fault and her generals—incapable; second, the victory of the Balkan allies threatened the existence of Turkey; it shook the foundation of the Balkan equilibrium, so painstakingly built up, tearing to pieces the German plans of advance through Turkey into Asia Minor. Even the Bagdad railroad lost its meaning with the defeat of the Porte. No wonder Berlin was furious and felt upset. The whole German policy of aggres-

siveness, of getting "a place in the sun" had to be reconstructed from the very beginning.

For several months Germany was extremely nervous, but to her great joy the Balkan allies did not know how to share the spoils in peace. Presently it became evident that they would quarrel and destroy with their own hands the military achievements of the first war.

The second war, of 1913, was a pleasant sight to Germany, whereas the other powers, and especially Russia, did all they could to prevent it. The St. Petersburg government realized very well both sides of the question, the German political defeat, which came with the Turkish military disaster, and the rising hopes of Germany when the Balkan allies began to bicker and quarrel. The Russian warnings were of no avail, however; after the treaty of Bucharest was signed, Germany had regained her former influence in Constantinople and was once more set on establishing her supremacy in the Levant. During the long and wearying peace negotiations in London, 1912-1913, Russia was effectively backing the Slav nations and earnestly trying to find a way of mutually satisfying the contradictory interests of the Balkan peoples. She was careful and considerate, but perhaps just for that reason her advice had no great influence in the Balkans.

It thus happened that when the Great War broke out, Turkey was once more under the spell of Germany and it took no great effort on the part of the latter to persuade Turkey to join her against the western Allies.

There is no doubt but that the events of 1914, which led to the Great War were in no mean degree hastened

by that nervous desire of Germany to assert her final power in Constantinople while the Young Turks had still a predominant influence there. Germany could not have stood the chance of a second defeat and overthrow of the Young Turks.

Germany was not alone in a nervous state during those two eventful years, 1913-1914. Russia was also getting restless. With great anxiety did she watch the renewals of German intrigues at Constantinople, after the peace of Bucharest; she looked at these developments as a direct threat to herself. Indeed, Germany firmly entrenched on the Bosphorus, meant a national danger to her. Germany would thus be able to control the entire southern export trade of Russia, as well as her relations with all southern powers. Sazonoff consequently tried to persuade the Russian government to take urgent steps to counteract that policy of Germany. The Bolsheviki made known to the world the Russian plan of action, in their publication of secret treaties (Paris, 1919). On March 23, 1914, four months before the Great War broke out, Sazonoff made a special report to the Tsar, after having debated the questions with military and diplomatic representatives. He contemplated the occupation by Russia of the Straits and of using military force if necessary, to coerce the Porte. Nothing came of it, fortunately for Russia, because otherwise she would surely have been accused of having started the general European conflagration, as Germany would never have acquiesced in such action without calling forth an open conflict. But it clearly shows how full of electricity the air was and

how near the storm really was; Russia and Germany both were very intense in their purposes.

When the war did come Turkey almost at once took sides with Germany, perfectly convinced of the invincible strength of the latter. The Russian interests were thus in abeyance and Russia had to wait, patiently conducting negotiations with her Allies to have her desires satisfied in the Near East after the final victory.

The Allies on their part were very reluctant to make any promises or definite arrangements concerning the fate of Turkey. Toward the end of 1915 they agreed, however, to promise Russia Constantinople (some *porto-franco* arrangement seemed best to them) and the control of the Straits. This promise was finally embodied in a special secret treaty, also made public in 1919 by the Bolsheviki.

In 1917 the Russian provisional government met with great difficulties just on this account, and Miliukov, the first foreign minister after the abdication of the Tsar, had to resign, because he defended these same claims of Russia regarding Constantinople.

During the following months Russian interests in Turkey seemed to be entirely forgotten and at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, Russia was conspicuously absent. By a strange irony of fate, however, that treaty itself seems to have gone to pieces and the whole question of Constantinople and the Straits remains still unsettled.

We might add in conclusion a few words as to the future of the Turkish question. From the Russian

point of view the matter can be discussed from three angles:

First, concerning the Turkish rule in Europe. It will stand to the everlasting shame of the Allies that Turkey has been allowed to remain in Europe. The allied nations were promised by their governments, that in case of victory Turkey will be driven into Asia, where she really belongs; and that very definite promise was broken by the treaty of Sèvres. To Russia this is politically a matter of indifference. We can and shall condemn this allied policy morally, but we will always remain passive onlookers at the further developments.

The second angle relates to the question of Constantinople, with its very large and cosmopolitan population, where the Turkish element does not play the preponderant rôle. What is to be done with that city? Even if the Turkish rule will disappear from Europe, there will constantly remain the question of how to deal with the Turks of Constantinople. We can suppose at present that in this last respect the vast majority of Russians will also be more or less indifferent; in former days many Russians would have preferred for sentimental reasons to have the city as their own; so many times did the Russian armies come close to the walls of Constantinople-Byzantium, that Russians could not help expressing the wish to occupy the city. Now, however, this is quite impracticable. In the near future every educated Russian will be needed at home; Russia has her own vast and lasting troubles on hand; she cannot spare a single citizen to govern an outside town. Thus, the only possible solution

would be to establish an international administration of Constantinople, under the League of Nations or otherwise;¹ Russia might be given a chance to participate, in case she wants, on equal terms with the other nations. No single power will be able to do this alone, least of all Greece; some people have suggested Bulgaria, as least objectionable; the trouble is, however, that these small powers will never succeed in enforcing their rule and remain themselves impartial; on the contrary, they will inevitably arouse jealousies and quarrels.

The third and most important phase of the question concerns the Straits. No matter what happens to Constantinople, Russia must be assured of the freedom of the Straits. This is one of the most weighty of her historical claims, for which she was fighting and striving for so many centuries. The question of the Straits, again, has a double meaning, first, the freedom of commerce, viz., that there should not be any possibility on the part of any power to close the Straits against the outflow of raw materials from Russia; and second, that the Straits should not be used in time of war for strategic purposes, in other words, that there should not be possible any military attack on Russia through the Straits, or based upon them; no fortifications can be allowed around the Straits; the latter must not be used by any navy for strategic purposes.

We might hope that the progress of international relations will achieve these two objects: that the Turks

¹ For example, an international Commission with a Governor-General at the head and a *porto-franco* or free port for international commerce.

and especially their rulers will sooner or later leave Europe, and that such international guarantees will be established, that would make Russian commerce safe through the Straits and would prevent the use of them as a point of aggression against Russia.

CHAPTER VII.

GERMANY.

I.

OUR narrative concerning the relations of Russia and Germany starts also, immediately after the Berlin Congress of 1878, with the description of a rather hostile attitude on the part of Russia. She had been counting very much on Germany's support. Their old friendship, the perfect neutrality of Prussia during the Turkish war, the monarchical ideals of the two Courts and not least of all the personal relations of the two Emperors created the Russian hope, that when English hostility became so evident and the British fleet was ready to bombard the Russian troops at their entry into Constantinople, Germany would openly side with Russia and prevent such disastrous occurrences. Bismarck, previously, was often talking of his friendship with Russia; often too, did he say that Germany must keep close friendship with her eastern neighbor to preserve her monarchical ideals. As is well known, he called his rôle at the Congress of 1878, that of an honest broker, and as a matter of fact he did have a splendid chance of holding the balance between Russia and England. The Russian government was cognizant of this fact. And yet the results of the Congress were exceedingly disappointing to Russia and

much of the blame for this diplomatic defeat was put by the Russians upon Germany and her leading statesman, the Iron Chancellor.

Several times the Russian government expected assistance or at least sympathy from Germany, but invariably she found Berlin's attitude very cool. Things went so far that in 1879, Alexander wrote a long letter to the Kaiser complaining of this attitude of the German government and expressing his astonishment at the "systematic refusal of coöperation."

On the whole, Bismarck was not much impressed by Russia's strength; much better than many other European statesmen he realized Russia's weakness, caused, primarily as he thought, by internal dissatisfaction and by the revolutionary movement that her government did not know how to cope with. Consequently he directed all his efforts elsewhere, building up an alliance with Austria. His main object was to make that alliance as strong as he could; the understanding with Russia was supplementary.¹ At that time he looked at Russia as a mere insurance of his eastern front, guarding Germany against any possible understanding between Russia and France, his real enemy. Bismarck never for a moment forgot that France would some day try to avenge her defeat of 1870. But he began to cool considerably as to the possibility of Russia being actively useful to him in his political designs, his plan being that she should play merely a passive rôle.

Alexander III, who came to the throne in 1881 after

¹This was the object Bismarck had in view at the time of his meeting with count Andrassy at Gastein in September, 1879.

the assassination of his father, was very well disposed towards Berlin; his first visit he paid in consequence to the Kaiser. The alliance of the "Three Emperors" was renewed in 1881 and 1884. The second time, in 1884, Bismarck arranged for a personal meeting of the three Emperors, which took place in September, 1884, at Skiernevice; it was a great demonstration of monarchical friendship. But in 1887, when Russia inquired about the next renewal, she was met in Berlin, to her great surprise, rather coldly; the following negotiations lasted longer than usual. In November of that year an important incident took place, which was bound to strain the relations between the two countries, the personal quarrel between Alexander and Bismarck concerning the forged Bulgarian letters. Bismarck never forgot Alexander's words. His demeanor regarding the renewal offended the Tsar very much and only added to his growing feeling of distrust of the Chancellor's policy in general.

The treaty of "reinsurance," as Bismarck called it, between Russia and Germany was finally signed in 1887 in Berlin, but there was no success in reëstablishing friendly relation between the two countries. There remained a certain feeling of distrust and suspicion on both sides.

The treaty of 1887 provided: first, for the *status quo* in the Balkans and for the recognition of the Russian interests there; second, for the *status quo* of the Straits; and third, for the secrecy of this agreement. There was an additional protocol attached to the treaty, promising the assistance of Germany in re-establishing order in Bulgaria; Germany also agreed

to remain "benevolently neutral" in case Russia would have to defend by force of arms her claims concerning the Straits. It was concluded once more for three years.

When the time for its renewal came in 1890 much had changed in the situation in Eastern Europe; the Iron Chancellor was no more in his towering position decreeing the fate of the German Empire. The negotiations with Russia were, however, started in Berlin, but did not progress rapidly, and after several months of half-hearted efforts were first transferred to St. Petersburg and then finally dropped. The treaty of reinsurance thus lapsed. There exists an opinion that the main opposition to the renewal came from the new Chancellor; Caprivi maintained that it was too offensive for Germany's trusted ally and that good relations with Austria created a moral obligation for Germany not to have any secret understanding with Russia. We can seriously doubt the sincerity of that story; Germany never evinced any moral scruples concerning her allies. Both, Russians and Germans, asserted later on that it was due to their initiative that the transactions were broken off, and I think that more or less both were right, as these countries quite evidently rapidly drifted apart, though the reluctance of Russia to the renewal of the agreement of 1887 is well known and can be historically proved. The Russian point of view is very lucidly exposed by *S. Goriainov* in an article, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors." (*Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 1918, vol. 23). The author proves that the Russian statesmen were almost

unanimously of the opinion that the alliance *was not to be renewed*, due to the existing strained relations between Russia and Austria.

It was then that the real rapprochement of Russia and France began, at first unconscious, and so thorough later on; in other words, the policy that Bismarck was always most afraid of.

We must mention in this respect a powerful personal anti-German influence in Russia, namely, the feelings of the Tsar's wife, the empress Marie. She was a patriotic Dane, the daughter of king Christian, whom Bismarck had treated so badly; she never could forget this and was constantly urging Alexander not to be too friendly with the Germans; her personal influence on the Tsar was very strong.

As we have mentioned, Alexander strove to withdraw from west-European politics and concentrated all his attention exclusively on the Balkans. Bismarck in the '80's was taking himself a rather passive attitude towards the Balkan peoples; it was at that time that he made his pointed remark that "The Balkans are not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier"; he much preferred not to interfere and let Austria fight out the quarrel with Russia, playing for him in the Near East the rôle of the monkey taking the chestnuts out of the fire. As to Constantinople, Bismarck did not care in the least what was happening there or whose influence dominated; and he really meant to prove to Russia that he did not care. Thus, for instance, in 1888 he started in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* a whole campaign, publishing a series of articles

expounding the government's program. Gradually, however, he became more truculent towards Russia, egged on by the seeming indifference of the Tsar, and finally burst out with rage, when he delivered his famous aggressive speech in the Reichstag, saying that "Germany feared no one, but God." This was a direct threat against Russia and was thus understood by the latter.

Bismarck was not alone in his unfriendly attitude toward Russia; one might even say that he was more considerate than some other Germans. There existed a very strong group among the German generals, with the Chief of Staff and his Assistant, the Generals Moltke and Waldersee at their head. These men were absolutely convinced that a war with Russia would break out sooner or later and considered, just as in the case concerning France, that a "preventive" war, that would annihilate and break Russia up, was far preferable. Some people, Friedjung for example, still think that it would have been much better for Germany to have struck then at Russia and defeated her once and for ever.

Bismarck's own plans were more political than strategic, possibly because he constantly underrated Russia's military strength. His own idea was to break Russia up, severing all the non-Slav peoples and forming out of them an anti-Russian alliance or else a federation under the guidance of Germany or of her allies. The wonderful part of this is that Bismarck's plan was made use of much later not only by the German government (for instance, at the time of the

conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace), but even by some of Russia's western allies.

Bismarck's aggressiveness reached its height toward 1888, and just then suddenly the old Kaiser died and a period of political confusion followed in Germany. It was evident that the emperor Frederick, who succeeded Wilhelm I, could not live long. Then came the accession of Wilhelm II, who brought with him very kind feelings towards Russia. The Tsar also at the beginning was quite sympathetic towards the young Kaiser. The latter, as is well known, soon began to fret under the bullying Chancellor and eventually got rid of him.

There is a story, dating from those days, the gist of which is, that Bismarck, just prior to his resignation, realized that he had gone too far with Russia and that he was ready to make up with her, but that his dismissal prevented it. This is quite possible. The rapprochement of Russia with France, of which he knew much, was certainly not to his taste. It may be that he began to realize that it was his own policy that had helped to estrange Russia from Germany. It was, however, too late for him to act.

There exists also another legend concerning Bismarck's views of Russia, namely, that all his life he advocated close friendship between Russia and Germany and that it was really Wilhelm II who brought with him the final break between the two countries.¹ This one often hears from contemporary Germans of

¹The main support for that point of view is found in Bismarck's own memoirs and the publications of his friend Busch.

the old school, who admire Bismarck and his days of German greatness. It is only relatively true, however; Bismarck well realized the possible dangers to Germany of an understanding between Russia and France. His plan was always to keep peace with the eastern neighbor and not let Russia make an agreement with France; but that is all. Bismarck did not realize that he was bullying Russia and irritating her by his overbearing ways. He did not see that his friendship with Austria was exceedingly unpleasant to the Tsar. It was this policy that was chiefly the cause of the gradual estrangement of Russia; Russia resented deeply his desire to keep her weak.

The results of Bismarck's policy were quite evident in 1890. Russia was no longer under the influence of Berlin although the Tsar was still supporting strongly the monarchical principle, and disliked the French people.

II.

At his accession to the throne Wilhelm II was very anti-British. He knew too that the Tsar was no friend of England, that Russia had great troubles on hand on account of her disputes with England. Though he showed signs of desiring close friendship with Russia, which met with the hearty sympathy of the Tsar, the Kaiser was, nevertheless, not averse to a quarrel breaking out between England and Russia. Wilhelm shrewdly counted upon such a possibility; it would have been profitable to Germany, as both antagonists could only be weakened by such a war. Russia cer-

tainly was bound to lose much by it and England had but little to gain in any case; the gain would have been to Germany's profit. It was exactly the same idea that prompted the Kaiser to interfere, later on, with the Boer uprising and still later in the Japanese war with Russia, while he was surreptitiously urging the Tsar to oppose the Japanese claims.

At the same time, Wilhelm was doing all he could to make himself agreeable to the Tsar. Alexander III liked him at first and was seemingly inclined to renew his friendship with Berlin, so disappointingly interrupted by the harshness and aggressiveness of Bismarck. However, the previous policy of the German government had by this time become too deeply rooted and Russia was too much involved with France to turn back. The French advances and especially the loans, in which Germany had declined to participate, had firmly bound the Russian government to France.

The first diplomatic steps of the young Kaiser were directed by Bismarck, who during the early months of the new reign was still at the helm of the German ship of State; it is possible that this fact prejudiced Wilhelm a trifle in his relations with Russia. The heritage of the previous reigns also told heavily upon him. Wilhelm did not have his hands free in dealing with the Tsar. Thus for example, he paid Alexander a formal visit immediately following his accession to the throne and then wished to see him once more informally. Bismarck interfered and tried to prevent this second visit, thinking that it would mean too much of a friendship between the two Emperors. The Kaiser was very much displeased with Bismarck's action,

deferred his visit, but finally did go to Russia a second time. The impression of this friendly act was spoiled, however, because meanwhile the Tsar had heard of the interference of the Chancellor.

The real break in the friendly relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, however, came a few months later. It was caused by the greed of East Prussia. The representatives of this province, the so-called Junkers, soon began to dominate more and more over the German government and forced the latter to start a new tariff policy against Russia.

At that time a very strong man was appointed by Alexander as minister of finance, S. J. Witte, and it was due to him that the Russian government at once firmly resisted the German demands for a very unprofitable commercial treaty. The Prussian jingoes wanted to impose prohibitive duties on imports from Russia and in retaliation Witte at once raised the tariff on German goods. Germany was amazed at the action, but was helpless. A tariff war ensued which lasted about three years, 1892-1894, and at first neither side wanted to give in.

This, however, was spoiling all the plans of the German government. Russia seemed to slip away from its grasp. The Franco-Russian rapprochement, on the other hand, became much stronger and soon crystallized into a military agreement. It at once became evident that Wilhelm had failed to establish a strong and firm German influence in St. Petersburg. Witte had thwarted his plans and to save the situation Germany had to give in and sign the commercial treaty of 1894, thereby abandoning her hopes of exploiting

the Russian market by getting cheap and abundant raw materials.

It was a great victory for Russia; unfortunately, the treaty, being signed for the term of ten years, expired in 1904, just when Russia was in the depths of defeat, overwhelmed by Japan, and absolutely helpless. Germany naturally made use of this opportunity to enforce her will, abrogate the treaty of 1894, and replace it by a new one, in which she had all the advantages.¹

The action of Germany in taking this advantage could not be forgotten at St. Petersburg for a long time and the consequences of it were still felt in 1913-1914, during the months preceding the Great War. It also helped to create the belief that no real friendship existed between Germany and Russia, notwithstanding the outward assurances and promises of the Kaiser to stand by the monarchical principle and defend autocracy in all its glory. Under cover of friendship there thus existed a strong undercurrent of mutual suspicions, that saved Russia from any possible close understanding with Germany, which would have meant for Russia economic exploitation and political subjugation for a long period of time.

After the failure to establish direct influence in St. Petersburg Wilhelm did not give up the idea of keeping a close watch on Russia's foreign relations and of trying constantly to exert a personal pressure upon the Tsar. During the reign of Alexander III this was certainly impossible. Alexander was too strong and independent to be swayed by Wilhelm. Again, he

¹The new treaty was signed on July 28, 1904.

was much older and was looked upon by the Kaiser as a personal friend and relative of his grandfather. He could play towards him only the rôle of an obedient grand-nephew. But this changed at the sudden death of Alexander. With Nicholas the situation was exactly reversed; Wilhelm was the stronger and the older, more clever and more experienced in diplomatic intrigue. His government too was nearly always stronger and abler, having little difficulty in overreaching the Russian ministers, with the exception of Witte and one or two others.

Realizing his intellectual and technical superiority, Wilhelm constantly played the rôle of counsellor towards Nicholas, exerting upon him a most pernicious influence. The Tsar knew and felt this influence, but was too weak to overcome it.¹ One important consequence was a strong feeling of dislike for the Kaiser on the part of the Tsar. He never dared show it but it broke out into a violent flame of hatred, when the war began in 1914.

There exist many proofs of how Wilhelm tried to sway Nicholas. For instance in 1895, when the European powers started their policy of grab in China and exerted strong pressure upon Japan to relinquish her gains, Port Arthur included, it was the Kaiser who was backing Russia. It was then that he sent his famous telegram, "greetings from the Admiral of the Atlantic to the Admiral of the Pacific." It was Ger-

¹There is no wonder whatever, knowing the personal relations of Nicholas and Wilhelm, that the former is said to have been constantly very nervous when he met the Kaiser and personally afraid of him. This was witnessed for example by Iswolsky, Russian foreign minister, who had the opportunity of seeing the Emperors together several times.

many who urged Russia to develop her expansion towards the Pacific, where she would have to meet, without any doubt, the Japanese claims and resistance. Further, at the time of the Japanese war, Wilhelm energetically supported Russia, not by arms, but by counsel (which was less expensive and less dangerous), especially in her anti-English attitude. When the Dogger Bank incident happened Wilhelm expressed his sympathies with Russia and informed St. Petersburg that the English were marching into Afghanistan with the purpose of annexing that country. The whole story was simply an invention, made up in order to create trouble between Russia and England. Most characteristic was the demeanor of Germany towards the Hague peace conferences, the initiative of which belongs, as is well known, to the Tsar.

The first peace conference was due to the constantly augmenting armaments; the great powers could no longer bear the increasing expense; some even were desperately looking for relief. Russia's situation was one of the worst, due to her financial difficulties and the strain put upon her by her shortsighted expansion in the Far East. Just when her financial troubles seemed at their worst, the St. Petersburg government heard that Austria had begun to rearm her artillery. The Russian war office at once laid plans for a similar reform of the Russian artillery and this called for an expenditure that she was not able to meet. The clever finance minister, Witte, at once protested. He was afraid of such an appropriation, as it would be a tremendous strain on the newly established gold currency, which might have broken entirely. Then too, it would

necessarily curtail Witte's plans for peaceful penetration of Manchuria and react on Russia's policy in Persia. His violent protests made the other ministers hesitate and look for some other way to meet Austria's move. The initiative of the new proposal belongs to the minister of foreign affairs, count Muraviev. It is not known which one of his subordinates originated it; it was certainly not the count himself, as he was much too ignorant and superficial. However, he presented a report to the Tsar, recommending a call for a peace conference, which would start the idea of a general disarmament program or at least stop the increase of armaments. The other ministers supported the plan with ardor and easily persuaded the Tsar to send out a circular to all the Powers, calling such a conference (August 24, 1898). This action gave the Tsar the reputation of a "Peace-Maker." The plan of such a conference appealed so much to the public opinion of all the nations, that no government dared to oppose it, though we know now that not many sympathized with it. The nations were too tired and exhausted by the constant increase in armaments and were longing for some guarantee against future wars. The Russian proposal was met everywhere with tremendous enthusiasm and the governments had to comply, with the hope, however, of thwarting the plan by sabotage. In this latter respect the palm of success belongs to Germany. She knew how to create friction and practically annulled the intent of the work of the conference.

Still worse was her policy at the second conference, called in 1907; here too Russia had the initiative. The Americans were most eager to have the second

conference called, but President Roosevelt gave way to the desire of the Russian government that the initiative should again come from St. Petersburg. Germany very successfully opposed all the more important resolutions of this conference and really annulled all its work. The Russian government realized this and the Tsar took it as a personal offense, though once more, he had not the courage to tell Berlin what he thought.

III.

It is important to notice that just when Russia was in the midst of her worst troubles during the Russo-Japanese war, Wilhelm chose to enforce upon Nicholas the famous agreement of Björkö (August 24, 1905). This only shows what little regard Germany had for Russian interests. The Kaiser simply wanted to make use of her weakness in order to force her either to break with France or to counteract her alliance with that country. He also made use of the personal weakness of the Tsar in forcing him to sign that treaty and keep it secret even from his own ministers. He was harping at the same time on the anti-English feelings of the Russians and reminding them of Great Britain's attitude during the whole Japanese war. The history of this agreement signed at Björkö is too well known at present to need any further elucidation.

Witte had his first hint about it when returning from Portsmouth. He stopped at Berlin and was invited by the Kaiser to spend a night with him at his hunting lodge at Rominten, East Prussia. But the

whole story he heard only from the minister of foreign affairs, Lamsdorff, on his return to St. Petersburg. He was horrified at what he rightly deemed to be a death blow to the Franco-Russian alliance and at once set to work to nullify its political meaning. Little could be done, however, since the Tsar had signed the agreement and Germany was in no way ready to release him from this obligation. The explanatory notes sent from St. Petersburg could not help him much. The Tsar, as a consequence, found himself in a very false position, for at any moment France might have accused him of duplicity and even betrayal. It increased his secret illfeeling towards Wilhelm, but could not affect the disastrous consequences, which at once made themselves felt. It was in the Balkans that Germany first made use of her new situation, hampering the Russian policy where it concerned Constantinople.

One must say, however, that though Witte, clever as he was, at once perceived the meaning of the ill-fated Björkö treaty, he himself was in no way averse to a three-cornered understanding between Russia, France and Germany. Often had he endeavored to bring about such an agreement of the continental powers, which would have meant the isolation of England and the inclusion of Austria-Hungary as an adjunct only, and which would have brought with it finally the triumph of Germany, because of Russia's inherent weakness. Witte himself was thus only against the *form*, in which the Russian-German agreement was brought about, a form that was bound to create alarm and disappointment in France. He was not averse to the essence of the treaty. His own idea

was to play off Germany against France and then reap advantages out of their competition. His fundamental mistake was, however, that Russia after the Japanese war was no longer the rich bride with the many suitors, but on the contrary she was hopelessly weak and the outside world knew it only too well. The Kaiser was more shrewd in that case than was the Russian statesman and realized very well how much he succeeded in making Russia's position an extremely false one. On the day he declared war against Russia, speaking from the balcony of the Potsdam Palace, he waved the text of the Björkö treaty in his hand, shouting "Er hat mich betrogen, er hat mir gelogen" (meaning that the Tsar promised to be Germany's ally and betrayed her in taking sides with France). The Björkö treaty was such, as a matter of fact, that the Tsar was bound to betray one or the other of his two allies, France or Germany. The Kaiser knew quite well that Russia's choice would necessarily be France, but this only gave him a good chance for calling Nicholas a traitor.

The first consequences of Germany's free hand towards Russia told very soon in Constantinople, where German influence became predominant. The Germans developed a feverish activity in Turkey; their salesmen invaded every Turkish town; their merchant navy began to do flourishing business in the Bosphorus; their political and semi-political societies, like the All-Deutscher Verband, began their work among the Mussulmen. Every day saw the increase of Germany's prestige and influence.

Russia naturally was very much alarmed at this. The worst, however, was still to come, when after the

Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany made her famous threat, standing in "shining armor" beside her ally. This showed how much contempt was felt in Berlin towards Russia and how convinced the German government was of Russia's absolute helplessness and weakness. Yet Wilhelm could not afford to quarrel with Russia. On the contrary, he tried to allay her displeasure and indignation for he was not yet ready for a definite break. He did not feel that he was sufficiently firm in the saddle and had to be careful with his eastern neighbor.

Strange to say, that after all that happened in 1908-1909 the Kaiser tried to make himself once more agreeable to Nicholas.¹ With no great effort he finally succeeded in making the Tsar pay him a visit at Potsdam. It took place on November 4, 1910, and resulted in a new agreement between Russia and Germany, which was signed August 19, 1911. The Russian government agreed to connect its Persian railroad with the Bagdad line (Russia was supposed to build a spur from Teheran), and practically give Germany a free hand in North Persia in regard to German imports there.² From the very first day the European governments heard of the Tsar's visit to Germany, accompanied by his minister of foreign affairs, Sazonoff, they were extremely alarmed. Sazonoff had to issue a quieting communiqué to assure them that no questions of a general nature were dis-

¹ See, the Willy-Nicky correspondence, by telegraph and by letter, ed. by *H. Bernstein*, N. Y., 1918, and *I. Don Levine*, Chicago, 1920.

² North Persia was Russia's sphere of influence according to the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.

cussed and that the meeting had only Turkey and Persia in view. Both London and Paris were dissatisfied with the communiqué; the statesmen there knew better and thoroughly distrusted the Kaiser, fearing at the same time the Tsar's weakness.

In other words, Germany succeeded in consolidating her economic influences in central Asia and acquired the possibility of a new trade route to the Persian Gulf. Russia on her side did not get any profit out of that understanding.

The Potsdam agreement once more proved how little reliable was the Tsar's policy; how easily one could get around him and how inconsistent was Russia's stand concerning Turkey, and Persia, Germany and England. One of Germany's objects was to separate Russia from England and create trouble between them; the other, no less alarming for England, was Germany's desire to enter the Persian market and get an outlet for her trade into the Persian Gulf. It was not Russia's fault that she was drawn into the world conflict, but in no way could she avoid it. The reactionary forces in Russia were never averse to an understanding with Germany and this the Kaiser knew. The Russian reactionaries rightly saw in Germany the only possible strong support of dying autocracy, and in this view they were not mistaken. Fate, civilization and progress were, however, against them and firmly bound Russia to the western Entente, thwarting all the Kaiser's intrigues.

There was one last warning to Germany, showing clearly that all was not right in her plans in the Near East. Namely the unexpected results of the first

Balkan war, when to the amazement of Germany Turkey was so badly defeated by the Balkan allies. For the moment it seemed that Germany was quite disconcerted; everything she had been hoping for seemed to have been lost.

The tide soon changed, however, when the quarrels of the Balkan allies saved Germany's plans. The treaty of Bucharest proved much more advantageous for Germany than Berlin even hoped for the previous year. The most important fact was that Turkey was saved and was quickly recuperating from her defeat of 1912. Germany was ready for any sacrifice to save the Porte from utter breakdown and that she meant to do at any cost. This was the main object of Germany's policy during the London conference of the powers.

But on the other hand there existed a serious drawback for Berlin. Serbia was becoming too strong and was threatening the Balkan hegemony of Austria. Germany's desire was to see a strong Austria and a rehabilitated Turkey, working side by side, imposing their will on the rest of the Balkan nations, neutralizing Russian influences, as far as possible.

In order to counteract the strengthening of Serbia, Germany was bound to stand by Austria in whatever policy the latter country might inaugurate. As Vienna had begun the policy of force, trying to bully Serbia into subservience, Germany was prepared to back her, even if such a policy should involve her in another serious conflict with Russia. The German ultimatum to Russia in 1909 was so successful that she, no doubt, thought she might repeat the experiment with the same immunity and success.

This brings us to the very door of the origin of the Great War. Its causes cannot be well appreciated if that point is not kept in mind, namely the absolute necessity for Germany to keep in close touch with Austria and back her up "*quand même*." The detailed analysis of the days preceding the war, disclosing the immediate actions of the three eastern empires, is at present brilliantly given by the works of Kautsky and professor Fay, but to my mind this is absolutely insufficient for the just appreciation of the entire and complete situation which brought about the war. That it is not sufficient we can judge by the fact that such a seemingly impartial German historian as professor Dehlbrück does not see it.¹

Toward the end of the nineteenth century there was established a seeming equilibrium in European politics, at least the mutual aims and objects of the policies of the different countries were clear. The Near East was one of the centers of trouble for there Russia, Austria and England were in conflict. The first two powers concentrated their attention on the Balkans, while England was looking further, through Constantinople, into Asia. The other center was in the west, where France was slowly but surely consolidating her position as against Germany. In the center was Germany, a tremendously growing power, economically and socially, needing expansion in order to have an outlet for her increasing internal pressure. She deliberately chose two channels for it; North Africa, perhaps a trifle less important, and the Near Eastern route into Asia,

¹ See the lucid article of *Headlam-Morley* in the *Contemporary Review*, March, 1921.

through Constantinople. There she was bound to come into conflict with Russia, at the nearer end of the route, and with England—at the farther end. Germany associated herself with Austria to strengthen the Near Eastern route. It was a heavy weight to carry and proved fatal to her, as professor Fay clearly shows.

The first step towards letting loose the forces of Armageddon was the appointment of General Liman von Sanders to Constantinople, which at once made evident the absolutely incompatible claims of Russia and Germany towards Turkey. Besides, the German action was quite unnecessary. She could have achieved the same ends by much less aggressive means. Even in Vienna there were a few farsighted men who realized the danger; among these count Tisza, the Hungarian premier, was the most prominent.

In the summer months of 1914 it was entirely too late to prevent war from breaking out. Beginning with the preceding summer, when the treaty of Bucharest was signed, the ball was rolling down the hill and its plunge into the abyss could not be avoided.

None of the three eastern empires—all three destined to fall in consequence of the war—was able to stop Armageddon. Austria, because her foolish statesmen had called forth spirits, which they could not in any way control. Her Slavs, as well as the Serbians were bound to fight for independence. Germany because of her own free will she had bound her fate so inseparably with Austria, and finally Russia, because, due to her inconsistent policy in the Near East and

her internal political weakness, was feeling that her stand with the Slavs was threatened, ruining her national prestige.

At the present date a dark cloud hangs over Europe again, and there is, I think, a great danger looming in the background, the danger of the future relations of Russia and Germany. There is a possibility, that Germany will go into Russia, that she will control her and get out of Russia the two things that Germany needs in order to be strong—an endless supply of raw materials and man power. And if that be the case, if Germany could permeate the Russian body politic and control Russia, the question is fairly put, who won the war? There will not be any physical power on earth to curb her then.

I am sometimes asked by Americans: After all, what difference does it make to Russians? If that danger to the outside world exists, as it does, what do the Russians care about it? Isn't it the same for them after all?

The argument follows on the lines of indisputable facts,—first, that Russia economically is down and out. She is ruined; her industries hardly exist; her commerce is killed; she is prostrate. On the other hand, she has tremendous potentialities. She has great natural wealth, lying at the easy reach of anyone ready to exploit her. Further, capital is always allured by such a possibility. The latter is very tempting; it is enticing to go into Russia and get those natural resources and pump them out.

Some people think that gold has no smell attached

to it, that capital is quite indifferent, that it cannot make any difference if it is German or English or American capital that goes into Russia, and that Russia is bound to be economically exploited. That theory stands good with one exception. Economic exploitation seems unavoidable; it seems further inevitable that Russia in the near future will be exploited by foreign capital. She has no capital of her own; she must be exploited by foreign capital. But foreign capital is not the same everywhere. The saying that "gold has no smell" is wrong. It does have unfortunately very specific characteristics; with economic exploitation there come everywhere the political ideals that are unconsciously carried by those who come in for economic purposes. And if in the future there will occur the permeating of the Russian body politic by Germans, there will enter into Russia just those ideas that we were always most afraid of.

Such peaceful German penetration will be carried on, first, by the technical men, engineers of different calling; we might surmise that many of them are all ready to go into Russia at short notice; second, the military men, officers of all ranks, who do not have any employment in Germany on account of the present day demobilization—there always was an overproduction of such men in Germany and most of them can hardly make a living in their own country: they will be only too glad to migrate eastward; and third, the commercial travellers, who will come to Russia to sell German goods; the Russians will be heartily thankful to receive the latter, whatever their quality; they need so much; nearly everything is lacking in

Russia on account of the prolonged civil war and the breakdown of all industries; but with all these men will inevitably come their political ideals, embodying their future aspirations and hopes.

We can presume that at present Germany is sincerely and honestly trying to work off her international obligations, imposed upon her by the victorious allies. But, when Germany will have Russia under her control at her beck and call, wouldn't it be simply human to suppose that the feeling for vengeance will begin to grow among Germans, that they will begin to think that they can get back at the allies? Here lies the great danger. In the future fates of European nations there is no factor on which so much depends and yet so little heed is taken of it.

How can one fight such a danger? Only by understanding, by a common policy among the other nations; and just that does not exist at present.

Those among Americans, who believe in a League of Nations—and I know there are many in this country—do not realize that the lack of success of that idea depends not at all on the faulty construction of this or that project of some sort of structure of a League organization; it does not depend on the personal mistakes of a president or a secretary of state or a wrong government policy. But it does depend on the absence of good understanding among the great powers. And as long as there is no real understanding there exists no means of fighting the oncoming dangers.

That applies both to small and to large questions. For just that reason the allies did not oust the Turks from Europe; because they do not agree they cannot

settle the Russian question. They cannot defend the minorities which are suffering from oppression in the different States. They cannot control the future developments either of Germany or Russia. They cannot finally build up a successful League of Nations.

It is thus quite evident that as long as that understanding does not exist, there will be no peace in Europe, nor in the world.

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CHAPTER VIII.

SWEDEN.

ONE of the most pernicious consequences of German propaganda was the gradual estrangement of Sweden from Russia. The Germans did all they could to bring about a feeling of mutual distrust between Sweden and Russia. The object of such a policy is easily explained. The northwest corner of the Russian Empire, where Peter the Great built his famous "window into Europe," was always a very vulnerable point. It is a back-door into Russia, both strategically and economically, and besides threatens Russia's best sea-trade-route, across the Baltic. The Germans realized this very well, knew the value of such a threat, and that a hostile Sweden could be a very real menace to Russia.

This is in no way a new or modern development; it dates back to the eighteenth century, to the epoch when Peter reached the Baltic and established Russian rule over the southern coast. During a whole century after Peter, the Swedes were hostile to Russia, constantly threatening her northern frontiers. The question was finally solved by Alexander I in 1809, when he annexed Finland after his victory over the Swedes.

For many consecutive years Alexander was secretly but steadily preparing to fight Napoleon; it was a sort of obsession with him. He knew the day was sure to

come when Napoleon's greed would force him to attack Russia. But the Tsar also realized the danger that was threatening him in such a case from the rear. Napoleon could attack Russia not only from the west, by way of Germany, but also simultaneously through Scandinavia, going straight to the capital of Russia, St. Petersburg, which is situated some twenty miles from the Finnish frontier.

Thus, with statesmanlike foresight, preparing for the coming struggle with Napoleon, Alexander endeavored to secure his northern frontier. Sweden, governed at that time by a half-crazy and foolish sovereign, was constantly bickering over all sorts of secondary matters and finally brought about a rupture with Russia. War followed and the Russians defeated the Swedes without much difficulty, drove them out of Finland and concluded a victorious peace, signed at Frederickshamn in September 1809. According to the provisions of this treaty Sweden ceded her province of Finland to Russia, the Finns themselves, with few exceptions, hailing this cession with sincere delight. The mere conquest of Finland, however, was evidently not sufficient for Alexander's purpose; the change of sovereignty over the territory of Finland did not destroy the danger of an invasion by Napoleon's troops.

It was the realization of such a danger which prompted the Tsar to what was probably his greatest political achievement, namely, the granting of a constitution to conquered Finland. His purpose was to foster among the Finnish people feelings of gratitude towards Russia and thus alienate their sympathies from Sweden. In a number of acts, speeches and promises,

Alexander secured constitutional liberty to the Grand Duchy of Finland, thus binding the Finnish people to the Russian Empire, not by mere force of conquest, but by sincere and well deserved friendship and gratitude.

Thus was created an ideal buffer-state on Russia's northern frontier, where the Russians acquired devoted friends, ready to help them in protecting their Baltic possessions from inimical intrusion. The whole situation was changed at a stroke of the pen, when the Russian and Swedish plenipotentiaries signed the Frederickshamn treaty. Russia could not be attacked directly. Napoleon would have first to cross an enemy country, easily protected against foreign invasion by its topographic peculiarities.

Twice in the course of the nineteenth century did Finland successfully play the rôle of such a buffer, protecting and defending Russia's northwestern frontier; once as early as 1811, when the long awaited attack by Napoleon finally took place, as Alexander had anticipated, and the second time, during the Crimean war with England and France, when these allies unsuccessfully attacked the Finnish coast.

But this clever policy of Alexander was only the first step of his general plan. Next came the effort to smooth out the troubles with Sweden, make her forget her historic enmity towards Russia, as well as her recent defeat and loss of the Finnish province.

In that matter too, Alexander adopted an extremely clever course and was, consequently, very successful. The Swedish throne was soon to become vacant, the king having no male descendants. Alexander helped

one of Napoleon's ambitious and unscrupulous marshals, Bernadotte, to be elected, Heir Apparent, later to succeed as king of Sweden. Alexander knew that for the gift of a crown, Bernadotte would abandon his former master, and therefore, urged and helped him in the realization of his ambition.¹

Thus, when Napoleon's attack came, Alexander had in Sweden a good friend and not an enemy, and in addition, a man of great military talent, one of Napoleon's best generals, thoroughly acquainted with Napoleon's strategy and ready to meet him with his own weapons of warfare.

This stroke of Alexander's genius was one of the first serious diplomatic reverses of Napoleon, which opened the way to his final defeat on the frozen plains of Russia.

For a long time the Finns were well satisfied with their national existence; Russia practically never interfered, leaving them alone to develop their political and social institutions, not forcing them to take any part whatever in the burdens of the Russian state, in taxation or recruiting. Finland had her own legislation, her own administration and her own courts of law. The Russian Governor-General seldom interfered in the local administration.

This happy state of affairs lasted up to the end of the nineteenth century, when some Russian nationalists started the most dangerous and shortsighted policy

¹ As a territorial compensation for the loss of Finland, Sweden was promised the annexation of Norway, which led to the Moss Convention of 1814, when, by the efforts of Alexander, Bernadotte and some others, a special form of union between Sweden and Norway was established, which lasted for nearly a century, up to 1905.

of russification, attempting gradually to take away from Finland her constitutional privileges and thus necessarily creating a national conflict of vast political importance.

Germany was not slow in realizing the great possible advantage of such a nationalistic struggle. Her General Staff, always alert and so well informed, had studied the lessons of the Napoleonic and Crimean wars and knew very well how vulnerable this north-western corner of the Russian empire was.

Germany now began to make strenuous efforts to alienate Sweden from Russia. German propaganda made great capital out of the russification of Finland, trying to prove to Sweden how dangerous this was to the Swedes themselves—that it was merely meant by the Russian imperialists as a first step towards threatening Sweden proper and then attacking her and conquering still more Swedish territory. Especially did this propaganda harp on the idea of Russia wanting an ice-free harbor on the northern coast of Scandinavia, for the purpose of getting a firm foot on the Arctic Sea. There was even invented a special story about an apocryphal testament of Peter the Great, who entrusted his successors with the task of securing such a northern harbor for Russia, as a necessary complement to his newly built port, St. Petersburg. Needless to say this was pure fiction, but it had the desired effect on Sweden; the Swedes were greatly alarmed and not without good reason.

One must add that unfortunately some Russian government officials were also much at fault in this case. There lived in Stockholm a Russian colonel, whom the

Swedes caught red-handed, spying on the Swedish military activities. A great noise was made of this incident by the chauvinists of both countries, which necessarily increased the national friction on both sides. But worst of all for the Swedes was the reorganization of the Russian army, undertaken by the minister of war, General Kuropatkin. His plans were first put in action in May 1901. He had in view Germany only and in particular the fact mentioned above of the great advantages of Finland's territory for strategic purposes of attack against Russia—having an army there and threatening at the same time the Russian naval bases. Here again, the events of the Great War amply justified Kuropatkin's anxiety about Russia's northern frontier, but in Sweden, under the influence of German propaganda, all this was taken to mean military preparations for an invasion of Scandinavia and as purely imperialistic designs of the Russian reactionaries. Nothing could convince the Swedes to the contrary, neither the Tsar's personal assurances nor the repeated notes and acts of the Russian government. The Stockholm government, as well as the Swedish nation at large, were absolutely sure that Russia seriously contemplated an aggression against Sweden and Norway and that she was preparing her way to reach the Arctic Ocean by gathering before hand a very strong army in Finland. In order to pave the way for such a conquest, Russia wanted, so most of the Swedes thought, to avoid any impediments from the side of the Finns, by subduing them by force.

Berlin naturally looked at this increasing friction between Russia and Sweden with pleasure and joy; it

was just what Germany wanted. On the one side, she knew that Russia was much too weak for such aggression and that the foolish policy of the russification of Finland would only further increase this weakness, by creating hatred on the part of the Finnish nation, and on the other hand, the Germans were counting on the increase of enmity towards Russia among the Swedish nation in order to bring the latter into an alliance with the Teutonic powers or at least to create there such hostility against Russia that it would end any possible understanding between Sweden and the Entente powers. In these endeavors, in both ways, Germany scored a brilliant success. Though Sweden never dared join Germany openly during the Great War, her government was favoring the Teuton powers by every possible means and was inimical to Russia and her Allies.

There were two short breaks in this feeling of mutual suspicions and hostility between Russia and Sweden; one in 1908, the other in 1912, but both proved very short lived. The first case happened in 1908, when at the instigation of the St. Petersburg cabinet the question of the Baltic Sea was taken up by the neighboring powers. The more liberal and farseeing members of the Russian government were rather alarmed by the absolutely unnecessary irritation of Sweden and tried their best to obliterate the mutual pressure. Among those most anxious for a peaceful solution of this trouble was Russia's foreign minister, A. Iswolsky, who initiated the negotiations concerning the Baltic Sea and finally succeeded in bringing about the signing in St. Petersburg of a convention (1908) by Russia,

Germany, Sweden and Denmark, confirming the *status quo ante* of that sea and its coasts. A visit to Stockholm of the Tsar of Russia followed in the summer of 1909, which tended to persuade the Swedish government of the friendly intentions of Russia, but as I said, for a very short while only. Russia's policy in Finland was too much in contravention of her verbal assurances.

The year 1912 saw the second attempt at reconciliation in the Russo-Swedish relations, when the Swedish king returned the Tsar's visit and came to see him in the Finnish fjords. The Tsar and king Gustav were accompanied by their ministers of foreign affairs, Sazonoff and Ehrensvärd, and long conversations took place concerning the mutual relations of the two countries, as well as the Baltic Sea and the Finnish question. This seemed to satisfy the Swedes for the time being, but again, unfortunately, it did not last. It helped however to create a distinct line of cleavage among the Swedes. The Swedish liberals, then in power, with Staaff as prime minister and Ehrensvärd as minister of foreign affairs, were now convinced of the absence on the part of Russia of any aggressive designs against Sweden or Scandinavia. They quite evidently realized that the army reforms and changes of garrisons were not directed in any way against Sweden and that on the other hand, the Russian policy in Finland was only the result of a handful of criminally shortsighted individuals among the Russian ruling class, who were striving to take from Finland, by any possible means, mostly by coercion, her constitutional autonomy, as it

was too much of a contradiction to their beloved principles of autocracy.

Unfortunately, however, the liberals at that time were not in the majority among the Swedish ruling classes, though they always had the support of the masses. The conservatives and the reactionaries were constantly much stronger among the ruling bureaucracy and military class and they tenaciously held to quite opposite views concerning the "Russian danger." It is difficult to say how much sincerity there was in their anxiety about Russian aggression, but outwardly they certainly made a great show of it and found hearty support in the German propaganda and secret influences.

As usual, the Swedish reactionaries made a great case for themselves and their policy, mostly out of the question of national defence. This matter is always and everywhere the choice subject for conservative and chauvinistic propaganda. The liberals had to withstand repeated and rabid attacks and though they often had a strong majority in the Riksdag (as for instance in 1911, when the liberals disposed of 101 votes, while the Socialists had 63 and the conservatives only 70), nevertheless their position was made insecure by the energetic antagonism of the ruling classes, the Court, the bureaucracy and the military.

During the months preceding the Great War much activity was displayed by the German propagandists in Sweden; the Swedish conservatives lent a willing ear to these intrigues, with the object of getting even with the liberals and to wrest the government power

from them. Quite exceptional methods were employed by them to oust the liberals, who were reluctant to add any new elements of strain to the trouble with Russia. The conservative papers were making a terrific outcry about Russia's treacherous designs. First, the conservatives began a private collection, raising a fund for the building of a warship, as the government declined to make the necessary appropriations; twenty-five million kronas were raised in this way. I think there can hardly be found any other example in the history of the whole modern world, of a man-of-war being built by private subscription. Its military significance was certainly not important to the Russian fleet, which was about ten times stronger than the Swedish naval forces, but its political meaning was enormous, as a demonstration of hostility towards Russia. Second must be mentioned the great peasant-pageant also staged by the conservatives, in order to prove that their views were not only the policy of one or two ruling classes, but that they were backed by the nation. The conservatives induced some thirty-two thousand peasants to form in procession in Stockholm and petition the king to devote more efforts to national defence. There cannot be found many examples of such a case in modern history, where a political party, representing a small minority of the people, succeeded in staging such a demonstration. Gustav, whose sympathies were with the conservatives, graciously received the peasant procession and promised them that the Government would devote its attention to the matters of defence. The liberal ministry had to exert a tremendous pressure on the king in order to lessen the impression made by this

foolish demonstration. Worst of all was the fact that the liberals could not simply resign, for that would have meant playing into the hands of the conservatives, who were eagerly looking for the chance of getting into office. The latter could not succeed by any other means, as the parliament majority was against them.

The Russian conservative and reactionary press naturally answered this demonstration of hostility and many other minor ones that followed, by very vituperative and vicious attacks on Sweden and Finland, and these were hailed in Sweden as the desired "Gefundenes Fressen" and proof of Russian enmity and aggression, whereas the liberal and moderate press of Russia was effectively gagged by the reactionary government and had no chance whatever to counteract all this artificial propaganda. The most curious fact about it is, that Russians never even noticed, until it was too late, the rôle that the German propaganda played in the case. Neither did most of them realize the harm done in the matter by the Russian policy of coercion in Finland.

Finally there happened a very unfortunate Court incident which also greatly helped to intensify the mutual hostility of the two countries. We mean the divorce of the Russian Grand Duchess, Maria Pavlovna, from the Swedish prince. She was married only a short time, but her conduct in Stockholm and at the Swedish Court made an extremely bad impression on the prudish Swedes. After having had great freedom in Russia, the Grand Duchess Maria found the Swedish Court life dull and slow and tried in every way to show her superiority and contempt, hurting the feelings of the Swedes repeatedly. The Russian minister in

Stockholm, Savinsky, was also very much to blame for her most extraordinary conduct. The Tsar tried to shield his unruly cousin and finally sanctioned her divorce, which created a great scandal in Sweden and hurt the Swedish national pride, thereby pouring more oil on the already spreading fire of national hatred.

Thus in the summer of 1914, when the Great War broke out, the Germans had a well and carefully prepared case in Sweden and only the frantic efforts of the Swedish liberals and the thoroughly peace loving tendencies of the Swedish people saved that country from the disasters of taking part in the war.

In western Europe and America many people wondered why Sweden seemed so hostile to the Entente and so friendly to Germany, helping her by thought and act. This was not the case, however; it was purely and simply distrust and even hatred of Russia which actuated the Swedes, but these feelings were confined to the reactionary and conservative elements exclusively. Those feelings were created artificially and cleverly fostered and strengthened by the German propaganda, because Berlin realized better than anyone else the weak point of Russia, her northern defence.

Sweden was saved from the disasters of becoming a belligerent power by two facts, first, because her reactionaries and conservatives were after all only a small minority and were never backed by the mass of the people; and second, on account of the freedom of the press, publicity and public discussion that existed at the time Armageddon first swept over Europe. As long as a liberal ministry kept the power in their hands, backed by a strong parliamentary majority, the con-

servatives could not achieve their avowed aim of dragging Sweden into the war. As long as the liberals were in power they did not allow any secret diplomacy to prevail and thus they saved Sweden from a great national calamity. When the conservatives finally came into power, after the war was already under way, it was too late for them to find any enthusiasm among the masses and even among the staunchest supporters of their own party for any participation in the horrors of warfare.

This is probably one of the best examples of the advantages to be gained by discarding secret diplomacy.

CHAPTER IX.

SOME ITEMS.

A FEW conclusions from the preceding pages might not be amiss. We have seen that in the case of France the relations were growing slowly but steadily better, and finally a friendly alliance with France was established to the great satisfaction of Russia. This really meant that Russia was definitely bound with the west, western culture and western political ideals, and at the same time, it meant a break sooner or later in her relations with Germany, a break that liberal Russia was hailing with enthusiasm on account of the support that autocracy steadily received from Berlin.

In the history of Russia's relations with France unfortunately the French loans played a decisive rôle. One cannot help feeling that France in this respect had a very good means of influencing the Russian government and forcing them to bring about constitutional reforms. This especially was true at the critical moment after the Japanese war when the first rumblings of the revolutionary thunder were heard all over Russia.

This might be also a lesson as to the great dangers of government inter-State loans, of one government supporting another with selfish motives, and not minding the interests of the people at large. One might wish

that in the future governments would not recur to such means.

With England we saw the opposite process developing, of a long established policy of mutual distrust between the two countries, an antagonism that lasted up to 1907, and then suddenly changed only on account of the realization by the English government of the growing German danger. German expansion, in particular in the Balkans and the Near East, became a very real threat to England, so much so that her statesmen preferred to reverse her traditional policy and first approach France and then conclude a friendly entente with Russia.

Here, I think, are hidden the real roots of the Great War. The change that came over England between 1903 and 1908 necessarily reversed the whole European situation.

During the last decades, the far-sighted English statesmanship was badly handicapped by the old methods of procedure of Downing Street. It is difficult to say if it was simply a matter of routine or the deeply rooted psychology of the men in the foreign office that prevented them from employing a more liberal foreign policy. The action of Sir Edward Grey in the question of Persia, as we have seen, might be cited as the best possible example. In other words, the British government realized very well the tremendous dangers that threatened Europe on account of Germany's aggression, and yet they failed to impart their knowledge of the situation to their own people. A direct consequence of that policy was that the English people could not up to the last understand the motives

of the change of policy that had come over Great Britain when she started to work for a rapprochement with Russia. Exactly the same argument applies to the Russian government, only in a much stronger way. The Russian government, deficient as it was, never had the confidence of their people. As a general consequence of that situation we might say that Great Britain also lost a remarkable chance during those years of influencing the Russian government and forcing upon it constitutional concessions.

There might possibly be one excuse for it: namely, that the British statesmen, realizing the imminence of a clash with Germany, considered that it was too late to attempt to support any Russian reforms, that the needs of the moment were so pressing that they could not wait for the necessarily slow development of Russian constitutionalism.

As to Russia's relations with the Far East we saw that the events of the decade preceding the Japanese war were so very artificial and unnatural and brought upon Russia such disastrous consequences only on account of the short-sightedness of the Tsar's surroundings. Russia's interests ought to have been concentrated upon her own development and in the Near East, leaving the Far East to a more hopeful future.

Describing the Austro-Russian relations, I wanted to emphasize their complex and contradictory tendencies as a typical example of European diplomatic entanglements. The interests of both countries centered in the Balkans, and necessarily clashed at the time of the German intrusion.

In the Balkans, we witnessed the struggle between

Slavism and Teutonism, the one inwardly weakened by a deficient government order and mutual suspicion, the other one much too aggressive and impulsive to be able to stop for a moment and consider the rights and interests of its opponents. The Russian policy in the Balkans was from the beginning very inconsistent and unsatisfactory, which can be explained exclusively by the short-comings of the government system of the former Russian Empire.

Pan-Slavism as a national movement, uniting all the Slav peoples into one big family, was bound to fail, as we have seen, for two main reasons, because, first, the smaller nations could not trust the larger one, Russia, as long as the latter had such a deficient government system, and second, because the smaller states were themselves constantly at odds, fighting and bickering over selfish and foolish personal claims and aspirations. In the future, we can hope, that these distracting factors will gradually disappear and the Slav nations will unite in some form of alliance for mutual support and friendship. The smaller nations can only gain by such mutual assistance in the stern modern struggle for existence. It can be accomplished as soon as Russia develops some stable form of government.

As to the relations with Germany, two facts stand out: first, the constant aggression of Bismarck, who tried to satisfy his political ambitions, relying exclusively on Russia's weakness; not wanting any break with Russia and trying to keep outward friendship, he still succeeded in antagonizing the Russian government as well as the people. Later on, William II tried to carry on the same policy, only much less successfully

because of the evident duplicity of his methods. The little success he had was possibly due to the weakness of Nicholas II, who never found moral courage to withstand the apparently friendly counsels of the Kaiser. In other words, the most significant meaning of the Russo-German relations was constantly the upholding and strengthening of the monarchical principle in all its glory and in contravention to the pressing needs of the time.

The consequence of this German policy was that only a very few Russians and only those who belonged to the extreme reactionary camp were advocating an alliance between Russia and Germany. This is possibly the most striking example of the way Russian foreign policy was influenced by the internal political and social conditions. The Russian reactionaries and conservatives constantly advocated a close friendship with Berlin, hoping to find there the much needed support for their own defence of dying autocracy, whereas liberal and progressive Russia looked further west and tried to establish firm connections with the western constitutionalism of France. And it was in this last respect that the Franco-Russian alliance had its greatest historical meaning.

The study of the history of Russia's foreign relations is most instructive in this respect, as it gives such a vivid picture of the developments of modern times and of the interrelations and involved connections of the historical forces, binding all civilized nations into one huge family.

As to the future, one can be sure that Russia's foreign policy will not be complex. She will have to con-

centrate her forces and all her attention, of necessity, on her own internal development and on establishing again lasting social stability. Fortunately in this respect, Russia is absolutely self-sufficient; she possesses vast natural resources, hardly surpassed by any other country; she needs no colonies, she easily can avoid outward aggression, she will never need to fight for "a place in the sun," being well satisfied with what she has, as long as she retains her free connections with the outside world.

In this last respect the most important question will always remain Russia's free access to the warm seas, through the Black Sea and the Baltic. As soon as these outlets will be satisfactorily guaranteed, Russia will not have any trouble in building up friendly relations with the other powers and nations. This serves to explain the importance for Russia of Constantinople, on one side, and of the future relations with Baltic peoples, on the other. It will also remain the key to Russia's intercourse with the Balkan nations in particular and with the world at large, in general.

It was said long ago and, I think, it is realized by most people at the present moment, that without Russia there is no peace in Europe and that the progress of civilization depends very much on the return of the great Slav nation to normal life and international intercourse.

Finally, the history of Russia's foreign relations during the last half century can be used as a poignant example of the evils of the former methods of European diplomacy, which brought so much harm to so many nations.

CHAPTER X.

SECRET DIPLOMACY.

I.

DURING the preceding course of lectures I have often had to point out cases of secret diplomatic transactions and the evils they invariably brought upon Russia and the other powers. The history of the foreign relations of Russia gives convincing evidence of how much harm secret diplomatic intercourse between nations can bring in its train. This, however, is fortunately well realized at the present day by all educated people. Very much scientific material has been accumulated lately on this question; we know quite well that many of the causes of the Great War are due to the methods used by the European foreign offices. I find that perhaps even too much stress is laid upon the study of examples, illustrating these methods and too little attention is paid to the ways and means of eradicating the evil. Thus, not long ago, I heard an interesting valedictory address by the President of the American Association of Political Science, giving his audience a frightful array of facts concerning secret diplomacy. If we go back a century, we can find cases that are truly amazing from our point of view, of kings and potentates playing their private little game of dispos-

ing of the fate of "their" peoples, "their" territory, "their" states. Not much was said, however, by the orator, as to why this evil still persists in our day, when so many efforts are made to make the world safe for democracy.

This is more important for political science especially, as it is intrinsically connected with some of the basic political problems of the modern state. We find that both the fundamental institutions of democracy are closely bound up with it, namely, parliament and public opinion. But with this difference, whereas the latter seems to increase constantly its powers and influence, the former is unmistakably and yet so unjustly losing its popularity.

Take for example the writings of a contemporary school of political science and you will find there most abusive language applied to parliamentary institutions. To these writers everything seems wrong with the modern parliament; some of them even try to build up systems of government without any parliaments. One must acknowledge that the great number of attacks are perfectly justified, the evils painted are real ones, not mere inventions of sensational reformers. Further, such criticism applies not only to the Anglo-Saxon countries, but even in a greater measure to most of the other countries. There is little to choose between the French Chamber and the Italian, to cite only one example.

Yet there seems to be no substitute suggested; all the systems which are constructed without the parliamentary institutions are not really worth mentioning or taking seriously. Then too, it is quite a remarkable

fact that nearly all criticism of parliaments is negative. All reformers are satisfied to point out the evils; hardly one of them, who has studied the origins and causes of these evils, suggests any possible ways to eradicate or avoid them. It is in this latter field alone, that scientific investigation ought really to center.

In the domain that we have just been studying, viz., foreign relations, we can easily notice two very important developments, first, the gradual and steady growth of parliamentary influence as the *best* and *most powerful* channel of control by public opinion, expressing the will of the nation, and second, paralyzing or minimizing this control, an abundant remnant of ancient ideas and institutions dating back to those days, when foreign relations were the private (possibly the most private) business of kings and emperors, their own, personal or dynastic property, so to speak, their dower or gift, their inheritance or their purchase.¹

This applies not only to such unusual personalities as Louis XIV or George III, Frederick the Great or Tsar Peter, but to all the lesser crowned heads as well, and reaches far down into the nineteenth century. In many a German textbook of the middle of that century one can find numerous examples, taken from existing constitutions (no mere *pia desideria* of worshippers of autocracy), of rights and privileges of monarchs

¹The history of extradition probably is the best possible example of the changes brought about in this domain; in former times the extradition of criminals was a personal matter with the monarchs. They cared very little about the criminals themselves and still less did they consider the welfare of the nation. Only gradually did the institution of extradition become a national matter, controlled by international law and public interests.

in matters of foreign relations, when the nation as such counted for little or nothing. This is perhaps the most doleful and certainly the most pernicious inheritance of autocracy, which prevailed in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Only very slowly and at the cost of great efforts did the individual parliaments succeed in gradually establishing their right of participation to a slight degree at least in this important state function. And it might be looked at as one of the great victories of constitutionalism, when the principle of such parliamentary participation was recognized, first by political science and later by constitutional practice. We must qualify this statement, however, by saying that though this principle seems to be accepted everywhere unanimously, the parliamentary practice is still very uncertain and in many ways deficient.

The means by which the parliaments of different countries established their participation in foreign affairs were usually the ones already tried many times, namely, by holding the strings of the purse and thus forcing the governments, kings and ministers to seek the consent of the nation's representatives "in Parliament assembled" for the contracting of international obligations. As soon as the latter necessitated any expenditure, parliaments had to be consulted and this gave the representatives their chance to learn something of and investigate the questions of foreign relations.

In exactly the same way parliaments secured another means of participation, namely, in controlling the recruiting system of a state and thus taking part in the composition of the armed forces of the nation. The

contingent of the army could hence be established only with the consent of parliament.

Finally, two very important questions, taken from the domain of foreign relations, received special attention in this respect and soon became the exclusive function of parliament—all matters concerning the territory of the state and the final ratification of international treaties. The former could no longer be considered as the private property of a monarch, which he could give away as a present to his friend or a dowry to his daughter, slicing off a part "of his people." The most recent examples of such methods are the policy of Napoleon, when he was distributing conquered territory among his relatives and supporters and of the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, which practically did the same thing. The inhabitants of such "distributed" territories counted for little or nothing in those days and it was only towards the middle of the century that those ideas began to die out.¹

As to the second principle, of the participation of parliament in the ratification of international treaties this became recognized by international and constitutional law only towards the middle of the nineteenth century. It developed very gradually. At first, foreign relations were still looked at as the personal privilege of the monarch, but it was considered as advantageous for him to have "his" people consulted, providing greater weight to his agreements and policies. Only much later was this additional participation of parlia-

¹In the United States this is less realized for the very simple reason that Americans never had to deal with autocracy as a form of government and from the start of their national life considered the territory of their States, as their national property.

ments transformed into a *conditio sine qua non* of ratifying international treaties. Monarchs were forced to adopt such a method of ratification of treaties in order to satisfy their people; the latter rightly insisted on it in order to safeguard their interests, as a nation, and finally, the counter-agents, the other contracting nations, required it in order to secure better guarantees of the fulfillment of such treaties.

One must state, however, that the theory of political science was very reluctant to accept and register these changes. Some schools, especially some German ones, tenaciously clung to the old ideas, making every possible effort to save the dying principle of the exclusive powers of the Head of the State. Thus for example, some of the most brilliant German jurists, Laband among others, insisted on the distinction of the force of the act of ratification inside the State and outside, relating to the other contracting powers.¹

II.

If the theory of political science was slow in accepting the new idea, practical life and legislation were still

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less impressed by such a movement. The constitutions of the different European countries began to be influenced very slowly indeed and thus kept up for a long time the old fiction, that foreign relations and diplomacy were the exclusive function or even the privilege of the Head of the State, emperor, king or president, the minister of foreign affairs being his dependent agent, whereas parliament or the parliamentary committees were still looked upon as unpleasant intruders or bothersome meddlers, who had to be constantly pacified by concessions.

Some constitutions, however, were an exception, accepting the principle of necessary coöperation between the executive and legislative branches of government in foreign affairs, granting the parliament a share in the ratification of treaties and by this means opening the door to the influence of public opinion on the diplomatic relations of the respective countries.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the world's constitutions could be classified into three groups. To the one belonged a few constitutions, which still rigidly kept to the old idea, that foreign affairs were the exclusive domain of executive activity, not admitting of any coöperation of legislative authorities.

The second group, numerically also very small, contained the few constitutions which assured the legislative branch full equality or at least ample rights of coöperation in foreign affairs. Finally the third group, composed of the vast majority of constitutions contained only half-hearted attempts at providing some means, usually very limited, of parliamentary coöperation in certain questions, concerning the foreign rela-

tions of a nation. The most frequent cases in this respect were the requirement of parliamentary sanction of financial burdens put upon the country by an international treaty, or of the most vital questions of war and peace.¹ But just in this latter respect we will see how easy it was for the executive to avoid coöperation or even to deceive parliament.

To sum up: the forward movement during the nineteenth century, as often happens, was very slow, whereas some principles seemed to have been finally well established and generally accepted, their practical working was still very much limited and restricted.

But also, as is usual in such cases, it is only the first step that is difficult and once the door is opened, the new ideas develop of their own force and power and conquer new fields. The coöperation of parliaments in certain questions opened the door and gradually public opinion began to increase its influence. One must remember in this respect, that in other domains of political and social life of the modern nations public opinion has only very lately won its permanent influential position. It is not so very long ago that public opinion hardly played any rôle worth mentioning. Thus the achievements in the domain of foreign relations were not so very far behind the rest in development.

The main trouble lay with the parliaments themselves; in other words the first means of influence, which public opinion had adopted (by which, figura-

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Rivier, A., Principes du droit des Gens, II, Paris, 1896.

Textbooks on international law by Ullman, Nippold, Mérignhac.

tively speaking, it had opened the door to wider influence) were deficient. The parliamentary system, toward the end of the century began itself to deteriorate and in many respects did not work satisfactorily. Contemporary literature on the subject of parliamentary deficiencies affords overwhelming testimony. As mentioned above there grew up even a whole school, that is at present questioning the main subject, the necessity of retaining parliaments as a *conditio sine qua non* of the modern state. I do not consider that the attacks on the modern parliament are without any foundation. On the contrary, one must admit that the parliamentary systems do not work well, that they are honeycombed with defects and even with some evils, and urgently call for reform and revision. Again, in the domain of foreign relations this seems to be more evident and conspicuous than anywhere else.

The plenary sessions of parliaments do not work well anywhere. They are usually overcrowded with work, selfishly interested in politics, apt to devote most of their time to bickering with the executive, prating or obstructive, impractical or else too much absorbed in local and petty questions, which restrict their national horizon and in many other ways make them lose touch with the public opinion of their own country, not to mention the wider field of international relations and world politics.

All this necessitated the introduction of remedies, in most cases by substituting committee work for the plenary sessions. Thus it happened that in many countries all over the world, not alone in Europe, the burden of serious work slowly gravitated into the secret

sessions of all sorts of parliamentary committees. The executive authorities too, much preferred dealing with such committees; they are eager everywhere to attain practical results, to push through the legislation that is necessary for their policies, and naturally find it much easier and more agreeable to have to deal with a committee, which usually represents the pick of the most capable parliamentarians, than with a turbulent and unruly plenary session, bent on bitter criticism of the government, and yet unwilling to share the responsibilities.

This tendency to devolve the serious work upon the parliamentary committees has however one grave drawback. The work of the committees is everywhere strictly secret, the committees are nowhere in direct touch with public opinion, neither do they seem to be influenced by the latter to any appreciable degree.¹ In the domain that interests us at the present time this drawback proved most pernicious, as it tended to neutralize the achievements of parliamentary co-operation in foreign affairs. By this means, the executives and foreign offices could keep the influential members of parliament informed of their foreign policies, thereby satisfying their personal ambitions and yet have the transactions as safely secret as ever before. As we have just said, public opinion did not seem to be able to reach behind the closed doors of committee-rooms.

Thus there was created a *circulus vitiosus*: parliaments did not work well in their plenary sessions, com-

¹This does not apply however to the United States Congress, as in most cases the Congressional committees are working publicly, and hardly ever close their doors.

mittees had to be substituted,¹ but the latter excluded publicity, the main merit of the parliamentary system of the nineteenth century. The executive ministers reverted with pleasure to the old system of impenetrable secrecy. The recent enemies of the parliamentary system find no small amount of material for attack just in these facts. They rightly point out the easy way of establishing collusion between the committee members and the government officials, the former being influenced and sometimes even perverted by the methods and ideas of the latter, and usually as a result, the nation is cheated out of its influence or participation in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Thus, new ways have to be found to remedy the situation; it will not do to simply decree the abolition of parliaments. The increase of committee work was unavoidable and in other ways proved beneficial. For instance, it certainly improved the methods of legislation and increased its efficiency. The most vital and necessary remedy would seem to be the introduction of some forms of publicity into committee work and the creation of ways and means of influencing this work by the public opinion of the country. What has been won for parliaments, must now be established for parliamentary committees and their work with the executive ministers.

¹There existed once a very strong movement among specialists in political science advocating the increase and strengthening of parliamentary committee work. Some writers saw salvation from the superficial prating of parliaments only in the creation of special committees of foreign affairs, which would be able to control the executives, but at whose expense? This applies especially to Great Britain.

III.

If we examine closely the domain of foreign relations, we can easily notice that they have a double function. Locke was the first to point this out, when he defined his "federative power"; but at that time it hardly had any practical meaning, all the executive functions being united in the hands of the irresponsible king. Thus it passed unnoticed in the theory of political science and acquired its significance only in the nineteenth century.

One of these two functions consists in acts that create a legal obligation for the state (or nation). All treaties, obligations, understandings and agreements would come under this head. The other function is constituted by the daily intercourse of states (or nations), the transactions which do not create any legal obligation, diplomacy in the technical meaning of the word, conversations between foreign secretaries and diplomatic representatives. The first function invariably binds the state in some way or other, the second one does not affect its legal obligations, but usually prepares the way for the acts of the first group.

It is very hard in some cases to draw the line between the two functions, which is easily explained by their past history. In former days, as we have said, both functions were in the hands of the head of the state and his ministers and only too often a mere word, a promise, the vague utterance of a monarch or his ambassador created a legal obligation for the state. That is why diplomacy in those days was such a dangerous

game and such a wily craft. Transactions were usually couched in such vague terms, that governments could construe them as they chose and all of them were built on purely personal relations and mutual trickery. Much of this has certainly disappeared in the modern state and yet some of the obnoxious consequences still linger on, hampering the smooth sailing of the ship of state, as unseen reefs and rocks under a seemingly safe surface of the ocean of life.

Two great changes have been effected in the modern state concerning these functions, and both tend toward establishing a line of marked distinction between them, enhancing the meaning of the first and diminishing the rôle of the second.

The introduction of compulsory participation in the first function of other institutions, for example parliaments, and not leaving it exclusively to the head of the state; through such participation and also because of greater publicity, the people of a state know much better the details of international relations of the present day. Second, modern international relations have become the business of central governments, the diplomatic agents having lost their former significance. As soon as any international question becomes of some importance, it is taken out of the hands of ambassadors and settled directly by the ministers of foreign affairs. The great facilities of modern communications, the telegraph and the wireless, have made this possible and established direct ties between the respective foreign offices. The personal "talks," conversations and "assurances" of ambassadors have lost much of their former meaning; every word of theirs can be

easily checked up by their governments and is also watched and controlled by public opinion, informed and often advised by the daily press.

Thus the second function tends to become gradually a purely preparatory one; at present it can be looked upon as an established principle, that this function must not create any legal obligation for a state, or at least when such an obligation arises (in very exceptional cases) the *onus probandi* weighs heavily on the state which admits such a possibility.

One of the axiomatic principles of modern political science is the theory that a state can be bound only by its own will; for every legal obligation of a state there must exist the sanction of the sovereign authority of that state. Nothing can be legally imposed from without. This is the meaning, for example, of the peace treaties, signed by the vanquished nations. Germany was forced to sign the Versailles Treaty in order that the victorious Allies could get from her the necessary legal sanction of the conditions of peace, imposed upon the vanquished nation. The Allies could have occupied Berlin, crushed the German nation, if they had so wished, but they could not impose legal obligations on the German state without getting the legal sanction in the form of consent from Germany.

In former days the head of a state was perfectly free to impose whatever obligations he deemed best upon a nation; at present, such sovereign power is vested in other institutions, usually the parliament, as the sole representative of the nation.¹

¹ This is axiomatically accepted by most of the writers on inter-

This axiom gives us the clue to the legal explanation of the participation of the different state institutions in the above mentioned functions. The first creates legal obligations for the state, or binds it in its international relations and the participation of parliament is absolutely necessary, whereas in the second function, though in some cases possibly desirable, is not necessary and can be left in the hands of the government, the diplomatic representatives and foreign offices.

The same distinction of these two functions leads us to a better understanding of the present day antagonism between publicity and secrecy. In former days when that distinction was purely theoretical, and both functions alike were looked upon as a personal right or rather privilege of the head of the state, the whole field of international relations was enshrouded in absolute secrecy. All international transactions were personal and secret and under that fatal cover of secrecy, the methods employed by the transacting heads of states, were only too often based on trickery and dishonesty. At the present time all this has changed and though many of the old elements still influence modern international relations, their improvement is great and quite evident.

As we have seen, with the participation of parliaments came publicity. At least as a principle it became recognized that in the domain of the first function (where legal obligations were being created for a state) publicity ought to prevail and secrecy ought

national law. See, *Nys, E.*, *Droit international*, vol. III; *M. Lie*, *Legitimation des Traktat*. *Heilborn*, *Der Staatsvertrag*, *Archiv für öff. Recht*, Bd. 12, 1897; *Dauzat*, *Le rôle des Chambres en matière de traités internationaux*, Paris, 1899.

to be eradicated. The ideal is not yet attained, many of the old evils still exist, but modern states are on the right path and publicity will some day win its final victory. This is what former President Wilson so brilliantly formulated in his famous phrase, "open covenants, openly arrived at."

In the domain of the other function, secrecy can still persist and probably always will remain the dominant factor and usual method. There is no danger in this case, as long as this function is merely a preparatory one, consisting of introductory negotiations, making ready for future obligations. In fact these preparatory negotiations often gain from being kept secret; publicity usually only harms them in arousing mutual jealousies, competition or strife. And there is no danger, so long as the first principle is firmly established, namely, that as soon as it comes to creating a legal obligation of a state, other organs or institutions than the foreign office must participate and secrecy thereafter must stop.

Unfortunately there exists one difficulty of no mean significance. On account of their historical past these two functions are in many cases not easily distinguished from each other. This tells chiefly in one respect; the second function is in some cases, not merely a preparatory one, as it ought to be, but tends to bind the state legally, or at least its transacting government agents. The foreign offices are very apt to take upon themselves more responsibility than they ought to have and thus give their counter-agents, the governments of other countries, assurances and promises, which become binding upon a state, without having called for

the necessary participation either of parliamentary representatives or of the public opinion of a nation.

One must say that of all the modern branches of government, the foreign offices are most apt to make use of this method of circumventing the constitutional principle of publicity. Other ministries dare it very seldom and when they do, they are in most cases forced to account for it by parliamentary control whereas the foreign offices somehow escape this control.

The explanation is also a historical one. It is closely bound up with the old idea of national honor and dates back to the time when a mere word of a monarch or foreign minister was deemed sufficient to put any obligation upon a nation. That psychological point of view, in contradiction to the described political principles, still exists among many peoples. Some nations still consider that their head of state, foreign minister or ambassador can "bind them in honor" to a certain policy or a certain promise, no matter how secretly given or in what flagrant violation of or contradiction to their national policy or constitutional ideals.

Most often it is done by the method of "fait accompli"; the government agent, the head of state, the foreign minister or ambassador (extremely rarely the latter, however) has long and elaborate negotiations with a like government agent of another country, makes promises, establishes certain lines of policy, accepts certain international obligations and thus spins a whole web of international relations, which tend to create legal obligations. When the plan or policy is ready, the agent bluntly puts it before his nation or

parliament and forces them to accept it, because his acts have "bound in honor" the state, he represents, the fiction being that his counter-agent, the representative of another nation could expect him to have the full authority and right to deal in this way and not to suspect any constitutional requirement of coöperation on the part of some other organ or institution.

Very much mischief has been done by the use of this method and unfortunately, it must be said that not only the reactionary agents of the old régimes made use of it, those men who are always ready to revert to ancient methods, but even most liberal representatives among enlightened statesmen. The two most prominent examples in this respect are President Wilson and Lord Grey, the first using the method of "fait accompli" in his endeavor to force upon the United States Senate the agreements he signed with his European allies, the second making use of the same method during his negotiations with France concerning Belgium prior to the Great War, which forced upon Great Britain (not only England, but the whole British Empire, Canada, Australia and the other Dominions) the participation in a war against Germany.¹

The possible dangers of this method are so great and so very evident that they hardly need any further elucidation.

The history of Russia's foreign relations affords a good lesson in this respect. We can easily establish the following summary of evils brought forth by Russia's secret diplomacy.

1. Secrecy did much harm to the Franco-Rus-

¹ *Loreburn, Earl, How War Came*, London, 1919.

sian alliance because it prevented public opinion in both countries from supporting the Russian constitutional movement; a constitutional Russia would have been an infinitely stronger and better ally and friend to France and no one would realize that better than the French nation itself. Secrecy in the mutual relations of France and Russia made two mistakes on the part of France possible, the loaning of money to the Russian autocracy and worse still the assistance in the persecution of the Russian revolutionaries, radicals and liberals, which France never would have tolerated had she known it in time. The same arguments apply in an identical manner to Russia, with this difference, that public opinion in Russia had far less influence under the Tsar's régime than in republican France.

2. Secrecy is much to blame for the constant friction and enmity which existed between Russia and England. The history of the Persian question is possibly the best example. How much trouble could have been avoided if both countries had had a chance to publicly discuss in full detail the pending Anglo-Persian agreement in 1906-1907!

3. The methods of secret diplomacy were a potent cause of the Russo-Japanese conflict. There would not have been a war between Russia and Japan had the Russian government acted openly and fairly in the decade preceding 1904. Beginning with the aggression against China in 1895-1898, through the occupation of Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula, the refusal to withdraw the troops from Manchuria and finally ending in the criminal enterprise on the Yalu,

where Besobrasoff was exploiting the private concessions of the Romanoff family; all that long list of international abuses, which irritated not only Japan, but even the rest of the civilized world, was possible only because of the secrecy which enshrouded the actions of the Tsar's government.

4. Finally, it was again secret diplomacy which proved to be one of the most dangerous causes of the Great War with Germany. It was the secret urgings of the Kaiser, pushing the Tsar towards a war with Japan, it was Germany's secret efforts to create a quarrel between Russia and England, it was the mischievous treaty of Björkö, which was meant to undermine the Franco-Russian alliance, it was the secret negotiations and promises, given by Nicholas at Potsdam in 1910, and finally, it was the secret intrigues of Russian diplomacy in the Balkans, which slowly but unavoidably created the atmosphere of mutual distrust, competition and suspicion, which led to the general conflagration. Here again one can be absolutely sure, that had publicity of these negotiations existed, had the nations of Europe had the chance of discussing freely their international relations, war could have been avoided. Least of all did the nations at large want a war. Their preference for peace was clearly evident; only certain classes and governments desired a conflict, while some others were criminally indifferent. But the fight against these belligerent classes and governments was possible only in one way, namely, by publicity, by divulging their secret policies and negotiations.

IV.

When the evil is once determined it is much easier to find a remedy for it.

The defence of secrecy in diplomatic negotiations is usually based on one or several of the following arguments.

The most important one consists in the pointing out of the fact that secrecy always insures rapidity of negotiations; the more publicity is given, the more there is discussion of them and the longer time it takes to arrive at any decision. This is very true, but rapidity comes invariably at the expense of public satisfaction and international stability.

Secrecy, it is asserted, lessens competition and sometimes even eliminates competitors entirely to the great advantage of the secretly negotiating powers. This is also quite true, but it also comes at the great expense of international instability and creates all kinds of dangers as we have seen above.

Less frequently does one meet with the argument that secrecy of negotiations abates national enmities and hatreds, not giving free play to such ill feelings. Examples are usually cited in such cases concerning the damage done by the so-called yellow press in different countries.

Further it is asserted, we can still find many prejudices and misconceptions in international relations as elsewhere and the free discussion of such prejudices only helps to magnify them, further distorting the truth. Thus at times of chauvinistic revivals the dis-

cussion of international relations invariably tends to strengthen the ill will of nations towards one another or at least prevents any possible amicable settlement.

Then it is often pointed out that public opinion everywhere is a very unstable factor. It might be easily swung one way or another and each change is apt to upset the equilibrium, sometimes achieved with great effort and by overcoming many difficulties. There is no doubt that secret negotiations, kept from public opinion, are much easier to conduct for statesmen, officials and bureaucrats, and public opinion, fickle as it is, often does upset their best laid plans. One can easily imagine their grief and annoyance at such occurrences.

Finally, the shortcomings of modern parliamentary proceedings are also cited as an argument against publicity and in defence of secrecy. Thus for instance, it is pointed out that the present-day parliamentary eloquence in no way helps diplomacy. The members of parliament only too often want their opinion registered for their own electorates and prate, most inconsiderately, of the diplomatic usages or the needs of the nation. There is, alas, very much truth in such criticism.

However, all these arguments lose their force and miss the point as soon as we confront them with the above mentioned division of functions. When legal obligations are being created for a nation, the latter has a full right to know about them, discuss them at length and take up as much time as is needed, no matter what impediments this may place in the way of diplomatic negotiations. As to enmities and ill-feelings between

nations, publicity and free discussion of international relations is really the only means to fight them. Secrecy only helps to increase prejudices and misconceptions and in no case alleviates these evils. The argument concerning rapidity of negotiations has certainly no meaning whatever in these cases.

It is quite different with the second function, the diplomatic negotiations in the strict meaning of the word. Secrecy in these cases can be and usually is essential to success. As long as publicity of the first function is assured and the responsibility of the government to the people is firmly established, there is no danger whatever in secret diplomatic negotiations, because the latter, in such cases, cannot have any binding force upon the nations and are merely preparatory to the final stage of negotiations, when the legal obligations are really created and established.

Thus we come to the first necessary conclusion: the pressing need of carrying into practice the mentioned division of functions, the introduction of as much publicity as possible into the first case, concerning those international negotiations which create legal obligations between the states and the establishment of actual responsibility of government officials (ministers and diplomats) for their work as international agents. When this is well assured, secrecy can be admitted concerning the diplomatic negotiations in all the preparatory stages, such as "conversations," "talks" and "negotiations."

The second conclusion relates to the need of reforming the foreign offices and the system of diplomatic representation among the nations. It is a well known

fact that in the present day systems of government, the ministers of foreign affairs are invariably the least responsible branch of the administration and least affected by the modern ideas of responsibility and efficiency. Their methods of work are usually quite archaic.¹ They are the very last ones to be reformed, for their methods have hardly changed since the downfall of autocracies. Then too, as life became more complex, the work of the foreign offices also became much more diversified and complicated, the burden of work became much heavier and the tasks to be achieved more delicate and involved. This differentiation of work necessarily lessened the possibilities of control. As time went on the foreign offices in most countries became very independent, running their business on their own responsibility and according to their own methods. Not only was it hard for parliament to keep a watchful eye on them, but even the other branches of government tended to stand off. This is easily noticeable in the cabinet system; other ministers invariably try their best not to interfere with their colleague, who is in charge of the foreign office. They have usually no time and no desire for such interference, leaving the minister of foreign affairs a free hand. Only in exceptional cases, for instance, at the time of discussions concerning the general budget or some important treaty and international policy or finally at the personal request of the foreign secretary or the head of the state does the cabinet take part in the discussion of matters concerning the foreign office.

¹ Some writers even point out that the foreign offices and diplomatic services have developed a language of their own in their mutual intercourse.

We can discern the same tendency in some parliaments, to shun the close control of foreign offices on account of the great technical complications which such a control calls for. And all this augments the dangers of secret diplomacy, lessening the responsibility of the minister of foreign affairs.¹

In other words the whole machinery of diplomacy needs overhauling and calls for urgent reform. This is our second important conclusion.

The diplomatic service, first, needs unification. The complexity of modern international intercourse calls into service many kinds of agents, attachés, consuls and other men. The army and the navy have their own, the commercial departments have theirs, the colonial offices also often maintain agents, sometimes the government railroads, shipping offices and other departments have agents. Most of them try to outdo one another, have their own policy and conduct their own negotiations. This is as a rule very detrimental to the general policy of the state; especially dangerous are the military attachés, who are at times entrusted with purely diplomatic negotiations, preparatory to all sorts of military alliances. Such agents ought to retain their independence only concerning purely technical matters and in all other questions must be absolutely subordinated to the chief diplomatic representative, ambassador or minister, of their country. This is the first necessary reform; the Russian, as well as the German systems were most deficient in this respect, due to

¹ Compare for example: *Morrell, Ph.*, The Control of Foreign Affairs, The Contemporary Review, Nov., 1912, and *Ponsomby, A.*, Democracy and Diplomacy, London, 1915. Both authors take an extreme point of view.

autocracy which always prefers personal influences and commissions.

Second, the reform must reach the diplomatic agents themselves. The professional caste system has certain advantages, but it is very harmful in many other ways. The diplomatic haughtiness, aloofness and secretive methods are proverbial. The best means of eradicating these evils seem to be, the opening of the diplomatic profession to all educated men, selected by competition and abolishing once and for all the class privileges of this service. This is realized in most countries at the present day. The ambassadorial offices must be filled exclusively by men, specially chosen or by means of promotion, as a reward to the man who was the longest in office and not for political pull or for reason of wealth. Such a reform is made easier by the fact that the diplomatic agent has lost in our day his former importance, as the main negotiations are usually conducted directly between the foreign offices; any way the diplomatic agent has always the wire at his disposal and can ask for instructions with the least possible difficulty and get an answer in a few hours, no matter how distant he is from his government.

Third, the reform must concern the central foreign offices themselves; this is the most difficult question. They must be not only modernized but better controlled, as to their general policies. Publicity, again, is one of the best means. Better and more constant relations should exist between the foreign office and the press, so that the nation may better keep in touch with the international relations of its government.

All these reforms are urgently needed in most countries. The details can be elaborated only in connection with the local constitutions. The evils of secret diplomacy and the defects of the systems of diplomatic representation and foreign offices were made evident by the Great War and cannot be passed over lightly. The best and latest example of secret diplomacy were the allied treaties of 1915. I will never forget the consternation of the Russian Provisional Government, when in 1917 the foreign minister, P. Miliukov, communicated to them the contents of these treaties. Most of these enlightened Russian statesmen suspected some such agreements, but not one of them had any idea of the real purport of the arrangements of 1915. One can absolutely affirm that not one of those arrangements would have been possible if the light of publicity had been thrown on them at their inception.

On the other hand we can cite several cases, when modern governments had recourse to publicity in settling their international disputes and in every case only advantages were gained by this means. Concerning Russia for instance, it was the case several times in the Balkan question, relating to Russian aggression in China and finally in the unfortunate Dogger Bank incident, which nearly brought upon Russia a war with England and which was averted only by the fact that the contending powers were willing to arbitrate and that full publicity was given the incident in both countries.

What a powerful weapon publicity and the participation of public opinion are in international relations we can judge by the fact that recently instances occurred,

when a chief of state and a member of a government tried to reach the public of a country above the head of their governments. In former days this was sometimes done, but invariably in an anonymous form. (Bismarck used the *Hamburger Nachrichten* and other governments—their so-called official or semi-official press). As Professor Hyde¹ points out, it was recently done openly in two cases; first, when President Wilson appealed to the Italian people in the Fiume dispute, in April 1919, and second, when Lord Grey tried, in January 1920, to enlist the sympathies of the English nation with the reservations to the treaty of Versailles, drawn up by the United States Senate. Both cases are a good illustration of the above mentioned tendency to enlarge the influence of public opinion in international relations.

Consequently, I believe that we may look forward to a far greater knowledge of foreign relations on the part of the public at large, to an increasing control by public opinion and to a gradual drawing together of all civilized nations and the recognition of certain basic principles of equity and justice which will lead eventually to the achievements of a Court of Justice and a successful League of Nations.

¹ International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 1922.



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
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
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
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